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SUMMARY 
 
Conventional studies of ethnic conflict and violence have offered general explanations 
as to the factors that variously influence the escalation of conflicts into violence. The 
validity of such explanations, by and large, has been confirmed via numerous empirical 
and quantitative research studies. This particular study, however, does not intend to 
figure out which factors are more important in bringing about ethnic conflict and 
violence but rather, is more concerned with interpreting how the various “master 
cleavages” in selected countries affect ethnic groups and inter-ethnic relations in general. 
More specifically, this thesis aims to investigate “the processes” by which Governments 
adopt in managing ethnic relations, specifically, the series of institutional arrangements 
or policy designs, which in turn lead to changes in the balance of ethnic groups’ relative 
status and strength. Given the dynamic characteristic of inter-ethnic relations, especially 
majority-minority relations, invariably, there are bound to be different responses from 
ethnic groups of such state-initiated policy moves. In turn, these could force the 
government to further mediate, if not amend, its policies—with the similar 
corresponding chain reactions from affected ethnic groups, being repeated again and 
again. It is argued in this thesis that such processes, although admittedly dynamic and 
somewhat complicated, can actually be better understood through the “ethnic triangle 
model”, which is adapted from the “strategic triangle” theory in international relations. 
Applying this theoretical paradigm, this dissertation reviews and analyzes the dynamic, 
on-going change consequent to State actions, in the relationships among the principal 
actors in the “triangle”, namely, the State, the Chinese, and the indigenous population, 
in three post-colonial countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.  
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This dissertation adapts an international relations theory, the “strategic triangle” model, 
to interpret the dynamic changes in relations between the state and ethnic groups over 
time. Using this model, it assesses the likelihood of ethnic violence in general and the 
nature of relations between ethnic Chinese and native populations in three Southeast 
Asian countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore—in particular. Specifically, this 
study focuses on the effects of policy and institutional factors on state-majority-minority 
relations, which lead to either ethnic peace or ethnic violence. 
 
Over the last decade, ethnic and nationalist strife across the world has drawn both public 
and academic attention to ethno-cultural violence as a “striking symptom of the ‘new 
world disorder’” (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998: 424). Recognizing that ethnic war or peace 
has profound effects on prospects for democracy and economic growth in many 
countries1, a multitude of explanations has been offered to account for the causes of 
ethnic violence. These include primordial-cultural, socio-economic, and political factors 
that contribute to ethnic mobilization and conflict. Scholars and policy-makers have 
also sought ways of managing ethnic tension and preventing potential violent conflict. 
These include various designs of constitutional and electoral systems, elite level 
negotiation and co-operation, and, as a last resort, interventions by international 
peacekeeping institutions. A review of some of the major research in ethnic-conflict 
studies will be presented in Chapter II. It appears that some are more theory-oriented, 
                                                 
1
  For empirical reports on the effect of ethnic conflict on economic growth, see Alesina, et al. (1999), 
Easterly & Levine (1997), and Rodrik (1999) for some of the examples. For discussions on the 
relationship between ethnic heterogeneity on the one hand, and political participation, social capital, and 
the fate of democracy on the other hand, see Alesina & La Ferrara (2000) and Horowitz (1993). 
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seeking to understand and explain ethnic conflict in general, while others provide either 
statistical data for comparison or detailed information on specific cases or events. 
 
Arguably, there are two major weaknesses in much of the past research on ethnic 
conflict studies. First, most of the research fails to make a distinction between ethnic 
“conflict” and ethnic “violence,” and between different forms of ethnic violence.2 This 
lack of a conceptual distinction raises some pertinent questions: Why do some ethnic 
conflicts escalate while others are controlled? Why are some factors salient in some 
conflicts but not in others? Which kinds of socio-economic and political circumstances 
are more likely to produce some form of ethnic violence? Second, much of the research 
is rather mono-dimensional—or at best dual-dimensional. To be sure, many scholars 
either focus on how state institutions (e.g. the electoral system) and public policies (e.g. 
language education) unilaterally influence particular ethnic groups, or concentrate on 
the mobilization processes and tactics of two parties in conflict—either “state versus the 
opposition” or “group A versus group B.” However, in most multiethnic societies, there 
are almost always more than two parties in competition in different arenas, and they all 
affect and are affected by other parties. How do these multiple actors or groups 
(including the state) interact with others and reach a status of equilibrium? What is the 
role of the state—which represents either the majority group, or the minority group(s), 
or none—within such multi-actor, multi-dimensional competition?  
 
This dissertation proposes to answer the above puzzles by focusing on the dynamics of 
ethnic conflict and violence. The central questions of this study are: Under what 
conditions would ethnic groups behave violently? Which types of violence would these 
                                                 
2
 Some exceptions include Horowitz (2001) and Varshney (2002), which will be discussed in Chapter II. 
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ethnic groups produce? Who are the targets of such ethnic violence? The aims of this 
study are: first, to investigate how and why a state adopts a series of institutional 
arrangements or policy designs to deal with existing inter-ethnic tensions and to prevent 
large-scale violent conflicts; secondly, to examine how these institutions and policies 
construct or reconstruct inter-ethnic relations as well as state-society relations, and thus 
enhance or reduce state capacity to manage ethnic conflict; thirdly, to understand the 
dynamic interactions between the state, the majority, and the minority group(s) via a 
simple but comprehensive model; and fourthly, to assess the links between the types of 
ethnic relations and the types of ethnic violence via this conceptual model. 
 
Most of the key concepts mentioned above—the “state,” the “majority” and “minority” 
groups, “conflict,” and “violence”—will be discussed in greater detail in the next 
chapter. At this juncture, it may be useful to first clarify what is meant by “ethnicity.” 
Scholars define this term and the related notion of “ethnic group” in very different ways. 
In its narrower sense, ethnicity is connected to birth and blood, and ethnic group refers 
to a community of people who share common descent or kinship and possess a 
distinctive culture and language different from others. In its broader sense, however, any 
group based on ascriptive group identities such as color, race, language, religion, culture, 
tribe, nationality, or caste has been called “ethnic” (Horowitz, 1985: 41-54). For 
example, the Sunnis, Shi’as, and Druze in Lebanon, and the Protestants and Catholics in 
Northern Ireland identify themselves along religious lines, while the Tamils in Sri 
Lanka and Quebecois in Canada differentiate themselves from others on the basis of 
language. In Pakistan, the main cleavage seems to be religious sect, while in South 
Africa the main cleavage is race. The difference between Malays, Chinese and Indians 
in Malaysia and Singapore relates to racial, linguistic, religious, as well as cultural 
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dimensions. Since the major concern of this study is not ethnic groups per se, it shall 
employ the concept of “ethnicity” in its broader meaning to include any community of 
people whose collective identities are based on ascriptive criteria, as indicated earlier.  
 
The Argument  
 
In a multiethnic society, competition among ethnic groups is inevitable. Different ethnic 
groups compete for economic and political power in order to gain access to scarce 
resources, determine public policies and development projects, control productive 
inputs (such as raw materials or industrial sites), allocate jobs or slots in educational 
facilities, and so on. But what accounts for the difference between peaceful ethnic 
competition and conflict on the one hand, and various types of ethnic violence on the 
other? The composition and characteristics of ethnic groups, the experiences and the 
intensity of inter-ethnic connections, state institutions and policies, as well as other 
political and economic factors are all influential variables in ethnic violence. For 
example, past research, introduced in Chapter II, will show that countries that are more 
ethnically heterogeneous, less economically developed, or have experienced ethnic 
violence in the past are more prone to violence than countries that are more 
homogeneous and advanced.   
 
Nonetheless, one argument of this dissertation is that state institutions and 
policies—especially those concerning ethnic groups—stand out as the most crucial 
factor when inter-ethnic relations are compared in different time periods within a 
country. Although state institutions and policies should ideally be “difference-blind” and 
neutral, in reality almost all institutional settings and policy decisions, by their nature, 
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are never culturally or ethnically neutral in their effect. Not only are these institutions 
and policies implicitly tilted towards the needs, interests, and identities of the ruling 
group, but at the same time they create a range of relatively higher burdens on and 
barriers to people from other groups competing in the political process, the job market, 
and so on (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000). In short, state institutions and policies have a 
profound influence on ethnic groups—especially those whose language and culture are 
distinct from the ruling group—and the changes of the institutions and policies would 
dramatically challenge the existing “balance” between ethnic groups. This is why ethnic 
groups compete so mercilessly for power, as it is the key to changing the status quo.  
 
What are the mechanisms that connect state institutions and policies, on the one hand, 
and ethnic conflict and violence, on the other? Inspired by the “strategic triangle” theory 
of international relations, this dissertation attempts to construct an “ethnic triangle” 
model to explain how state institutions and policies affect state-society and inter-ethnic 
relations, how an ethnic group responds to the changes of state institutions and policies, 
and how such responses cause chain reactions from other groups and from the state.3 
Through the ethnic triangle, one may identify two major mechanisms that link 
institutional factors to ethnic conflict. First, by generally satisfying the demands and 
interests of both the majority and minority ethnic groups, institutions make state-society 
relations peaceful—or at least controllable by the state. Otherwise, ethnic groups may 
riot against the state when they are not satisfied with the existing institutions and 
policies. Second, by promoting contacts and communications between members of 
different groups, institutions make inter-ethnic peace possible. By contrast, horizontal 
violence between ethnic groups may happen when such institutional channels are 
                                                 
3
 A detailed discussion is included in Chapter II. 
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unavailable. In all, different relations between the state and ethnic groups along with 
different inter-ethnic relations form different types of triangular equilibria; and different 
triangles either make ethnic peace possible or provide opportunities for various forms of 
ethnic violence.  
 
Applying the ethnic triangle model to ethnic conflicts in Southeast Asia, especially the 
cases of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, this study examines the effects of policy 
and institutional factors on changes in state-majority-minority relations in these 
countries since their independence. Admittedly, the diversity of the three countries 
raises concerns about the justification of a cross-country comparison. Indeed, the three 
countries differ in their levels of development, systems of governance, and the degree of 
ethnic heterogeneity. With respect to the level of development, Indonesia is ranked 142th 
out of 210 economies by the World Bank (2008), with a gross national income (GNI) 
per capita of US$2,010, which places it in the lower-middle-income category, while 
Malaysia is in the upper-middle-income category with a rank of 85 and a GNI per capita 
of US$6,970. Singapore is in the high-income category with a rank of 33 and a GNI per 
capita of US$34,760. With respect to the systems of governance, Indonesia is a unitary 
state with a mixed (semi-presidential) system; Malaysia is a federal state with a 
parliamentary system; and Singapore is a unitary city-state with a parliamentary system. 
As to the degree of ethnic heterogeneity, Indonesia contains some 300 distinct 
ethno-linguistic groups, with less than five percent of the population being of Chinese 
ancestry. In Malaysia, Malays and the indigenous people make up 61 percent of the 
population, while Chinese make up 24 percent and Indians seven percent of the total. In 
Singapore, Chinese are numerically dominant, making up 74 percent of the population, 
while Malays make up 14 percent and Indians 9 percent of the total.  
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However, despite these differences, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore share many 
points in common, especially with regard to inter-ethnic relations between the Chinese 
and native groups that justify comparison. Historically, the Chinese population migrated 
to cities in these countries long before the colonial period and they were, and still are, 
economically dominant. Inter-ethnic relations were relatively separated and nervous, 
first due to the colonialists’ “divide-and-rule” policies and then due to the intense 
competition during and after independence. All three countries experienced inter-ethnic 
riots between Chinese and Malays or native Indonesians. In fact, it was mainly due to 
Chinese-Malay conflicts that Singapore, once part of Malaysia from 1963 to 1965, was 
forced to be separated from Malaysia in 1965. Because the level of ethnic tension was 
intense in the three countries, it is understandable that the governments implemented 
many policies pertaining to ethnic groups and were in many ways involved in 
inter-ethnic competition. Nonetheless, their motivations, approaches, policy goals and 
contents, and ultimate successes in dealing with ethnic conflict varied greatly—even in 
each country, the policy orientations and challenges would not be the same during 
different time periods. Thus, a comparative analysis that addresses both changes in 
state-majority-minority relations within each country and the differences among the 
three countries would be academically interesting and valuable.  
 
The contributions of this study are twofold. First, on the theoretical level, this study may 
be one of the few that attempts applying and adapting an international relations theory 
to domestic politics and/or ethnic conflict studies.4 Moreover, the proposed “ethnic 
triangle” model is a dynamic model that not only shows the existing equilibrium of the 
relations among the state, the majority and minority groups, but also allows paradigm 
                                                 
4
 Posen (1993) and Rose (2000) both tried to apply the concept of “the Security Dilemma” in 
international relations to the studies of ethnic conflict. However, their applications are more restricted to 
the cases of separatist and semi-states’ wars. 
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shifts from one situation to another when the equilibrium breaks down. Second, on the 
empirical level, the “ethnic triangle” model provides a better comprehension of the 
“context” of ethnic conflict. For countries that are under threats of multiple types of 
ethnic violence, the governments must dynamically grasp such complicated ethnic 
relations and assess possible outcomes; then they may make correct and efficient 
measures to prevent ethnic violence. In this sense, the relevance of this ethnic triangle 
model is not merely restricted to the study of Chinese experiences in these three 
countries; it can also be expanded to studies of other types or cases of ethnic conflict 
after some necessary revision. 
 
Research Method and Data Source 
 
This study argues that state institutions and policies affect “state-majority-minority” 
interactions, and that changes in this triangular relationship lead to either ethnic peace 
or several types of violence, and consequently, cause changes in policies and 
institutional settings on the next stage. In other words, this study takes the new 
institutionalist viewpoint as it (1) discusses the impact of public policies on inter-ethnic 
relations at both the elite and the mass levels rather than merely focusing on formal and 
legal institutions of the state that regulate the behavior of major political actors; and (2) 
describes and explains all the above processes as “path dependent”—that “what 
happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of 
events occurring at a later point in time,” and that once actors have ventured far down a 
particular path, the costs of switching to another alternative “increase markedly over 
time” (Pierson, 2000: 252).5  
                                                 
5
 For more detailed introduction of institutionalism and new institutionalism, see Hall & Taylor (1996), 
Pierson (2000), Pierson & Skocpol (2002), and Thelen (1999). 
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To explain how and why ethnic conflicts occur and are controlled, this study applies a 
“nested” research design that employs both cross-national and time-series statistical 
analysis and case studies of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.6 The level of analysis 
is thus twofold. 
 
Cross-National and Time-Series Analysis 
Although a large-N cross-national analysis is not the main concern of this study, 
Chapter III presents statistical data on 78 cases from 48 countries during the period of 
1990-2000. After running the random-effects generalized least square regression 
(random-effects GLS), the results confirm the significant effects of several influencing 
variables on ethnic conflict and violence in the world as well as in Asia. The purpose of 
this part of the research is to provide a more valid, reliable, and powerful causal 
explanation than could be achieved with case studies alone. As shall be clarified in 
Chapter II, the dependent variables of horizontal inter-ethnic riots and vertical 
anti-government violence are treated separately. The data is from the Minorities at Risk 
(MAR) Dataset generated by the University of Maryland, which has been popularly 
used in ethnic-conflict studies in recent years. Appendix A contains the protocol used 
for data classification. 
 
The Country-Level Case Studies 
Since state policies and institutions play important roles in ethnic relations and conflict, 
the qualitative analysis of state institutions and policies during different time periods 
and in different countries will be the main part of this study. Detailed case studies of 
each of the three countries was undertaken in order to examine real causal mechanisms 
                                                 
6
 “Nested analysis” as a mixed-method strategy is quite popular in recent comparative research (e.g. 
Howard & Roessler, 2006). For an engaging discussion of the usefulness of nested analysis and the 
potential synergy between large-N/quantitative and small-N/qualitative analysis, see Lieberman (2005).  
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responsible for inter-ethnic peace or violence. Chapters IV through VI will investigate 
the relationship between the state, native populations, and the Chinese in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Singapore, respectively. In each country in its post-independence era, 
three specific moments or events will be selected as the keys of paradigm shifts—i.e. 
the changes of policy orientations and triangular relations—from one to another. 
Regarding the data sources of the three cases, in addition to government documents and 
academic studies, there is also information from fieldwork and interviews in the three 
countries. The main purpose of the fieldwork is to get an insight into the tensions 
between Chinese and Malays/Indonesians through contacts and interviews with local 
people. For reasons of manageability, the fieldwork and interviews were conducted in 
only three cities: Jakarta, Indonesia; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; and Singapore. The 
interviewees include actors in ethnic-based associations, local scholars who study 
ethnic-related issues, journalists, and ordinary people from both the Chinese and the 
Malay/Indonesian ethnic groups.  
 
Nonetheless, instead of descriptively presenting interview reports and the history of 
policy changes in three countries, this study is much more interested in systematically 
explaining such reports and changes through some formal modeling—i.e. through the 
ethnic triangle model. The latter part is the ultimate concern of this dissertation, which 
deserves repeated emphases. 
 
To sum up, the following types of research materials were used in this study: (1) 
selective statistical data on ethnic violence from the MAR Dataset; (2) government 
archives and documents on constitutions, legal regulations and other ethnic-related 
public policies; (3) statistical and survey data and academic research for historical and 
  11 
contemporary issues from other scholars and research institutes; (4) informal interviews 
with selected persons in three key cities; (5) information on the nature and number of 
inter-/trans-ethnic associations, organizations, and interest groups from websites, 
newspapers, and NGO reports; (6) selective reading of newspapers and the academic 
journals of these countries for background understanding of the important events/acts of 
violence. A “context” data collection on ethnic conflict and violence in the three 




This chapter discusses the research questions, basic arguments, methodology, data 
resources, the objectives, and the rationale of selecting the case studies. Chapter II first 
summarizes the various theoretical explanations of ethnic conflict in multiethnic 
societies and points out the gaps or weaknesses of the existing literature. This is 
followed by the introduction of an alternative approach, the “ethnic triangle” model, as 
the conceptual framework of this dissertation in studying state-majority-minority 
relations. In addition, Chapter II clarifies the main variables discussed in this study. 
Chapter III provides the large-N statistical data to show the causal links between various 
influencing variables and ethnic violence. While the database contains examples from 
across the globe, only selective cases from Southeast Asian countries are examined in 
more detail. Chapters IV through VI review the changes in the state-majority-minority 
relations in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, respectively, and interpret the processes 
in which the aforementioned variables influence the interactions among the state, the 
ethnic majority, and the minority during different time periods. After looking at three 
case studies, Chapter VII examines how far these three cases support the propositions of 
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the ethnic triangle theory, then points out some important differences and similarities 
among the three cases, and finally concludes the discussion with some suggestions for 
further studies on ethnic conflict and violence. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORIES OF ETHNIC CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE 
 
This chapter reviews the existing literature on ethnic conflict and ethnic violence, and 
points out some major drawbacks. It then introduces a new analytical framework, “the 
ethnic triangle,” that will be applied to interpret the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations 
and the mechanism responsible for ethnic violence. This will be done by adopting a 
longitudinal as well as a cross-national comparison in the chapters that ensue.  
 
Literature Review and Alternative Framework 
 
Two broad traditions can be identified in the studies of ethnic conflict and violence. In 
the first tradition, scholars examine the “preconditions”—the origins or the causes—of 
ethnic conflict. Scholars following this tradition ask why and under what conditions 
people would be mobilized into collective action, and sometimes behave violently to 
collide with other groups of people or to fight against the state. Four schools of thought 
concerning the causes of violent conflicts are discussed later: primordialism, 
instrumentalism, constructivism, and institutionalism. In the second tradition, scholars 
are more interested in the dynamics, the processes, and the durability of ethnic violence. 
Here, scholars do not merely question what triggers violence or what makes conflicts 
deadly, rather they question how states manage such situations and interact with groups 
in conflict, and what strategies the conflicting groups apply to persist in their actions. 
Along with state factors, some also investigate international factors that contribute to, or 
restrict, ethnic violence.  
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The Causes of Ethnic Conflict 
When searching for the origins of ethnic conflict, scholars of the primordialist school 
believe that ethnic conflicts today can be traced back to the longstanding animosity 
between groups, and that animosities are based on inherent differences of kinship, race, 
religion, or culture. To be sure, the sense of belonging to a group and the prejudice of 
“others” give rise to misunderstanding, distrust, and even hatred. Such “ancient hatreds” 
may not be rational, but are indeed powerful in triggering violence—such as the 
violence between Hindus and Muslims, Serbs and Croats, Arabs and Jews, and Hutus 
and Tutsis.7  
 
The primordialists sensitize us to the intimate links between ethnicity, culture, and 
religion, on the one hand, and conflict and violence, on the other. They also pay 
attention to the passionate and self-sacrificial characteristics of ethno-religious violence. 
However, as Varshney (2002) points out, primordialists fail to explain why, if 
animosities are so deep and so rooted in cultural differences, tensions and violence 
between groups tend to take place at different times. Nor can they explain why, on 
average, cooperative and peaceful relations between ethnic groups are much more 
common than large-scale violence (Fearon & Laitin, 1996). In short, primordial 
difference alone is not sufficient in explaining ethnic violence. 
 
Unlike primordialists who take ethno-cultural identity and distinction as a given, 
scholars of the instrumentalist school treat ethnic consciousness and affiliation as an 
artificial creation—which is created or, at least “chosen”, by the elites as a basis for 
                                                 
7
 The role of cultural traditions, historical legacies, and other “primordial” factors are salient in many 
academic works. See Connor (1994), Geertz (1963), Huntington (1996), Kaplan (1993), and Smith (1971; 
c1988; 1991; 1998) for some of the examples. Specifically, Fox (2000) points out that among all cultural 
factors, religion has a distinct and separate influence on ethnic conflict. For a critique of the primordialist/ 
culturalist approach, see Kurth (2001). 
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collective action. Therefore, instrumentalists focus on how political entrepreneurs 
strategically manipulate ethno-cultural factors and mobilize the masses to riot for the 
sake of political power or economic interest—such as access to lootable resources like 
diamonds (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000). Many empirical studies show the crucial role 
elites play in ethnic conflict. As Byman points out, even when the political and social 
circumstances might foster violence “a security dilemma may not occur if leaders see it 
in their interest to avoid, rather than to encourage, violence” (Byman, 2002: 17). 
Unfortunately, however, in most cases, when mass sentiment is aroused, unscrupulous 
political and cultural elites are more than happy to play the ethnic card to attract 
supporters and manipulate the masses to riot for their self-interest, thereby expanding 
the violence (Laitin, 1998; Walter, 1999). 
 
While the instrumentalist argument has both an intuitive and empirical appeal, it leaves 
many questions unanswered. For example, why do elites begin by choosing “ethnicity” 
to polarize the groups, but not other social factors such as class or occupation? Why 
should the masses respond to elites exactly the way the elites wish? Given that the costs 
of participation in violence are extremely high, there must be a certain level of emotion, 
commitment, and desperation of the masses. Such factors, however, are ignored by the 
instrumentalists (Horowitz, 1985; Nodia, 2000).  
 
Similar to the instrumentalists, constructivists also treat ethnic consciousness and 
affiliation as being created rather than determined by birth. Yet unlike instrumentalists 
who overemphasize the role of individuals (elites) on the identity creation process, 
constructivists argue that ethno-national identities are contingent, created or constituted 
by a specific macro-political or economic development—such as modernization 
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(Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1983), print-capitalism (Anderson, 1983), or colonialism 
(Prakash, c1995). Thus, scholars of the constructivist school focus more on explaining 
why, in a given historical process, some ethno-cultural cleavages acquire political and 
emotional salience and become “master cleavages”, and in some cases arouse frequent 
bitterness or cause terrible violence. For example, most people in Southeast Asia did not 
have a clear sense of “ethnic” or “racial” differences until the colonialists’ 
“divide-and-rule” policies. Nonetheless, having experienced ethnic separations for a 
long time, ethnic identities become deeply rooted in popular consciousness, and 
ethnic-related issues become highly sensitive in these pluralist societies. In the 
post-colonial phase, quarrels over the definition of citizenship or official religion, the 
language of education, or the representative proportion in the government, could easily 
produce violent conflicts between ethnic groups, for these issues affect a group’s 
relative status and social position in the new state (Horowitz, 1985: ch.5).  
 
The constructivists advance our understanding of the macro-contexts of ethnic conflict. 
What they fail to explain, however, is the dynamics between “the master cleavages” and 
the actual outcome—why are some cleavages the sources of violence in some parts of a 
country but not in others? Why does the same cleavage lead to different outcomes at 
different times? In short, the constructivists, like the other two approaches, have 
difficulty dealing with variance across time and space (Varshney, 2002).  
 
In comparison to other approaches, institutionalists pay less attention to why ethnic 
conflicts emerge, and instead focus on the links between types of political institutions 
and ethnic peace or violence, especially those associated with the state and government 
structure such as electoral rules, party systems, parliamentarism or presidentalism, and 
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federal or unitary structure.8 In other words, institutionalists care more about how 
political systems manage ethnic conflicts. Institutions are crucial to ethnic relations 
because they not only “specify procedures, rules, and sites for political contestation,” 
but also “generate predispositions to outcomes, given the number and size of ethnic 
groups” (Varshney, 2002:36). Nonetheless, in most countries these institutions are 
“implicitly tilted towards the needs, interests, and identities of the majority group,” 
creating “a range of burdens, barriers, stigmatizations, and exclusions of members of 
minority groups” (Kymlicka & Norman, 2000:4). Institutionalized injustice, such as 
cultural/political discrimination or the uneven distribution of economic resources and 
opportunities (or merely the perceptions of such injustice), creates inter-group 
grievances, anger, and resentment. As a result, an ethnic group that feels deprived tends 
to attack the groups that are benefiting or rebel against the state (Bates, 1974; Collier & 
Hoeffler, 2000; Gurr, 1993a; 1993b; Gurr & Moore, 1997). According to Gurr’s study 
on global minorities, during the period between 1945 and 1989, 233 ethnic groups 
experienced discrimination, either economically (147 groups), politically (168 groups), 
or both, and more than 200 of these 233 groups organized politically to defend their 
interests against the state or other ethnic groups. In at least 80 cases, the conflict 
escalated to civil war (Gurr & Harff, 2003:6).  
 
Along with state-level, formal institutions, many recent studies also take informal and 
local-level institutional factors into consideration. For example, Varshney (2002), in his 
study of ethnic violence in India, found inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic networks of civic 
                                                 
8
 Specifically, several institutional designs are commonly recommended in divided societies, such as the 
proportional representation (PR) electoral system and power sharing on the elite level (Lijphart, 1977; 
1996; 1999), special representations, poly-ethnic rights, self-government rights for cultural minorities 
(Kymlicka, 1995), and the constitutionalization of group rights (Tully, 1996). For detailed discussions on 
the relationship between constitutional design and ethnic conflict management, see Horowitz (2002); on 
the relationship between types of electoral systems and the incentives of inter-ethnic cooption, see Norris 
(2002), Reilly (2001), Reilly & Reynolds (1999), and Sartori (c1997). 
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engagement (both of which organized civic networks and everyday civic networks) had 
very different impacts on ethnic conflict. While inter-ethnic networks build bridges 
between ethnic groups, intra-ethnic networks reinforce ethnic boundaries and reduce 
positive communication and interaction between ethnic groups. In a society, if local 
communities are organized only along intra-ethnic lines, ethnic violence is much more 
likely to break out. On the other hand, vigorous inter-ethnic associations and 
organizations can act as a strong constraint against the polarizing strategies of a political 
elite intent on manipulating ethnic riots for his own selfish ends.  
 
Traditional institutionalists who focus only on state-level factors were criticized as 
being strong in comparing countries with different political systems but weak in 
explaining the variance within a country. After taking domestic factors into account, 
scholars of the institutional school can better explain why, within one country, ethnic 
riots are so unevenly distributed across space. Although this still fails to answer why 
violence has so many ups and downs within a specific place during different time 
periods, the institutional school provides more convincing interpretations on why ethnic 
violence emerges, subsides, or remains dormant.  
 
To sum up, each of the above four approaches has its particular strength in explaining 
the causes of ethnic conflict. However, given that ethnic conflict is such a complex issue, 
none of the above approaches alone offers a comprehensive understanding. Moreover, 
the four research traditions also share some common weaknesses. It is undeniable that 
people have special attachment to their own ethno- national groups, no matter whether 
this sentiment is given at birth, framed by elites, or constructed by the society or the 
state. Nonetheless, the sense of belonging to one group does not necessarily cause 
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confrontations with other groups (not to mention fighting each other in brutal and 
bloody ways). Primordialists, instrumentalists, constructivists, and institutionalists all 
cannot explain why in the same state, members of two ethnic groups with very different 
languages and religions can live together in peace most of the time, but suddenly kill 
each other over a tiny issue. Nor can they explain why under the same appeal and 
similar ways of mobilization, ethnic violence has variations in terms of space and 
intensity. Furthermore, these approaches only tell us why conflict arises—that is, the 
pre-conditions of ethnic violence—but do not explain or predict when or how violent 
actions will occur, and how serious those actions will be. 
 
The State and the Process of Ethnic Violence 
The scholars who concentrate on the process of violence provide explanations regarding 
the dynamics, the repertories and trajectories, and the durability of ethnic 
violence—such as how actors construct collective identity, frame their claims, and set 
the strategies to achieve their goals (Polletta & Jasper, 2001; Snow, et al. 1986), and 
how cultural factors—norms, values, beliefs, and symbols—shape the way actors 
construct their claims and repertories (Johnson & Klandermans, 1995). 
 
Within the literature, there has been emphasis on the crucial role of the state when 
discussing the process and intensity of ethnic violence, as the strategies taken by the 
state toward challengers combined with state capacities produce different opportunities 
(or constraints) for different types of mobilization (McAdam, 1982; 1996; Tarrow, 
c1998). For example, mature democratic states offer institutional channels, such as 
periodic elections and right to assemble and speak freely about politics, for people to 
express their grievances and dissent, so that they need not resort to a high-cost strategy 
of violence or rebellion (Cleary, 2000; Prezworski, 1991; Prezworski, et al. 1996; 
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Rothchild, 1991). In contrast, authoritarian regimes are more likely to use repression to 
stop protests and conflicts (Byman, 2002; Gurr & Harff, 2003; Tarrow, c1998:ch.5). 
Repression, however, is a double-edged sword. Although it may effectively raise the 
costs of mobilization and thus discourage collective action, it also strengthens group 
consciousness as “the oppressed.” This may ultimately contribute to deeper grievances, 
and trigger more organized and extensive resistance movements.9  
 
State capacity also matters. Strong states with effective and sophisticated policy 
instruments as well as rich economic resources are more likely to accommodate 
different political claims and economic demands of different groups, thus mitigating the 
unhappiness of affected and aggrieved groups (Prezworski, et al. 2000). But weak states, 
and/or states under foundational crises—such as a shift in economic resources or 
political power, the collapse of the state, the extreme stress of economic depressions, 
and bouts of social unrest—are more war-prone (Brubaker & Laitin, 1998; Hegre, et al. 
2001; Walter, 1999). Similarly, states under democratic transition often lack the capacity 
to resolve ethnic violence. For states containing divided societies but lacking liberal and 
democratic traditions, the introduction of the freedom of speech and open competitive 
politics often allows political entrepreneurs to politicize ethnic groups and to inflame 
communal tensions, which lead to the consequent danger of violence (Dudley & Miller, 
1998; Muller, 1985; Snyder, c2000; Snyder & Mansfield, 1995).10  
                                                 
9
 An earlier study shows that the probability of escalation to ethnic violence is 15 percent in autocracies 
but merely 1 percent in democracies (Roeder, 1991). Admittedly here the scholars are talking about stable, 
mature democracies where the main political and socio-economic systems are institutionalized, the state 
respects civil liberties, and a culture of tolerance is consolidated in the society (Diamond, et al. 1995).  
10
 Thus, Gurr, et al. (2001) find that many transitioning states would shift partway back to a mixed regime 
with both democratic and autocratic features in response to crises. Although on the surface such 
pseudo-democratic regimes still follow Western democratic institutions, they are never liberal in content. 
For example, a state may hold competitive elections for a legislature that exercises no effective control 
over the executive branch. A state may institutionally guarantee all citizens equal status and rights, but in 
practice exclude the minorities from participating in political decision-making. A state may also refuse to 
provide public services, including news media, education and judicial processes, in any but the official 
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International factors are also important in ethnic violence, especially for rebellious 
groups. The legitimacy and the duration of resistance usually rely on whether rebellious 
groups can attract international attention and recognition, and whether they can get 
external financial and/or military support. The availability of international support, 
however, is to a large degree determined by the state. The higher the international status 
of a state (which depends on its geopolitical and economic importance, etc.), the less 
likely a rebellious group can get external support (Fearon, 1995; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; 
Gurr, 1993a; 1993b; Jha, 1997; Keohane & Martin, 1995; Lake & Rothchild, 1996a; 
1996b).  
 
That said, scholars who focus on the process of the violence tend to be state-centered: 
state institutions and management capacities provide the context for violence; its 
response strategies and its interactions with the rebellious groups to a large degree 
determine the development of violence; and the power ratio between the state and the 
rebellious group determines whether this battle can persist. Nonetheless, one weakness 
of following this logic is the tendency to conclude that ethnic violence mostly refers to 
fights between the state and rebellious groups—usually the ethnic minority. Obviously, 
much of the evidence does not validate this. Ethnic violence happens not only between 
the state and unsatisfied minorities, but also between different ethnic groups. 
Furthermore, there indeed exist various types of ethnic violence, with respect to the 
intensity, the target, the participants and the victims of the violence. This point will be 
elaborated in the following section. 
 
Ethnic Conflict vs. Ethnic Violence 
                                                                                                                                               
language. Nonetheless, many such “illiberal democracies,” including Malaysia and Singapore, can 
maintain peace and stability (Zakaria, 1997). 
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Thus far, this chapter has briefly surveyed various interpretations of ethnic conflict and 
violence. It becomes clear that a distinction should be made between ethnic “conflict” 
and ethnic “violence,” and between various types of ethnic violence—a task that most 
of the relevant literature has failed to do. For many scholars, ethnic conflict and ethnic 
violence are two interchangeable terms; and thus when they talk about ethnic conflict, 
they are actually referring to quite different things, ranging from inter-group 
competition to protests to ethnic riots or even to civil wars.11 Such a situation is not 
satisfactory. Indeed, due to the long-standing trend of global migration, almost all states 
today are multiethnic states that contain more than two distinct ethno-cultural or 
religious groups within the state territory and they all compete with each other in 
politics, in the economy, and in cultural affairs. Yet, not all inter-group competitions 
have led to an accumulation of conflicts or escalated into violence. As stated before, in 
the whole of human history, ethnic cooperation and peace are much more common than 
conflict and violence.  
 
Thus, first of all, the general term “ethnic conflict” as employed in this dissertation—as 
in Varshney’s research (2002)—refers to conflicts between ethnic groups because of 
mutual competition over resources and power. Such conflicts are inevitable in 
multiethnic societies but are not necessarily violent. For example, if ethnic protest is 
expressed through such institutions as parliaments, assemblies, or government 
ministries or through non-violent street demonstrations, it is “conflict” but not 
“violence.” On the contrary, “ethnic violence” refers to conflicts expressed in violent 
ways, which would cause injury, death or damage to property.  
 
                                                 
11
 Some exceptions include Horowitz (2001) and Varshney (2002). 
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Second, with regard to violence, there is a huge variation in the structure, actors, and 
intensity of violence—from the lynching of people with specific ethnicity (e.g. the 
lynching of the blacks by members of the Ku Klux Klan in the Southern United States) 
to violent anti-government protests and mass riots to terrorist assassinations or 
bombings to civil war between the state and separatists (e.g. the case of Aceh) and 
finally to genocide (e.g. ethnic cleansing in Rwanda).12 Each type of ethnic violence 
cited above is very different in nature. For example, “ethnic riot” refers to a more or less 
spontaneous, emotional and relatively unorganized mass attack on members of one 
ethnic group by members of another. Such riots differ from lynching because the 
victims of mass riots are chosen randomly on the basis of group membership. Ethnic 
riots also differ from violent anti-government protests because rioters target the 
properties and members of an ethnic group rather than government buildings and 
institutions. However, it should be stressed that, in most cases, mass riots are not 
consciously directed toward the end of genocide. Compared to terrorist attacks, mass 
riots are less organized and planned. Finally, compared to separatist wars, mass riots are 
“more concentrated in time and space, more episodic, and apparently less instrumental 
and calculative” (Horowitz, 2001:18). 
 
Another way to classify ethnic violence is to distinguish between horizontal and vertical 
violence. This “horizontal versus vertical” distinction is made on the basis of the 
“actors” involved in the violence. Horizontal violence refers to violence within the 
society itself—i.e. violence between ethnic groups under a single political authority, 
while vertical violence refers to violence between the state and an ethnic group within 
the nation-state. This analytical distinction, according to Sukma (2005), is commonly 
                                                 
12
 For definitions, cases, and comparisons of various types of ethnic violence, see Horowitz (2001: 
17-28). 
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used by Indonesian scholars. Nonetheless, in his article, Sukma uses horizontal and 
vertical “conflict” instead of “violence,” even though he is referring to the violent 
horizontal conflicts in Kalimantan, Maluku, Sulawesi, and secessionist movements in 
Aceh and Papua that are of a vertical nature. This is, again, an example of 
non-distinction between conflict and violence.  
 
Also, it should be noted that when discussing the vertical violence between the state and 
ethnic groups, scholars tend to take for granted that such ethnic groups are 
ethno-religious “minorities” that are discriminated against by the state, which represents 
the interests of the majority group. Again, this may not be always true. Although vertical 
violence, like separatist civil wars, in almost all cases are triggered by the minorities 
against the state, many other instances of vertical violence, such as violent anti-state 
demonstrations or terrorist attacks, can be triggered either by members of the minority 
groups or by those in the majority, or even started by the state itself, such as the 
massacre of the Jews by the fascist German government during World War II.  
 
At this juncture, this dissertation proposes an alternative typology of ethnic conflict and 
violence. First of all, ethnic conflicts refer to all kinds of contestation and competition 
in non-violent ways, such as election campaigns, peaceful demonstrations, strikes, and 
so on. Conflicts can be either horizontal or vertical, and are permanent in all multiethnic 
societies. Because ethnic conflict is not the main subject of this research, there seems no 
need to elaborate the distinctions among types of ethnic conflict. Second, taking both 
“intensity” and “actor” variables into account, ethnic violence can be classified into five 
categories: (1) individual ethnic crimes—such as kidnapping, lynching, or gang 
attack—targeting individuals with specific ethno-religious identity, or sporadic violent 
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attacks on government institutes and/or officials; (2) horizontal mass riots between 
ethnic groups, which can be triggered by either the majority or the minority; (3) vertical 
mass violence triggered by the majority, such as violent anti-government protests, 
terrorist attacks, and so on; (4) vertical mass violence triggered by the minority, such as 
violent anti-government protests, terrorist attacks, separatist movements, or anti-regime 
rebellions; and (5) vertical mass violence triggered by the state and associated with 
horizontal mass rioting, such as pogrom, massacre, or genocide. Among these, only the 
first type of violence is on the individual level, while all the others are instances of mass 
ethnic violence. 
 
The Ethnic Triangle 
 
Thus far, this chapter has pointed out one main weakness in most of the existing 
literature—a lack of distinction between ethnic conflict and types of ethnic 
violence—and proposed a typology of ethnic violence to make up for this weakness. 
Still, there is another question unanswered: even if one clearly distinguishes the types of 
violence, s/he does not know which type of violence would break out under what 
situation. Again, because of the lack of a conceptual distinction among types of ethnic 
violence, the past research only offers a general explanation of the causes which would 
propel the escalation of some conflicts into violence, but it does not offer a theoretical 
framework to dynamically explain the interactions between the state and ethnic groups. 
Nor does it provide a systematic way to assess which type of violence would break out 
under what socio-political circumstances. 
 
This research constructs an “ethnic triangle” model to solve the above puzzle. The 
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concept of the “ethnic triangle,” however, is inspired by an international relations theory, 
“the strategic triangle,” that once dominated world politics during the Cold War period 
in the discussions of the relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 13  The strategic triangle model can be 
understood as a sort of transactional/exchange game among three players. However, for 
this model to function, two objective conditions must be met: all players must recognize 
(1) the legitimacy and (2) the strategic salience of the other two actors. It is because of 
such awareness that any player in the game is capable of shifting the triangular balance 
by changing its alignments with any of the others, and that each player would take the 
third player into consideration in managing its relationship with the second. Meanwhile, 
the three actors need not be of equal strategic weight, i.e. the power ratio of three actors 
can be asymmetrical (Dittmer, 1981; 1987).  
 
There are three variables that may affect the type of exchange: (1) the value 
(positive/negative) of an exchange is determined chiefly by the behavior of the two 
players in the bilateral relationship versus one another; (2) the symmetry of a 
relationship is strongly influenced by the power ratio (strong/weak) between the two 
players; and (3) both value and symmetry of any bilateral relationship are marginally 
affected by each player’s relationship with the third player. Accordingly, the relationship 
between any two triangular actors can be either positive (amity) or negative (enmity), 
being contingent on their relationship with the third, resulting in four types of triangles: 
the “ménage à trois” (three positive relations among all three “friends”), the “romantic 
                                                 
13
 The concept of the strategic triangle emerged in the 1970s and soon became popular among U.S. 
scholars and policy-makers in foreign affairs. See Dittmer (1981), Friedberg (1983), Goldstein & 
Freeman (1991), and Kim (1987) for some examples. Later on this concept was widely used in studies of 
U.S.-China-Japan relations (e.g. Zhang & Montaperto, 1999); U.S.-Japan-Korea relations (e.g. Cha, 
1999); U.S.-China-Taiwan relations (e.g. Wu, 1996; 2000); and U.S.-Russia-China relations (e.g. Rozman, 
2000; Hsiung, 2004). In recently years, this concept has also been applied to the discussions of 
U.S.-EU-Russia relations (Hallenberg & Karlsson, 2006); India-China-U.S. relations (Harding, 2004); 
and India-China-Russia relations (Boquérat & Grare, 2004). 
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triangle” (two positive relations between one “pivot” and two “wings” but one negative 
relation between two wings), the “marriage” (one positive relation between two 
“partners” but two negative relations between each partner and the third “outcast”), and 
a “unit-veto” triangle (three negatives among three “foes”) (See Figure 2-1). Such 
triangular relations are highly dynamic, as a change in one actor’s behavior would set 
off changes in the other actors’ behavior and the relationship between these two actors, 
as well as changes in the third party’s behavior and its relations with the other two 
parties, and thus lead to a shift from one strategic balance towards another. 
 
Figure 2-1: The Strategic Triangle 
Ménage à trois 
      Friend 
 
    +       + 
 
 
Friend   +  Friend 
Romantic Triangle 
      Pivot 
 
    +       + 
 
 
 Wing  —   Wing 
Marriage 
      Outcast 
 
   —        — 
 
 
Partner  +   Partner  
Unit-Veto 
      Foe 
 
  —       — 
 
 
 Foe  —   Foe  
Note: ——— or + : positive relation (amity); -------- or — : negative relation (enmity). 
 
As also shown in Figure 2-1, there are six possible roles in the four types of triangles. 
Since the theory assumes that the three players in the triangular games are rational 
thinkers, they shall have preferences among these various positions. It is asserted that 
each player prefers “at a maximum to have positive relations with both other players, 
and at a minimum to avoid negative relations with both other players” while at the same 
time tries “to prevent collusion between the other two players, under the apprehension 
that such collusion might be hostile” (Dittmer, 1987: 33). By this logic, the six roles, 
ranked from the most to the least preferred, are as follows: pivot, friend, partner, wing, 
foe, and outcast (Wu, 2000: 421). Any player in a bad position in the current triangle has 
stronger incentives to seek an elevation of its role, while a player in a better position has 
fewer incentives to change the status quo. In other words, if there are more players who 
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are highly unsatisfied with the current strategic balance, then the triangular relationship 
would turn more unstable, and a paradigm shift from one type of triangle to another is 
more likely to happen. Therefore, the ménage à trois triangle is inherently more stable 
than the romantic triangle, the romantic more stable than the marriage, and the unit-veto 
triangle the most unstable.14 
 
The “strategic triangle” model is traditionally used in studies of international relations 
rather than domestic politics. Indeed, there are differences between international and 
domestic politics. For one, the world system, which lacks a universal government, is 
more or less anarchical. Contrarily, in a state there are institutions and laws that regulate 
actors’ behaviors, and there is a government with coercive power that can resolve 
disputes and maintain order. Nonetheless, as stated above, the strategic triangle model 
does not require either “anarchy” or “institutionalization” as a pre-condition of analysis. 
As long as there are three actors whose first concern are their own survival and who 
realize that each affects and is affected by the other two actors, the concept of such 
triangular relations can be applied to the study of domestic politics such as competition 
among political parties or conflicts among ethnic groups. 
 
Guided by the concept of the strategic triangle, this dissertation tries to develop an 
“ethnic triangle” model for studying the dynamic interactions between the state and 
ethnic groups in particular countries. The purpose of doing so is to better understand 
and explain the causal links between various factors that can affect ethnic relations on 
                                                 
14
 Scholars have different opinions concerning the stability of the types of triangle. For example, Dittmer 
argues that the marriage is more stable than the romantic triangle, for the cost of being the pivot in the 
romantic triangle would be too high to retain (Dittmer, 1987: 34-35). However, Bau (1999) argues that the 
romantic triangle is more stable than the marriage since the outcast in the marriage has much stronger 
drives to change the status quo in order to elevate its triangular position. This study adopts Bau’s 
argument (as will be explained later).  
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one hand, and several types of ethnic violence on the other. The following sections will 
define the qualifications of the three players (the “rules of entry”), the influencing 
variables, and the “rules of play” in triangular games, as well as an elaboration of the 
eight types of triangular relations with possible consequences, i.e. peace or five types of 
ethnic violence. 
 
“Rules of Entry”: Actors in the Ethnic Triangle 
In the ethnic triangle, the actors include the state, the national majority, and the minority 
group(s). There are two “rules of entry” regarding who may compete in the triangular 
game and the power relationship of the three actors: 
 
First, each of the three actors must be recognized for its strategic salience by the other 
two actors. Following this logic, for a “minority” to qualify as a competitor in this 
triangular game, it must be a significant minority that satisfies at least one of the 
following conditions: (1) the size of this group must not be too small; (2) this minority 
must be politically or economically powerful; and/or (3) a certain portion of members of 
the group must be politicized. 
 
Second, concerning the power ratio of the three players, state-majority-minority 
relations are always asymmetrical—i.e., in general, the state is more powerful than the 
majority, and the majority is more powerful than the minority. Accepting this premise, 
the ethnic triangle model, to a certain degree, is still state-centric—i.e. the whole 
discussion starts from the state’s behavior, namely, investigating the impact of state 
policies and institutions on the other two actors’ responses. However, unlike other 
“one-way” research that only focuses on the effects of institutions on ethnic conflict and 
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violence, the ethnic triangle model does not exclude the possibilities of policy and 
institutional change due to the interactions among three actors. Again, this is because 
changes in triangular equilibrium may lead to a paradigm shift from one type of triangle 
to another. Facing a new condition, the state needs to adjust some of its policies and 
institutions.  
 
The Minority: Size, Power, and Will 
The “size” factor is crucial to ethnic groups in competition. As Bookman (1997; 2002) 
points out, while there are exceptions, in general there is a discernible positive 
correlation between the relative size of an ethnic group and its economic and political 
power—the more numerically dominant an ethnic group, the greater its power to 
appropriate resources through various forms of political manipulation. Even for an 
ethnic minority, its size contributes to the chances it may get to claim political 
legitimacy, to participate in the policy-making process, and to bargain with the majority 
group. For example, the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 granted the right to education in 
a non-titular language to the Hungarians and the Albanians, but not to the less populous 
Romanians or Vlahs (Bookman, 2002: 10). This case shows that ethnic minorities of 
larger size are more often granted privileges than smaller minorities. On the contrary, it 
is hard to expect a very tiny group to produce a critical mass in political and social 
systems, not to mention to initiate a politically meaningful action to fight for its group 
rights. In another study, Posner (2004) compares the Chewa and Tumbuka peoples in 
Malawi and Zambia. The objective cultural differences between the two groups in both 
countries are identical. Yet, the Chewa and Tumbuka communities are both large in 
Malawi (28 percent and 12 percent of the national population, respectively) but small in 
Zambia (7 percent and 4 percent, respectively). Thus, the cultural differences between 
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the two groups in Malawi are viable bases for political competition, but in Zambia such 
differences are not useful to mobilize people politically. As a result, in Malawi, 
interactions between Chewas and Tumbukas are often antagonistic, while in Zambia the 
Chewas and Tumbukas tend to view each other as ethnic brethren and political allies. In 
another research on post-colonial African countries, Jenkins and Kposowa (1992) also 
found that the closer the size of the two largest groups in a country, the greater the 
likelihood of military coups. Both of these two empirical research findings showed that 
“group size” also matters in the relations and interactions between ethnic groups. 
 
However, it should be noted that group size may refer to two different situations. An 
ethnic minority may contain a large percentage of the population across a country, such 
as the Chinese in Malaysia (27 percent of the population); or its members may be 
geographically concentrated in a region of the country where there is some strategic, 
economic, or political value, such as the Acehnese in Indonesia (1.7 percent of the 
population but dominant in Aceh) or the Shans in Burma (7 percent of the population 
but dominant in the Shan state). In the latter cases, while the minority only constitutes a 
small proportion of the population of the whole country, it is the majority in a specific 
region. If the country is a federal system, and if this minority controls the local 
government, it gains a very good position to bargain with the central government. Even 
if the country is a unitary system or an authoritarian regime, it would be very 
troublesome for the central government if this minority claimed self-rule or separation.  
 
Although ethnic size is crucial in determining whether a minority may qualify as a 
player in the triangular game, some exceptions needed to be noted here. Sometimes, an 
ethnic minority is significant not because it is large in number, but because it is 
  32 
economically or politically dominant in the society. Arguably, except in some cases, 
such as the Jews in some of the Western countries or the Armenians in Azerbaijan,15 
most of the advantaged minorities tend to be either the beneficiaries of colonialism or 
specific non-democratic regimes. In the former cases, Namibia and South Africa were 
once European colonies. Today, Europeans in both Namibia (5 percent) and South 
Africa (13 percent) still enjoy significant economic advantages. Moreover, despite the 
affirmative action policies in favor of the blacks in Namibia, the majority of the judges 
in the Constitutional and High Courts remain white, and there is a disproportionate 
representation of whites in media ownership and other professions. Russians in 
Tajikistan (4.3 percent), Uzbekistan (6.3 percent), and Kyrgystan (18 percent), and the 
Chinese in Indonesia (3.5 percent) and Malaysia (27 percent) are also economically 
dominant due to their colonial heritage—Russians were officially sponsored immigrants 
as the representatives of the Russian Empire, while the Chinese merchants were 
assigned middle-man status by European rulers and accumulated their wealth during the 
colonial period. Following independence, such wealth structures have remained in place 
to this day. In another case, the Kalenjin in Kenya only constituted 12 percent of the 
population but was provided with disproportionate political and economic advantages 
during the reign of President Daniel Arap Moi (1978-2002). Similarly, both the Ewe in 
Ghana (13 percent) during the Jerry Rawlings’ period (1979-2000) and the Soussou in 
Guinea (20 percent, the third largest group in the country) under President Lasana Conte 
(1984-recent) are politically dominant in their countries because the authoritarian 
leaders were from these ethnic groups.16  
                                                 
15
 The Armenians are an indigenous minority in Azebraijan, making up only 2.3 percent of the 
population. This group prospered during the industrialization of the USSR, making its per capita income 
higher than that of the USSR as a whole (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009). 
16
 Daniel Arap Moi was the president of Kenya from 1978 to 2002. Although by constitutional law Kenya 
is a Republic, President Moi established a de jure single-party authoritarian regime after a failed coup by 
his opponents in 1982. Multi-party elections were held only after 1992. Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings 
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Finally, to qualify in a triangular game, at least a certain proportion of the members of 
that minority group must be politicized in some way—meaning that they are willing to 
get involved in collective political action in defense or promotion of group interests. 
Mere existence or wealth does not imply that people of an ethnic minority are able to 
act collectively as a group. Even if members of this minority have a strong cultural 
identity, they may not translate it into political action if they feel that participation in 
political affairs is unnecessary for their well-being (e.g. ethnic Russians in Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan). Moreover, even if some minorities are dissatisfied with their current 
status or feel discriminated against, they may still keep away from politics because they 
feel such political engagement too costly or they consider themselves too weak to make 
a political impact (Esman, 1994: 16-17), such as the Kurds in Syria or the Russians in 
Azerbaijan. Also, in many cases, people of a minority would choose to assimilate into 
mainstream society for better life prospects, or otherwise consider emigration (e.g. 
Europeans in South Africa). In short, an ethnic minority would not become politically 
significant if its members show no will to do so.  
 
The Ethnic Boundaries 
The ethnic triangle model identifies three players: the state, the majority, and the 
minority. It should be noted, however, that the boundaries of the state, the majority, and 
the minority are never fixed or unchanging. Ethnic identities, as well as the interests of 
ethnic groups change over time along with changes in the external environment. Nor is 
“the majority” or “the minority” a monolithic block. Internal divisions and factions 
based on class, occupation, identity, and political and economic interests always occur 
                                                                                                                                               
was the president of Ghana from 1979 to 2000. He gained the power through a military coup in 1979, but 
he finally made a successful and stable transition from military ruler to elected president in 1992 (and was 
re-elected in 1996). The Kalenjin was the fourth largest tribe in Kenya, after the Kikuyu (22 percent), the 
Luhya (14 percent) and the Luo (13 percent). The Ewe was the second largest tribe in Ghana, after the 
Ashanti (44 percent). See Cooper (2002: 163, 175-176); and Minorities at Risk Project (2009). 
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in all ethnic groups. Sometimes such intra-communal conflicts may be even more 
violent than inter-communal violence. For example, in Pakistan, fighting among 
different factions of the Mohajirs has cost more Mohajir lives than Mohajir-government 
or Mohajir-Sindhi clashes in the past few decades. The Mohajir even allied with the 
Sindhi in 2001, though it failed to stop violence among its members (Minorities at Risk 
Project, 2009). Nevertheless, an ethnic group should resolve its internal competition and 
conflict before it jumps into the triangular game to compete with the two other players, 
otherwise such inner divisions would definitely hurt its competitiveness. 
 
On the other hand, if two or more ethnic groups can overcome their differences and are 
willing to cooperate, they may form a coalition of a majority or a minority to pursue 
some common interests. Such coalitions are quite common in multiethnic countries. For 
example, in Pakistan the Punjabis, as the largest ethnic group, constitute 44 percent of 
the population and control the politics, while the Sindh (12 percent), the Mohajir (8 
percent), the Pashtun (8 percent), and the Baluch (4 percent) are ethnic minorities. In 
1998, the Sindh, the Mohajir, the Pashtun and the Baluch parties allied to form the 
Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM) in order to challenge the Punjab 
hegemony. This is a case of minority coalition. In another example, the interim 
government of Afghanistan since 2002 has been dominated by ethnic Tajik (25 percent) 
cooperating with Hazaras (19 percent), and Uzbeks (6 percent) while the Pashtuns, the 
largest ethnic group (38 percent of the population), were not represented in proportion 
to their share of the population. This is a case in which several minorities together form 
a ruling league (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009). 
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The State 
The state is a party to most contemporary ethnic conflicts. Although in most cases the 
state is organized by the majority, it can be controlled by a dominant minority or by a 
coalition of several ethnic groups. The ethnic composition of the state raises concerns 
about the role of the state in ethnic competition: is the state the spokesman of its own 
ethnic group or is it a neutral conflict arbitrator? In Canada, the United States, and other 
countries where “the state/government” enjoys a certain degree of autonomy from 
society, the state can function as a (relatively) neutral umpire of ethnic disputes and a 
gatekeeper of justice and order. On the other hand, in Malaysia, Israel, and other 
countries where the state fails to develop autonomy away from the contending 
communities, whatever the state does would be easily perceived as partisan (Esman, 
1994: 19-20). Nonetheless, it should be noted that, no matter how the state is formulated 
by ethnic group(s), it does not necessarily or always represent the interests of its own 
group. In many cases, it has its own concerns that only reflect the will of a specific part 
of that group. For example, in Singapore, there are contradictions between the 
English-speaking Chinese and the Chinese-speaking (Mandarin- or dialect-speaking) 
Chinese, and the state is controlled by the English-speaking Chinese. It seems obvious 
that many state policies in Singapore, however well intended, favor the 
English-speaking Chinese elite rather than other groups. That said, the state, as with 
every ethnic group, is never an undifferentiated and coherent actor. There are also 
divisions and factions within the state. Nor do state elites respond monolithically to 
ethnic conflict. However, the level of internal heterogeneity has great influence on state 
capacity. The more diverse and heterogeneous components the state contains, the less 
likely the state is able to manage ethnic conflict. 
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Influencing Variables 
There are three sets of variables that may affect the relations between the state, the 
majority, and the minority:  
1. State institutions and public policies that would affect ethnic groups, including (1) 
political institutions and policies, (2) economic and social policies, (3) cultural and 
educational policies, and (4) regulations concerning inter-ethnic connections in civil 
society. 
 
2. The political significance of the minority. Except cultural characteristics, such as 
religion, language, or skin color that differentiate a group from others, whether a 
minority is significant in politics also depends on its size, its political or economic 
power, and the level of politicization of its members. 
 
3. Historical factors, such as the past experience of inter-ethnic contact, conflict, or 
cooperation, as well as the memories of some specific historical events. 
 
How do the above factors influence state-society relations as well as inter-ethnic 
relations? Here, one can posit at least three propositions:  
 
Proposition 1: the state-majority relationship is positively affected by the level of 
satisfaction of the majority with the current state institutions and public policies in the 
political, socio-economic, and cultural arenas.  
 
From the majority’s perspective, people care about whether state institutions and 
policies (1) represent the will of the majority and offer channels for mass political 
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participation, (2) bring economic growth and equality, and (3) maintain their social 
status as the “dominant” ethnic group. The more people from the majority that are 
satisfied with state institutions and policies, the better state-majority relations are. 
Meanwhile, a positive state-majority relationship implies that the majority supports the 
legitimacy of the state, and that the state can basically control the majority. 
 
Proposition 2: the state-minority relationship is positively affected by the level of 
significance of the minority, and the level of satisfaction of the minority with state 
institutions and policies in the political, socio-economic, and cultural arenas. 
 
As already mentioned, a minority with more geopolitical, economic, or social 
significance usually earns a better position and has a stronger ability to negotiate with 
the state or fight against institutional discrimination. With respect to institutions, people 
from the minority care about whether current institutions and policies (1) successfully 
incorporate them into politics and guarantee their human rights, (2) protect their wealth 
and guarantee generally unrestricted socio-economic opportunities, and (3) respect their 
cultural heritage. Again, the more people from the minority that are satisfied with state 
institutions and policies, the better state-minority relations are; and a positive state- 
minority relationship implies that the minority supports the legitimacy of the state, and 
that the state can basically control the minority. 
 
Proposition 3: both current and past institutions and policies, as well as current and 
past experiences of inter-ethnic contacts have a positive impact on majority-minority 
relations, while the level of the significance of a minority has a negative impact on its 
relationship with the majority. 
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This proposition is about inter-ethnic relations in civil society. Three factors are taken 
into consideration. First, whether positive and efficient inter-ethnic networks exist in a 
society depends on whether state institutions and policies promote inter-ethnic 
communications and contacts, and whether current institutions offer an environment in 
which the formation of inter-ethnic associations, organizations, and interest groups are 
encouraged. Meanwhile, inter-ethnic relations are also affected by their past and current 
experiences of interaction. It would be much easier for two ethnic groups to build up 
positive relations if these two groups have more pleasant contact experiences and less 
bad memories of the past (e.g. conflicts between two groups; or one has been exploited 
by the other). Also, inter-ethnic relations would be rather positive if there are more 
inter-/trans-ethnic institutes and organizations as bridges of communication. On the 
other hand, the majority-minority relationship would erode and inter-group violence 
become more likely when a minority controls disproportional political or economic 
power. 
 
“Rules of Play”: Strategies, Moves, and Consequences 
Similar to the “strategic triangle,” actors in the “ethnic triangle” have two preferences 
that guide them in “playing” the triangular game: (1) each prefers to have as many 
positive relations with others as possible while it tries to prevent an exclusive alliance 
between the other two players; (2) in view of the structural advantages and liabilities 
inherent in the various positions, the players have the same preference ranking for the 
six roles, from the most to the least preferred: pivot, friend, partner, wing, foe, and 
outcast. Following these two rational concerns, there are three propositions regarding 
the players’ behavior pattern and their influence on the triangular structure: 
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Proposition 4: any player in a lower position in the ethnic triangle will seek to elevate 
its role by directly changing its relationship with one another from negative to positive. 
 
In the ethnic triangle, there is an inherent drive by players to seek an elevation of their 
roles, and a player in a bad position in the current triangle has stronger incentives to 
break the status quo. By this logic, there are two ways to perform elevation: the player 
needs to turn its negative relation(s) into positive, or hope that other two players’ 
relationship would remain bad. Since the second way is not under one’s control, the 
more reliable way to break the status quo is to improve its direct relations with the 
others. For instance, logically an outcast can elevate its role by turning one of its 
negative relationships into a positive one and becoming a wing, or hope that the other 
two’s positive relationship turns negative and they thus become foes. Yet, in practice, 
becoming a wing is more likely than becoming a foe. Furthermore, if one takes the 
whole triangular structure into account (this will be elaborated later), being a wing in 
the romantic triangle is more desirable than being a foe in the unit-veto triangle. 
Similarly, the short-cut for a foe to elevate its role is to ally another foe and thus become 
a partner. A wing can become a friend with both of the other players, and a partner can 
become the pivot. As for a friend, although becoming the pivot might be more attractive, 
it would depend on other two’s behavior rather than on its own effort. Besides, staying 
in the ménage à trois triangle is, on the whole, more stable than being in a romantic 
triangle. In all, both the pivot and a friend in the ethnic triangle have the least incentive 
to change the status quo when compared to the other positions. 
 
Proposition 5: the greater the pressure a player faces, and/or the less likely a player 
may elevate its role, the more violent it tends to behave.  
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In principle, a player in the triangular game can achieve its goal either by cooperation or 
by coercion. For instance, the state can win its people’s support by fulfilling their 
requirements, or it can force people to obey its rule by repressing any disagreement. A 
minority may use its demographic or economic/political power as bargaining chips to 
persuade the state to take its demands into account; it may express its discontent 
through institutional channels such as rallies, strikes, and demonstrations; or it may 
fight against the state violently for its survival. When dealing with inter-ethnic relations, 
a minority may choose to integrate into mainstream society, or radically resist any 
outside impact that may hurt its group cohesion or social status. Nonetheless, when a 
player faces more intense pressure from the other two players, when it is more eager to 
change the current situation immediately, and/or when it feels that there is little chance 
to elevate its position in the existing triangle, it is less willing to cooperate and negotiate 
and tends to behave in more radical and violent ways. Thus, it is asserted that an outcast 
or a foe (both having two negative relationships with others) is more likely to riot than a 
wing or a partner (having only one negative relationship with another player), and a 
friend or the pivot (having two positive relationships with both other sides) least likely 
to riot. 
 
Proposition 6: other things being equal, the ménage à trois is more stable than the 
romantic triangle, the marriage, and the unit-veto triangle, and the romantic triangle is 
more stable with stronger players being the pivot rather than with weaker ones being 
the pivot. 
 
Propositions 4 and 5 are about the individual player’s behavior patterns in the triangular 
game, while this proposition concerns the aggregated impact of all players’ behavior on 
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the structure of the ethnic triangle. Given the fact that a change in one player’s behavior 
would lead to a chain of reactions from the other players and thus cause a shift from one 
triangular relationship to another, all of the eight triangular relationships are highly 
dynamic and never permanent. Yet, some types of triangles are expected to be more 
stable than others.  
 
To illustrate, simply let pivot = 0, friend = 1, partner = 2, wing = 3, foe = 4, and outcast 
= 5. The larger number indicates stronger incentives to change the status quo. Then, by 
adding up the three players’ numbers, we get a 3 in the ménage à trois (three 1s), a 6 in 
the romantic triangle (one 0 plus two 3s), a 9 in the marriage (one 5 plus two 2s), and a 
12 in the unit-veto triangle (three 4s). The result shows that players in the ménage à 
trois have the least incentive to change the status quo; players in the romantic triangle in 
total have less incentive to change the current balance than they do in the marriage; 
while players in the unit-veto in total have the greatest incentive to break the existing 
triangle. In other words, the unit veto triangle is the least stable, as there is nothing to 
hold the triangle together if there is enmity between all three players and none of them 
is willing to maintain the current relationship. If a state-majority-minority relationship 
falls into this (unit-veto) category, it shall disintegrate very soon. Adding Proposition 4 
into consideration, it is most likely that the unit-veto triangle will undergo a 
transformation to the marriage triangle—when two players build an alliance against the 
third. 
 
Moreover, given that the power ratio of the three players is asymmetrical, a romantic 
triangle with the state as the pivot shall be more stable than one with the majority as the 
pivot. In similar vein, a triangle with the majority as the pivot is more stable than one 
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with the minority as the pivot. To be sure, since the state is the strongest player in the 
game, it is easier for the state to both get and retain the pivot position. On the contrary, 
although the pivot position is also desirable for the minority, the opportunity to get it is 
relatively low and the cost to retain it—as well as to control the whole triangle—may be 
unaffordable.  
 
Types of Triangular Relations and Ethnic Violence 
In the ethnic triangle, the interaction between any two actors can be defined as either 
positive (amity; satisfaction) or negative (enmity; disappointment), being contingent on 
their interaction with the third, resulting in eight types of ethnic triangles. Each type of 
triangle represents a type of state-majority-minority relationship that indicates a specific 
socio-political situation in which ethnic peace or (five types of) violence may be 
produced. A simple summary is shown in Table 2-1.  
 
It may be necessary, in the pages to follow, to illustrate these eight categories of the 
triangle. The first type of triangle represents an ideal situation: the ménage à trois 
among the state, the majority, and the minority. This is likely to happen in countries 
where there are no significant ethnic problems (e.g. Japan), or in countries where state 
institutions and public policies (cultural, political, and economic) largely satisfy the 
demands of both the majority and the minority while inter-ethnic relations in society are 
also harmonious. Many European democracies (e.g. the Scandinavian states and 
Switzerland) and contemporary Singapore fall into this category. Usually the 
institutional designs of such countries contain some elements of what Lijphart (1977; 
1999) calls “the consensus system.” Meanwhile, in society there are frequent and close 
connections— even mixed ethnicity marriages—among people from different cultural 
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communities. Thus, while there is still competition and conflict between ethnic groups, 
mass ethnic violence is unlikely to occur in this scenario.  
 
Table 2-1: Ethnic Triangle and Ethnic Violence 




     State 
 
  +         + 
 
Majority + Minority 
Ménage à trois (ideal type) 
Both the majority and the minority are 
basically satisfied with the state and have good 
inter-ethnic relations.  
 [*Tensions/conflicts still 
exist, but mass violence 




     State 
 
  +         + 
 
Majority — Minority 
Romantic triangle   
(Pivot – State): the state can satisfy both the 
majority and the minority; but the society is 
divided along ethnic lines. 
Individual ethnic crimes (V1) 




     State 
 
  +        — 
 
Majority + Minority 
Romantic triangle 
(Pivot – Majority): the minority is unsatisfied 
with the state; but has good relations with the 
majority. 
Individual ethnic crimes (V1) 
may happen during 




     State 
 
  —       + 
 
Majority + Minority 
Romantic triangle 
(Pivot – Minority): the majority is unsatisfied 
with the state; but inter-ethnic relations remain 
positive. 
Individual ethnic crimes 
(V1) may happen during 




     State 
 
  —       — 
 
Majority + Minority 
The marriage 
(Outcast – State): the state fails to fulfill the 
demands of the society, while inter-ethnic 
relations are generally positive. 
[*Vertical anti-state 
violence or revolution may 
happen, but not necessarily 




     State 
 
  —       + 
 
Majority — Minority 
The marriage 
(Outcast – Majority): the majority is dis- 
advantaged as the state disproportionally favors 
the minority, and ethnic relations are negative. 
Inter-group mass riots (V2); 
anti-state violence triggered 
by the majority (V3); even 




     State 
 
  +        — 
 
Majority — Minority 
The marriage 
(Outcast – Minority): the minority is 
discriminated against by the state and the 
majority, and inter-ethnic relations are negative. 
Inter-group mass riots (V2); 
anti-state violence triggered 
by the minority (V4); even 




     State 
 
 —        — 
 
Majority — Minority 
The unit veto  
State failure plus social chaos: all relationships 
are negative. 
[*Any type of mass violence 
may happen (including V1- 
V5) but not necessarily be 
ethnic in nature*] 
Source: Created by author. 
Note: “V1, V2…” refer to “Type 1, Type 2… ethnic violence” mentioned in this chapter, pp.24-25. 
 
The second type of triangle represents a romantic triangular relationship in which the 
state maintains positive relations with ethnic groups and plays the role as the pivot, 
while the inter-ethnic relationship is negative. This is likely to occur when state 
institutions and policies fairly satisfy the demands of both the majority and the minority, 
yet the society is still divided by ethno-cultural cleavages and lacks inter-communal 
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connections due to historical heritage or long-standing cultural-economic differences, 
such as the relations between Filipinos and Chinese in the Philippines, or between 
pribumis and Chinese in Indonesia today. Under such circumstances, individual ethnic 
crimes, such as kidnapping, lynching, or gang attack, between members of different 
ethnic groups may still occasionally occur (such crimes being triggered most often by 
the majority targeting specific individual(s) from the minority). Although it is difficult 
for the state to ease such mutual alienation or hostility through short-term policies, the 
state, as the pivot, still has the ability to control the whole situation, to manage 
inter-ethnic conflicts, and to avoid mass violence. For instance, in Kyrgyzstan, the 
societal discrimination of the Kyrgyz majority against ethnic Russians is evident within 
the governmental administrative apparatus—particularly in the civil service, as well as 
against the use of Russian in school and in the media. Yet, compared to neighboring 
countries, Kyrgyzstan enjoys inter-ethnic stability due to President Akayev’s 
(1991-2005) efforts, such as fostering dialogue between the Kyrgyz and Russians to 
prevent resentment and misunderstandings from erupting into violent clashes, amending 
its constitution to make Russian an official language, and appointing an ethnic Russian, 
Nikolai Tanayev, as prime minister of the country (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009).  
 
The third type of triangle represents a romantic triangular relationship in which the 
majority enjoys positive relations with both the state and the minority, while the 
state-minority relationship is not smooth. On the societal level, the inter-ethnic relations 
are basically positive, and people from different ethnic communities can live together 
peacefully. However, members from the minority have complaints about their political 
under-representation and/or socio-economic backwardness due to state neglect or some 
existing discriminatory policies or institutions. Meanwhile, the majority, as the pivot, 
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takes advantage of being the balancer between the state and the minority. Institutional 
unfairness against the minorities is not uncommon, even in advanced democracies. For 
example, countries that adopt the majoritarian fist-past-the-post election system— 
including United States—usually face the problem of under-representation of minorities 
in government. Nonetheless, given that inter-ethnic relations are good, the minority may 
either choose to assimilate into mainstream society or to express its dissatisfaction and 
anger to the state via institutional channels—including petitions, rallies, strikes, and 
protests. Some sporadic, individual-level, violent attacks might also occur during mass 
demonstrations, but mass violence is quite unlikely to happen.  
 
The fourth type of triangle also represents a romantic triangular relationship, but this 
time the minority assumes the pivot position and takes advantage of the conflict 
between the state and the majority. This happens when the state policies and 
institutional settings disproportionally favor the minority, while the demands of the 
majority, to a certain degree, are ignored or suppressed. Nonetheless, longstanding 
cross-ethnic contact and interaction networks in the society function as riot-preventing 
systems and thus sustain inter-ethnic peace. One example of this triangular relationship 
is Singapore during 1965-79. To respond to the pressures and suspicions from 
neighboring states, the government of Singapore introduced many policies favoring the 
Malay minority (school, language, economic and housing benefits) and, concurrently, to 
some extent restricted majority privileges and benefits. Of course there were 
contradictions and conflicts between the state and the Chinese majority. Yet, such 
policies not only eased the international tension it faced, but also encouraged 
inter-ethnic accommodation and cooperation.  
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The type-5 triangle represents a situation in which the state is the outcast facing a 
marriage of the majority and the minority. This occurs when the state fails to fulfill the 
demands of both the majority and the minority, while at the societal level, there exists 
what Varshney (2002) calls “the institutionalized peace system” to prevent inter-ethnic 
mass riots and thus maintains basic ethnic stability among groups. In this situation, the 
state faces severe challenges from society, and the majority and the minority are likely 
to cooperate to force a transformation of the regime—i.e. a change of government. For 
example, in Malaysia, during the last days of the colonial period, Malays and Chinese 
(and Indians) forged an alliance vis-à-vis the colonial British government in the 
negotiation for independence. On the whole, this type of triangle is highly unstable and 
is not able to persist long. Either a new player (i.e. the new government) will soon 
replace the existing one, or the state will try to ally with one player to balance against 
the other, thus causing a paradigm shift from marriage to the romantic triangle. It should 
be noted that state-society conflicts during this period may erupt into violent clashes, 
although such vertical anti-state violence may not necessarily be ethnic in nature. 
Insofar as civilians are mobilized, regardless of their communal background, to fight 
against the state for trans-group interests, such as justice or political freedom, then the 
violence they produce are not relevant to this research.  
 
The type-6 triangle represents a situation in which the majority is the outcast facing a 
marriage of the state and the minority. This usually occurs in racially oligarchic regimes 
where the minority captures state power backed by military or police forces, and 
practices discriminatory policies against the majority. In South Africa, for generations a 
white minority ruled the country and enriched itself on the backs of a disenfranchised, 
exploited black majority (Chua 2003). In Togo, the Kabre (14 percent of the population) 
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was overwhelmingly dominant in politics during President Eyadema’s regime 
(1967-2005) while the Ewe (44 percent) was politically discriminated against. In 
Burundi, Tusis (14 percent) have been dominant socio-politically and economically over 
the Hutu majority (85 percent), controlling the government and military (Minorities at 
Risk Project, 2009). These are just a few cases among many. In such situations, both the 
majority-state and majority-minority relations are highly negative because of extreme 
institutionalized injustice. The majority will eventually fight against the state, and the 
hatred may easily spillover to the minority, given that the minority is scapegoated as the 
cause of injustice. In other words, both vertical anti-state violence triggered by the 
majority and horizontal inter-communal mass riots would occur in this situation. In the 
extreme scenario, the state—the high level officials or military leaders—may be 
actively involved in mass violence and make the violence deadly. In the case of Togo, 
although the Kabre and the Ewe do not compete in most sectors of the economy because 
the Kabre are located mostly in the north while the Ewe are located in the south, 
tensions between the Kabre and the Ewes exploded into inter-group violence in which 
hundreds were killed in 1999 in the spillover of the Ewe’s anti-government violence. In 
the case of Burundi, a genocide that killed some 200,000 Burundians occurred in 1993, 
after a Hutu elected president was assassinated. Inter-group attacks still take place, even 
after cease-fire agreements were signed in 2002 and 2006 (Minorities at Risk Project, 
2009).  
 
The type-7 triangle represents a situation in which the minority becomes the outcast 
facing a marriage of the state and the majority. This happens when the state only reflects 
the needs of the majority but represses the demands of the minority, and the society is 
deeply divided along ethnic lines. The minority’s resentment of the polity is high and it 
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would drive violence against the state or, if its members are territorially concentrated, 
claim separation and independence. Also, the minority may perceive the majority to be 
the primary cause of state failure in responding to minority grievances. This may 
aggravate violence between the majority and minority. In other words, under such 
circumstances, both horizontal inter-communal mass riots and vertical anti-regime 
violence triggered by the minority—including terrorist attacks, separatist movements, 
and civil war—are likely to occur, such as Abkhazians in Georgia, Armenians in 
Azerbaijan, the Acehnese in Indonesia, and the Kurds in Turkey, to name a few. 
Moreover, in extreme cases, the state may manipulate or actively organize genocide or a 
massacre of the minority, with the goal of eliminating the trouble-making group. 
Ironically, in the three “marriages”, this is usually the most stable marriage. As long as 
both the state-majority alliance and the minority are not willing to compromise, and as 
long as the minority is powerful enough not to be eliminated, the state of war will 
persist for a long time. 
 
Finally, the type-8 triangle represents a unit-veto triangular relationship among the state, 
the majority, and the minority. This situation takes place when the state is totally 
unresponsive to its people’s demands or when the state faces so-called “foundational 
crises”, such that its institutions are all out of action. Meanwhile, on the societal level, 
relations between the majority and the minority are also bad, and thus there is no 
“institutionalized peace system” to prevent ethnic riots. In such situations, any kind of 
violence is likely to occur, but that violence may not necessarily be ethnic in nature. As 
to the triangular structure, the unit veto triangle is the least stable and easily undergoes a 
transformation to other types of triangular relations. 
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To sum up, among the eight types of ethnic triangles above, the first one, the ménage à 
trois, is the ideal triangular situation in which all three actors are friends with each other. 
The type-2 to type-4 triangles are romantic triangles. In such triangular situations, inter- 
ethnic competition and state-society conflict within the institution still exist, and some 
individual ethnic crimes and violence may also occur occasionally. However, in general, 
the state is still able to control society and manage inter-ethnic tensions. Thus, the threat 
of large-scale mass ethnic violence (both vertical and horizontal) is relatively low. 
 
The type-5 to type-7 triangles are the marriage triangles, and the unfortunate outcasts 
are the state, the majority, and the minority, respectively. When the state fails to satisfy 
the demands of society (type-5), it faces a legitimacy crisis and the majority and the 
minority may work together to overthrow the current government—either peacefully or 
violently. Yet, large-scale inter-communal violence is less likely to occur as there are 
good relationships between ethnic groups. On the other hand, when the outcast is the 
majority or the minority (type-6 or type-7), either group would definitely try to reverse 
this unhappy situation and the likelihood of both vertical anti-state violence and 
horizontal inter-communal mass riots is very high. Finally, if the triangular situation 
falls into the unit-veto relationship in which every actor is the enemy of each other, any 




To summarize, this dissertation does not intend to argue which factors cause ethnic 
violence. The existing literature on ethnic conflict and violence has already made a 
comprehensive list of factors that may contribute to ethnic violence. What the past 
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studies lack is an analytical framework that can dynamically interpret the relationships 
between the state and ethnic groups and can systematically assess which type of ethnic 
violence will occur under what kind of socio-political circumstances. The purpose of 
this research is to try to better explain the dynamics of ethnic interactions and the 
mechanisms responsible for ethnic violence via the ethnic triangle model.  
 
Arguably, the variables that may influence the nature of ethnic triangles are (1) state 
institutions and policies, (2) the political salience of the minority, and (3) the experience 
of inter-ethnic contacts. Together, these factors result in different types of triangular 
relations between the state, the majority, and the minority, and each type of triangular 
relationship offers a specific scenario in which ethnic peace or five types of ethnic 
violence—(1) horizontal, individual ethnic crimes, (2) horizontal inter-group mass riots, 
(3) vertical anti-state violence triggered by the majority, (4) vertical anti-state violence 
triggered by the minority, and (5) vertical violence planned by the state and combined 
with horizontal mass violence—may occur. Figure 2-2 shows the analytical framework 
of this study. 
 
Figure 2-2: Analytical Framework of the Research 
Influencing Variables      Types of Ethnic Triangle      Types of Ethnic Violence 
Institution and Policy    a.b.c        State                  V1: Individual crime 
                                                        V2: Inter-group mass riot 
Significance of Minority  b.c       a       b               V3: Majority’s anti-state violence   
                           (+/—)        (+/—)           V4: Minority’s anti-state violence 
Experience of Contact    c                               V5: Violence triggered by the state 
                          Majority   c    Minority 
                                  (+/—)    
 
                                 feedback 
Note: a: state-majority relation; b: state-minority relation; c: inter-ethnic relation; +: positive relation 
(amity); —: negative relation (enmity). 
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CHAPTER III 
ETHNIC DIFFERENCE, DISCRIMINATION, AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: 
A CROSS-NATIONAL STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter first tests the causal significance of ethnic differences and institutional or 
policy discriminations on ethnic conflict and violence via a quantitative research 
method with 78 cases from 48 countries from 1990 to 2000 selected from the MAR 
Dataset. Although such an empirical, cross-national time-series comparison, to a certain 
degree, confirms the above causal relations, it has its limits. As will be mentioned later, 
the limitations of quantitative analyses leave plenty of room for qualitative case studies 
targeting specific areas and/or countries. As mentioned in the first chapter, this study 
looks at Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore for detailed case studies. Before 
proceeding to examine each case in the coming chapters, the second part of this chapter 
offers background knowledge of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, as well as a short 
history of the Chinese in the above three countries during their pre-independence 
period. 
 
Ethnic Difference, Discrimination, and Ethnic Conflict 
 
As proposed in Chapter II, the salience of differences between ethnic groups (due to 
various primordial characteristics, demographic distribution, and relative political or 
economic status of ethnic groups in the society) and the level of institutional and policy 
restrictions and/or discrimination on the ethnic groups are two important factors that 
affect the triangular relations between the state, the majority, and the minority, which in 
combination result in either ethnic peace or various types of conflict and violence. To 
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empirically test the causal links between the above influencing variables on the one 
hand and ethnic conflict and violence on the other hand, this chapter applies a 
cross-national time-series statistical analysis to examine the data on 78 ethnic groups 
from 48 countries during the period 1990-2000.  
 
Data 
Before proceeding to the analysis of statistical results, it is necessary to explain the 
criteria for data selection and the coding of variables. First, this study examines only the 
data from 1990 to 2000 for practical reasons: (1) part of the pre-1990 data of some 
countries under investigation is not complete based on the MAR Dataset; and (2) the 
latest data available in the MAR Dataset is for 2000.17  
 
Second, the research examines only those countries that, for at least one year within the 
period 1990-2000, were classified by the World Bank as “lower-middle income” 
countries or above, but excludes those always classified as “low income” countries in 
the eleven years. The low-income countries are excluded because it is widely believed 
that extremely poor countries have many economic, social, and ethno-political problems 
as well as inept central governments, all of which make those countries susceptible to 
violence and chaos.18 To eliminate the impact of economic backwardness on ethnic 
conflicts and violence—which is indeed another important influencing force but not the 
main concern of this study—it is appropriate to leave out countries that are extremely 
                                                 
17
 In 2008 the MAR team updated the information of some variables to the year of 2003. However, the 
data of several important variables in this research have not been updated yet. 
18
 This is supported by many empirical cross-national time-series studies. For example, Londregan and 
Poole (1990) in their research of 121 countries between 1950 and 1982 found that coups are 21 times 
more likely to occur among the poorest countries (measured by per capita income) than among the 
wealthiest. After comparing Africa with other developing countries from 1965 to 1999, Collier and 
Hoeffler (2002) also came to the conclusion that Africa’s rising trend of conflict is due to its atypically 
poor economic performance (measured by income level, growth rate, and economic structure). For other 
studies with similar conclusion, see Auvinen (1997); Ellingsen (2000); Fearon & Laitin (2003); Harff 
(2003); Helliwell (1994); and Prezworski & Limongi (1997). 
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poor. However, since one of the case study countries, Indonesia, falls into the 
“lower-middle income countries” category, this research still includes countries which 
fall into the same category as Indonesia.19  
 
The third concern is the choice of ethnic groups. As proposed in Chapter II, a qualified 
minority in ethnic triangular games has to have at least of some potential to engage in 
inter-ethnic competition in terms of group size and population. Also, the members of 
such minorities must be politicized to a certain degree to be able to act as a coherent 
group. Taking these factors into consideration, this study chooses only those ethnic 
groups with populations over 100,000, and which comprise more than 2.5 percent of a 
country’s total population, and have their own political organizations or parties 
promoting group interests.20 Nonetheless, to avoid excluding some “micro-minority” 
groups with strong group cohesion and that are highly active in political movements, 
ethnic groups whose members are highly concentrated in one region and which have 
militant organizations pursuing group interests are also selected, regardless of their 
small size or population.21 
 
Based on the above criteria for choosing countries and groups, a total of 78 cases from 
48 countries were selected from the MAR Dataset. As for the geographical distribution 
                                                 
19
 Indonesia was a “lower-middle income” country between 1993 and 1997. Subsequently, due to the 
Asian financial crisis and its domestic chaos, its currency hugely devaluated and it was downgraded to a 
low income country between 1998 and 2002. 
20
 To determine the degree of a group’s organizational cohesion, the MAR Dataset contains an indicator 
GOJPA (group organization for political action) based on the types and strategies of organizations that 
represent group interests. The coding scheme is from zero to five where 0 = no political organizations; 1 = 
group interests are promoted by trans-ethnic parties; 2 = group interests are promoted by political parties 
that draw their support from the group; 3 = group interests are promoted mainly by conventional parties 
but also by militant organizations; 4 = group interests are promoted mainly by militant organizations; and 
5 = group interests are promoted only by militant organizations. In this study, only groups with GOJPA ≥ 
2 (i.e. the groups with their own political organizations) are chosen. 
21
 In the MAR Dataset, GROUPCON (group’s spatial distribution) is one of the indicators of an ethnic 
group’s (geographic) concentration, for which scores are coded from zero (widely dispersed) to three 
(concentrated in one region). In this study, the “micro-minorities” are chosen if their GROUPCON ≥ 2 
and GOJPA ≥ 4. 
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of countries, seven are western democracies (containing 12 groups), 15 are 
post-communist states (25 groups), seven are Asian countries (13 groups), nine other 
countries are in the Middle East and Africa (18 groups), and the remaining 10 countries 
are in Latin America (10 groups). The list of countries and ethnic groups is provided in 
Table 3-1. 
 
Table 3-1: Selected Countries and Ethnic Groups 
Country Ethnic Group Country Ethnic Group Country Ethnic Group 
Western Democracies 
(7 States, 12 Groups) 
Post-communist States 
(15 States, 25 Groups) 
Latin America 
(10 States, 10 Groups) 
Canada French Canadians Belarus Poles Brazil Afro-Brazilians 
 Indigenous Peoples  Russians Chile Indigenous 
 Quebecois Bulgaria Turks Ecuador Indigenous Highland 
France Basques* Czech Rep Roma El Salvador Indigenous 
 Corsicans*  Slovaks Guatemala Indigenous 
Italy Sardinians Estonia Russians Guyana Africans 
New Zealand Maori Georgia Adzhars Honduras Indigenous 
Spain Basques  Russians Nicaragua Indigenous 
 Catalans Hungary Roma Panama Indigenous 
UK Scots Kazakhstan Germans Peru Indigenous Highland 
USA African-Americans  Russians Middle East & Africa 
 Hispanics Latvia Russians (9 States, 18 Groups) 
Asia Lithuania Poles Algeria Berbers 
(7 States, 13 Groups)  Russians Cyprus Turkish Cypriots 
Fiji East Indians Macedonia Albanians Iran Arabs 
 Fijians  Roma  Kurds 
Indonesia Acehnese* Moldova Gagauz Iraq Kurds 
 Chinese  Slavs  Sunnis 
 Papuans* Romania Magyars/Hungarians Israel Arabs 
Malaysia Chinese  Roma  Palestinians 
 Dayaks Russia Chechens* Jordan Palestinians 
 East Indians  Tatars Lebanon Druze 
Philippines Moros Slovakia Hungarians  Maronite Christians 
Singapore Malays  Roma  Palestinians 
Sri Lanka Indian Tamils Ukraine Crimean Russians  Shi'is 
 Sri Lankan Tamils    Sunnis 
Thailand Malay-Muslims   S. Africa Coloreds 
     Europeans 
     Zulus 
Total: 48 States, 78 Ethnic Groups. Syria Alawi 
Note: “micro-minority” groups are denoted by *. 
 
Types of Ethnic Conflict 
The main concern of this study is how influencing factors are related to both horizontal 
inter-ethnic/communal conflict and vertical conflict between the state and ethnic groups. 
In operation, there are three primary dependent variables: (1) the extent to which the 
ethnic group is engaged in communal conflicts with other groups; (2) the extent to 
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which group members engage in various forms of anti-government protest; and (3) the 
extent to which group members engage in rebellions against the state. All three 
variables are taken directly from the MAR Dataset, and are coded annually. 
 
Communal conflict is measured ordinally on a zero-to-six scale: no communal conflict 
reported in a particular year (=0); individual acts of harassment (=1); political agitation 
(=2); sporadic violent attacks by gangs or other small groups (=3); anti-group 
demonstrations (=4); mass communal rioting (=5); and large-scale inter-group violence 
(=6).  
 
Protest is also an ordinal variable measured on a zero-to-five scale: no protest reported 
(=0); verbal opposition via public letters, posters, publications, or petitions (=1); 
scattered acts of symbolic resistance (sit-ins, blockage of traffic, sabotage, etc.) or 
political organizing activity on a substantial scale (=2); small demonstrations, rallies, 
strikes, and/or riots with fewer than 10,000 participants (=3); medium demonstrations 
with fewer than 100,000 participants (=4); and large-scale demonstrations with more 
than 100,000 participants (=5). 
 
As with the communal conflict and protest measures, rebellion is also an ordinal 
variable. The scores are coded from zero to seven, representing “no rebellion reported”, 
“political banditry”, “campaigns of terrorism”, “local rebellion”, “small-scale guerrilla 
activity”, “intermediate guerrilla activity”, “large-scale guerrilla activity” and 
“protracted civil war”, respectively.22 
                                                 
22
 According to the MAR Dataset, “local rebellions” refer to armed attempts to seize power in a locale. 
“Small-scale guerrilla activities” refer to activities with fewer than 1,000 armed fighters and less than six 
attacks reported per year, with such attacks affecting only a small part of the area occupied by the group.  
“Large-scale guerrilla activities” on the other hand are those with more than 1,000 armed fighters 
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Institutional and Policy Restriction/Discrimination 
This study uses the premise that the level of institutional and policy 
discrimination—political and/or economic discrimination, and governmental restrictions 
on the pursuit or expression of a group’s cultural interests—positively affects the level 
of both inter-ethnic conflict and conflict between the state and ethnic groups. To 
measure the level of discrimination, this study uses three indicators from the MAR 
Dataset.  
 
The “cultural restrictions index” is a composite indicator constructed by adding the 
summed weights of eight types of cultural policy restrictions: religion, use of language, 
language instruction, ceremonies, appearance (e.g. dress), family life (e.g. marriage), 
cultural organizations, and other cultural restrictions.  
 
Similarly, the “political restrictions index” is constructed by adding the summed 
weights of nine types of policy restrictions: freedom of expression, freedom of 
movement, rights in judicial proceedings, restrictions on organizing, restrictions on 
voting rights, police/military recruitment, civil service access, access to higher office, 
and other restrictions.  
 
The “economic discrimination index,” however, is constructed in a different way. It is a 
macro coding of the role of public policy and social practice in maintaining or 
redressing economic inequalities, with scores from zero to four, representing “no 
discrimination”, “historical neglect but with remedial policies”, “historical neglect 
without remedial policies”, “social exclusion”, and “restrictive policies”, respectively. 
                                                                                                                                               
conducting frequent armed attacks, with the attacks affecting a large part of the occupied area. The 
“intermediate guerrilla activities” are in between the small-scale and large-scale guerrilla activities. 
Finally, “protracted civil wars” refers to fights by rebel military units with base areas. 
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It should be noted that, according to the MAR dataset, there are no codes for specific 
types of policy restrictions on economic activities. On the other hand, no macro-coding 
scheme for cultural discrimination, analogous to economic discrimination, can be 
devised. Because of the inconsistency of measurement, it does not make sense to create 
a composite “aggregate discrimination” variable by adding up the scores of the above 
three indicators. Therefore, this study will only test the effects of the three types of 
restriction/discrimination separately.  
 
Ethnic Difference  
As proposed previously, the more politically, economically, and culturally salient an 
ethnic group is in a society, the more likely it will experience conflict with other ethnic 
groups and with the state (as it is more likely to claim extra rights and demands that the 
state is unwilling to permit). To measure inter-group differences, this study employs an 
ordinal indicator, the “aggregate differentials index”, developed by the MAR project. 
This is a summary indicator based on the total number of differences checked for 18 
indicators—six cultural (ethnicity, language, historical origin, religion, social customs, 
and residence), six political (legal protection, voting rights, rights to organize, 
recruitment, access to power, and access to civil service), and six economic (income, 
land/property, higher education, presence in commerce, presence in official positions, 
and presence in professions). The maximum possible score is 18. 
 
Political Freedom 
Besides policy discrimination and ethnic difference, many empirical studies have 
suggested various macro-political and economic characteristics of a country as 
contributory factors to the occurrence of domestic political violence. Therefore, this 
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study also includes a measure of a country’s overall level of political freedom as a 
control.23  Political freedom takes on a value of 1 if a country is designated “free” by 
the Freedom House, 2 if a country is designated “partly free,” and 3 if it is “not free.”24  
 
Income Level 
As stated before, many empirical studies have shown that the economic 
underdevelopment is significantly associated with the onset of a civil war (e.g. Collier 
& Hoeffler, 2002; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Londregan & Poole, 1990). This study, to 
some degree, has controlled for the effects of poverty on ethnic conflict in the beginning 
when the country cases were chosen. Yet, the variable income level is still included here 
in order to test the potential effect of the level of economic development on ethnic 
conflicts. Income level is measured on a one-to-four scale, with 1 for “high income” 
countries, 2 for “upper-middle income” countries, 3 for “lower-middle” income 
countries, and 4 for “low income” countries.  
 
Appendix A lists the criteria of case selection and a detailed description of all variables 
employed in this chapter, as well as the criteria for classifying countries as high income, 
upper middle income, lower middle income, or low income by the World Bank.  
                                                 
23
 For example, the lack of political freedom is shown to explain terrorism in Abadie’s research (2004) of 
186 countries; and that the causal relationship between political freedom and terrorism is 
non-monotonic—that countries with intermediate levels of freedom are shown to be more prone to 
terrorism than countries with high levels of freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes.  
24
 According to Freedom House, countries whose combined average ratings for political rights (PR) and 
civil liberties (CL) fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated "free," those between 3.0 and 5.5 were 
designated “partly free," and those between 5.5 and 7.0 were designated “not free.” Both PR and CL are 
measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest degree of freedom and seven the 
lowest. 
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Table 3-2: Descriptive Statistics 
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Analysis 
Table 3-2 reports some descriptive statistics—the means, standard deviations, maximum 
values, percentage of “conflict” observations, and percentage of “mass violence” 
observations,25 for the global sample and for five subgroups: Asia, the Middle East and 
Africa, western democracies, post-communist states, and Latin America. All statistics 
are calculated over the entire period from 1990 to 2000. The total number of 
observations is 823. 
 
First, consider the dependent variables—communal conflict, protest, and rebellion. 
Table 3-2 indicates that protests are very common events that occur in more than 70 
percent of all country-group/years in the global and all regional samples. Communal 
conflicts and rebellions are less common than protests, yet neither of them can be 
regarded as “uncommon.” For the entire sample, the incidence of communal conflict is 
about 32 percent while the incidence of rebellion is about 23 percent—i.e. during the 
entire period, about a third and a fourth of all observations have experienced communal 
conflict and/or rebellion, respectively. Nonetheless, mass violent communal conflicts 
and anti-regime rebellions happen less frequently; they occur in about a tenth of all 
country-group/years in the global sample and most of the regional samples. The only 
exception is Asia, where mass violent rebellions occur in 25.2 percent of the whole 
sample of that region. 
 
                                                 
25
 The means, standard deviations, and maximum values are calculated over the entire 
observations—including those with “0” values. For the three types of ethnic conflict, “0s” indicate “no 
communal conflict/ protest/rebellion reported in the year,” while all “non-0s” indicate “conflict” 
observations for each category. Moreover, in communal conflict, values 1-4 refer to communal conflict in 
non-violent ways (e.g. anti-group rallies) or violence only on the individual/gang level, while values 5-6 
refer to communal rioting and warfare (i.e. mass communal violence). Similarly, in rebellion, values 1-2 
refer to anti-regime terrorist activities on the individual level and being more or less sporadic, while 
values 3-7 refer to armed rebellions on different scales (i.e. mass anti-regime violence). Dividing those 
“non-0” “mass violence” observations by the total number of observations gives an indication of how 
frequently conflicts or violence occur in the world, on the basis of the samples for this study. 
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In comparison, the incidence of protests in western democracies is the highest among all 
regional samples (84.1 percent; this is eight percent higher than the global incidence). 
However, western democracies on average experience a much lower level of communal 
conflicts and violence than other regions—in fact, the lowest among all regions. 
Although the threat of anti-government terrorism appears to be high in western 
democracies (31.8 percent), very few such protests escalate into mass-violence 
rebellions (only 0.8 percent). Similarly, the incidence of protests in Latin America is 
higher than the global average, but countries in this region enjoy a relatively low level 
of communal conflicts and rebellions raised by ethnic groups, as well as no single 
experience of mass-violence rebellion. Post-communist states, although in their 
transition in the early 1990s, on average follow similar patterns of ethnic conflict as the 
global sample. 
 
In contrast, the incidence of rebellions in Asia is quite high at about 40 percent, almost 
17 percent higher than the global average. The incidence of mass-violence rebellions in 
this region is 2.5 times the global average (25.2 percent versus 10.2 percent). In fact, 
among the 15 observations with the maximum value “7” (i.e. “protracted civil war”), 11 
are in Asia.26 Moreover, Asia also suffers the highest level of mass communal violence. 
While the incidence of communal conflicts in Asia is a bit lower than it is in the Middle 
East and Africa (35.7 percent versus 37.9 percent), such conflicts tend to be more 
violent in Asia than in the Middle East and Africa (11.9 percent versus 11.6 percent). To 
summarize, these statistics show that Asia, on average, over this 11-year period 
(1990-2000), experienced a much higher level of both mass inter-communal violence 
and large-scale violent rebellions than other regions. 
                                                 
26
 Also, more than half of the observations with values 4 and 5 (small and intermediate guerrilla activities) 
occurred in Asia. 
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Secondly, taking the explanatory variables into consideration, one may find a 
relationship pattern between these variables and ethnic conflicts. On the one hand, the 
lowest mean scores of institutional discriminations/restrictions and ethnic differences 
for western democracies seem to explain why western democracies enjoy the lowest risk 
of ethnic mass violence, while the high level of political freedom seems to encourage 
protests in this region. On the other hand, high levels of ethnic difference and political 
restriction along with the low degree of political freedom in the Middle East and Africa 
seem to correlate with the two regions’ relatively high risk of ethnic mass-violence but 
low level of anti-government protests.  
  
However, while Asia suffers the highest risk of ethnic mass-violence, the descriptive 
statistics of the explanatory variables reported in Table 3-2 are not markedly extreme for 
Asia: the average ethnic difference in Asia is less salient than that in Latin America and 
the Middle East and Africa; the economic discrimination in Asia is less serious than that 
in Latin America; and the income level in Asia is similar to that of post-communist 
states—and both are higher than that in Latin America. Although in general Asia is the 
second least politically free region (ahead of the Middle East and Africa), the averages 
of cultural and political restrictions on ethnic groups in this region are still lower than 
the global averages.  
 
To sum up, during the period from 1990 to 2000 Asia had a higher incidence of ethnic 
conflict and violence but a similar structure of factors, when compared to the global 
data, that seem to be causal. In other words, if the above mentioned factors were proven 
to have salient effects on ethnic conflict and violence, these factors may have different 
effects in Asia when compared to other regions—for example, Asia might be more 
sensitive to a given level of economic discrimination than other regions.  
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Before proceeding to the statistical tests, it is necessary to check whether there is a 
problem of multicollinearity between the independent variables—i.e. whether some of 
the independent variables are highly correlated so that one variable might weaken the 
predictive value of another. If this was the case, then redundant variables would need to 
be excluded.27 Table 3-3 reports the correlation coefficients between six independent 
variables. No coefficients for two different variables are at 0.70 or greater value, 
suggesting that there is no serious multicollinearity problem between any of these 
variables. Thus, the research may proceed to the following regression analysis. 
 













Ethnic Difference  1.0000* 
     
Cultural Restriction 0.2351 1.0000 
    
Economic Discrimination 0.4224 0.2528 1.0000 
   
Political Restriction 0.4002 0.2412 0.4543 1.0000 
  
Income Level 0.0880 0.1041 0.1525 0.0904 1.0000 
 
Freedom Level 0.1242 0.0443 
–0.0169 0.0784 0.5011 1.0000 
Note: *the correlation between any variable and itself is always 1. 
 
This study uses the random-effects generalized least square regression model 
(random-effects GLS) to estimate the effects of various explanatory variables on the 
probability that three types of ethnic conflict occurred in a country with competing 
ethnic groups. Table 3-4 reports the coefficients, the standard errors (in parentheses), 
and the significance levels.28 The results for the three separate models are all reported: 
the first and second are the global models (Global 1 and Global 2) with a total of 823 
observations, while the third model only examines the 143 observations from Asia. The 
difference between the Global 1 and Global 2 models is that in the Global 2 model a 
                                                 
27
 Usually if two independent variables correlate with one another at 0.70 or greater, one will be 
excluded. 
28
 The coefficients cannot be interpreted directly, but they give a clear indication whether the effects are 
positive or negative—i.e. whether the variables increase or decrease the risk of types of ethnic conflict.  
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dummy variable for Asia is added in order to test whether the global model fits the 
Asian experience. As reported in the “Global 2” columns of Table 3-4, the three 
coefficients for this dummy variable are positive, indicating a higher level of risk of 
three types of ethnic conflict in Asia. However, for both protest and communal conflict, 
the coefficients are not significant at conventional levels. This means that Asia, as a 
whole, is not significantly more prone to communal conflict and protest than the global 
average. On the other hand, for rebellion, the coefficient is significant both statistically 
and substantively. This provides strong evidence that Asia has a higher risk of rebellion 
than the global average. All other coefficients of the Global 2 model are in the same 
direction and have values similar to the coefficients of the Global 1 model. Thus, the 
following analysis will focus on the Global 1 model and the Asia model. 
 
First, consider the trend of communal conflicts on the basis of the global model. The 
results in Table 3-4 show that both the degree of ethnic difference and the level of 
economic discrimination exhibit positive, statistically significant relationships with the 
level of communal conflict, suggesting that both factors appear to exacerbate horizontal 
conflicts between ethnic groups. In contrast, the existence of more cultural and political 
restriction does not significantly increase the probability of communal conflict, nor does 
the lower level of per capita income exhibit a discernible relationship with the level of 
communal conflict. In addition, although the negative coefficient for freedom shows 
that the chance of communal conflict decreases with an increase in a country’s political 
control, this coefficient is not significant at conventional levels. In total, these results 
seem to suggest that political and cultural restrictions, a country’s income level, and the 
situation of that country’s political freedom are not powerful predictors of communal 
conflict—which is contrary to the research prediction as well as much of the literature. 
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To avoid a hasty conclusion, a further test is made by ruling out economic 
discrimination. Once this institutional factor is excluded in the analysis, the other two 
institutional factors—political and cultural restrictions—become significantly 
significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. Nonetheless, the effects of income 
status and freedom level still remain insignificant. 
 
Table 3-4: Regression Results for Three Types of Ethnic Conflict 
Communal Conflict 
 Global 1 Global 2 Asia 
Ethnic Difference  0.070 (.031)* 0.067 (.031)* –0.333 (.082)** 
Cultural Restriction 0.042 (.030) 0.043 (.030) 0.231 (.056)** 
Economic Discrimination 0.146 (.068)* 0.146 (.068)* 0.397 (.138)** 
Political Restriction 0.043 (.028) 0.044 (.028) 0.185 (.093)* 
Income Level (1=high, 4=low) 0.016 (.093) 0.010 (.094) –0.114 (.236) 
Freedom Level (1=free, 3=not free) –0.168 (.101) –0.172 (.102) –0.407 (.358) 
Asia Dummy 
 
  0.173 (.336) 
 
Number of Observations 








 Global 1 Global 2 Asia 
Ethnic Difference  0.002 (.023) 0.002 (.024) 0.023 (.087) 
Cultural Restriction –0.001 (.027) –0.000 (.027) –0.071 (.047) 
Economic Discrimination 0.189 (.058)** 0.189 (.058)** 0.174 (.130) 
Political Restriction 0.084 (.025)** 0.084 (.025)** 0.242 (.085)** 
Income Level –0.138 (.080) –0.138 (.081) 0.033 (.208) 
Freedom Level –0.166 (.090) –0.166 (.091) –0.688 (.274)* 
Asia Dummy 
 
  0.010 (.252) 
 
Number of Observations 








 Global 1 Global 2 Asia 
Ethnic Difference  –0.011 (.036) –0.028 (.036) –0.680 (.161)** 
Cultural Restriction 0.014 (.025) 0.015 (.024) –0.020 (.042) 
Economic Discrimination 0.130 (.060)* 0.130 (.059)* 0.304 (.161)* 
Political Restriction 0.046 (.022)* 0.050 (.023)* –0.054 (.089) 
Income Level 0.038 (.081) 0.019 (.081) 0.035 (.211) 
Freedom Level –0.099 (.083) –0.113 (.083) –0.593 (.241)* 
Asia Dummy 
 
 1.161 (.393)** 
 
Number of Observations 







Note: Table entries are regression coefficients, with standard errors in parentheses.  
All regressions include a constant. *Significance at p ≤ 0.05; ** at p ≤ 0.01. 
 
In addition, on the basis of the global model, consider the two types of vertical conflict 
between the state and ethnic groups: protest and rebellion. Both the level of political 
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restriction and the level of economic discrimination present significant positive effects 
on the levels of anti-regime protest and rebellion, indicating that the more policy 
restrictions and institutional discriminations in the political and economic arena have 
been practiced, the greater the level of protest and rebellion activity engaged in by the 
ethnic groups in a country. However, the effect of ethnic difference on vertical conflict 
between the state and ethnic groups is not as robust as it is in horizontal conflict 
between ethnic groups, and since the signs of the coefficients on the two types of 
conflicts are opposite, whether ethnic difference increases or decreases anti-regime 
activities in general is thus inconclusive. Besides ethnic difference, the effects of 
cultural restriction and income level on anti-regime activities are also ambiguous. 
Lower income levels and more cultural restrictions may prohibit ethnic groups from 
organizing large-scale demonstrations on the one hand, but motivate people to initiate 
more serious and deadly anti-regime rebellions on the other hand. In both cases, since 
those coefficients are not significant, a definite conclusion is difficult without further 
investigation.  
 
Comparing the trend of communal conflict in Asia with that in the global model, one 
finds that besides ethnic difference and economic discrimination, political and cultural 
restrictions also significantly—and positively—associate with the threat of communal 
conflict in this region. Given the fact that the average political and cultural restrictions 
in Asia are lower than the global average, ethnic groups in Asia appear to be much more 
sensitive than ethnic groups in other regions to discriminatory policies that restrain their 
cultural practices and political rights. Furthermore, in Asia the relationship between the 
ethnic difference score and communal conflict is significantly inversed, indicating that 
the greater the differences (cultural, political, and economic) between ethnic groups, the 
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lower the average level of communal conflict in Asia. This is contrary to the global 
model and much of the literature, which suggest that the greater the difference, the more 
likely conflict is to occur. 
 
Concerning the causal patterns of anti-state protest and rebellion, there are also some 
differences between Asia and the global model. First, although in Asia political 
restriction and economic discrimination also appear to exacerbate conflicts between the 
state and ethnic groups (just as in the global model), the impact of political restrictions 
are particularly robust on protest activities while the impact of economic discrimination 
is more salient on rebellion movements. Second, unlike the global model, ethnic 
difference in Asia appears to be one of the powerful predictors of anti-regime 
rebellion—and the negative sign of the coefficient suggests that ethnic difference, to a 
certain extent, dampens the risk of rebellion. Moreover, besides ethnic differences, the 
overall political control also has a significant dampening effect on the level of protest 
and rebellion in this region—the more restrictions on political rights and civil liberties, 
the lower the level of protest and rebellion. Although the similar effect of political 
control can also be observed in the global model, it is not as significant as it is in Asia. 
 
In sum, regardless of the period or the sample size, the above findings illustrate that the 
institutional/policy discrimination or restriction in general is more decisive in explaining 
ethnic conflict than other factors. Two of the three institutional variables, political 
restriction and economic discrimination, have robust positive effects on the level of 
three types of ethnic conflict. In comparison, cultural restriction has the weakest effect 
on ethnic conflict among three institutional variables, and is only significant in the 
communal conflict in Asia. Nonetheless, this is not to imply that discriminative 
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restrictions on an ethnic group’s religion, language, ceremonies or other cultural 
customs will not anger people of the targeted ethnic group. Rather, the implementation 
of such restrictions is incomplete most of the time. For example, the Indonesian 
government could ban the use of Chinese characters in public, but it could not 
successfully prohibit the ethnic Chinese from speaking Chinese in private (e.g. at home). 
In other words, to a certain degree ethnic groups have other—informal and 
subtle—strategies, rather than use open confrontation, to respond to official restrictions 
in the cultural arena. Contrarily, discrimination in the political and economic arenas, 
such as restrictions on voting, civil service access, judicial proceedings, or in the job 
market, are to disfranchise the targeted group in public affairs and from economic 
opportunities. The effects of such restrictions are more direct, immediate, and lethal to 
the group’s survival, thus the resistance to such policies is supposed to be stronger.   
 
The above results also provide some evidence to support the argument that inter-group 
political, economic, and cultural differences are influential in ethnic conflict. Yet, ethnic 
differences seem to only drive horizontal communal conflicts but not vertical 
anti-regime activities—except the rebellions in Asia. This finding is reasonable. On the 
one hand, the ethnic composition of the state will not be the cause of conflict between 
the state and society if the state can fairly satisfy the demands of the different parts of 
the society. It is only when the governing ethnic group attempts to “institutionalize” and 
“eternalize” its political and economic advantaged status via discriminative public 
policies that the vertical conflict between the state and ethnic groups occurs. In such a 
situation, it is “institutional and policy discrimination,” but not “ethnic difference 
between the state and rebel group per se,” that should be blamed. On the other hand, it 
is also natural that that difference usually accompanies inter-group distrust, 
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misunderstanding, grievance, and greed, which are the potential triggers for communal 
conflict and violence.  
 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that in Asia the relationships between the ethnic 
difference scores and both communal conflict and rebellion are significant but inverse, 
indicating that although Asia is sensitive to ethnic difference, such sensitivity 
contributes to ethnic peace rather than conflict. This finding was not anticipated and is 
contrary to many other works which suggest that the greater the difference the more 
likely conflict is to occur (suggested by the infamous “clash of civilizations” thesis, see 
Huntington, 1996). However, taking the deadly conflicts between Serbs, Croats and 
Bosniaks, or Northern Irish Catholics and Protestants, or Turkish and Greek Cypriots as 
examples, Appadurai (1998) had claimed that conflict are more likely to occur—and 
tend to be more intense and violent—between groups that appear to be quite similar. In 
Ishiyama’s research (2006) of 90 ethnic groups in 32 developing countries, he also 
found that cultural similarities appear to drive conflict. Thus, the finding here somewhat 
supports scholars like Appadurai and Ishiyama. Nonetheless, whether ethnic differences 
encourage or discourage ethnic conflict still deserves further empirical investigation.  
 
Another interesting point of this research is that, in contrast to institutional and policy 
discrimination and ethnic difference, the overall political freedom and income level of a 
country appear to have little effect on the risk of ethnic conflict on the basis of the above 
regression results. This finding is also inconsistent with much of the existing literature, 
which suggests that poverty and the absence of political freedom increase the likelihood 
of political conflict (including but not restricted to ethnic conflict). Although the data in 
Table 3-4 suggest that the increase of political freedom apparently encourages 
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anti-regime protest and rebellion in Asia, which may be symptomatic of the effect of 
freedom on promoting ethnic “awakening”, such positive effects are only very marginal 
in other regions—i.e., at best, the findings of this research only provide very weak 
evidence that there may be a positive association between ethnic conflict and political 
freedom. To elaborate, greater political control raises the cost and diminishes the 
opportunities for all kinds of political mobilization, and poverty creates a sense of 
grievance as well as incentives for public confrontation. However, regarding 
ethnically-based conflicts, some micro-level factors, such as inter-group differences and 
the practice of specific discriminatory policies, are supposed to be more powerful 
predictors than the macro-political and economic characteristics of a country, such as 
freedom and income level. In other words, once the effects of these policy and 
difference factors are taken into account, the risk of ethnic conflict is not significantly 
higher for freer and/or poorer countries. 
 
Limitations 
Statistical analysis of a large sample of cases is known to be useful for providing 
quantitative estimates of the robustness of a theoretical model and drawing broad 
patterns across cases. Research with cross-national time-series data has another 
additional advantage: it is able to compare not only the effects of the mentioned 
variables on ethnic conflict and violence across countries and regions, but also such 
effects within countries over time.  
 
Nevertheless, statistical analysis has its limitations. First of all, it is relatively thin with 
respect to specifying causal processes in more detail. For example, while the above data 
confirm that policy discrimination and ethnic differences are important factors in 
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bringing about ethnic conflict and violence, such data does not provide any clue to how 
these factors matter. Without the in-depth comparative study of the specific social, 
political, and economic “context” of different countries, finding out that “country A has 
institutionally discriminated against minority X more than country B has against 
minority Y, thus there are more riots in country A than in country B” has very limited 
utility, if it is somehow not totally devoid of meaning.  
 
Secondly, in many instances, cross-national time-series statistical analyses are not 
available due to the difficulties of collecting time-series data across countries and 
standardizing the various data so that they are comparable. For example, this study was 
only able to collect complete data for 48 countries and 78 ethnic groups between 1990 
and 2000. With data spanning only an 11-year period, it is hard to examine the path of 
policy changes and the effects of such changes on inter-group relations, as changes in 
state policies and institutions are steady but slow under normal circumstances. Similarly, 
some potential influencing factors mentioned in Chapter II, such as memories of history 
and the past experience of inter-group interaction, cannot be tested since there is no past 
data outside the period of 1990-2000 with which to compare.  
 
With these limitations in mind, this study therefore turns to the qualitative part of the 
“nested” design in the latter chapters. The main purposes of more focused case studies 
and comparisons of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are to assess the plausibility of 
the observed statistical relationships between variables, and to examine in more detail 
the mechanism by which different types of ethnic triangles (state-majority-minority 
relations) interact with incumbent dynamics to contribute to ethnic peace or various 
forms of ethnic violence. Before proceeding to each case study, the following part of 
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this chapter offers some background knowledge of the Chinese in Southeast Asia, as 
well as a short history of the Chinese in the above three countries during their 
pre-independence period. 
 
The Chinese in Southeast Asia  
 
Since the large-scale migrations encouraged by European colonial governments in the 
early 19th century, the Chinese have settled in Southeast Asia for generations. 
Numbering in excess of 30 million people, the Southeast Asian Chinese are one of the 
largest diaspora communities in the world.29 
 
As shown in Table 3-5, the Chinese in Singapore are the dominant majority, making up 
74 percent of the population. In other Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese are 
economically advantaged ethnic minorities. In Malaysia, ethnic Chinese comprise 
around 25 percent of the population but contribute to 42 percent of national GNP, 
meaning that their share in GNP is 1.8 times larger than their demographic weight. In 
other countries, the unbalanced ratio between their economic weight and demographic 
weight is even higher, ranging from three times (e.g. Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam) 
to five times (e.g. Cambodia and Laos).30  
 
 
                                                 
29
 This figure may be highly underestimated because of intermarriage between the Chinese and the local 
peoples, and because of the unwillingness of many Chinese to declare themselves as ethnic Chinese in 
order to avoid various kinds of discrimination in many countries. 
30
 Such a “low” evaluation by de Vienne (2004) may surprise many people, as the popular impression is 
that the ethnic Chinese control 85-90 percent of the business interests in Thailand, over 70 percent of the 
market capitalization in Indonesia, and 50 percent of local commercial activities in Vietnam (Minorities 
At Risk, 2009). However, de Vienne points out that, say, the control of 70 percent of the market in 
Indonesia does not mean that the Chinese control 70 percent of GNP, as in Indonesia market capitalization 
ratio to GNP was only 20.7 percent in 2001. 
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Estimated % of 
National GNP 
20021 
Indonesia 7.8 3.3~3.5 17.20 10.0 
Thailand 7.1 14 41.83 33.0 
Malaysia 7.1 25 40.30 42.0 
Singapore 2.83 74 71.20 81.0 
Philippines 1.2 1.5~2.8 6.50 8.4 
Burma/Myanmar 1.1 2.2~4.0 2.50 12.0 
Vietnam 1.3 1.5~3.0 1.60 4.5 
Cambodia 0.4 1.0~2.3 0.26 10.0 
Laos 0.2 1.0~3.1 0.16 9.4 
Brunei 0.04 15 2.00 40.0 
 Sources: 1de Vienne (2004: tables 1.1, 1.2); 2Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, Taiwan, R.O.C. 
(2007); 3Department of Statistics Singapore (2009). 
 
Because of their visible group population and their dominant power in the economy, the 
ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia have often experienced hostility and discrimination. 
Nonetheless, the relations between the Chinese and local populations vary significantly 
due to different degrees of assimilation and changing governmental attitudes toward the 
Chinese. In comparison, the Chinese communities in Thailand and the Philippines have 
probably enjoyed the smoothest ride among all Chinese communities in region. The 
apparently high degree of integration and assimilation of Tsinoys (Chinese Filipinos) 
and Sino-Thais into the very fabric of the host societies marks them as a notable success 
story in inter-ethnic accommodation. Apart from the relative absence of religious 
(Buddhist/Christian) barriers to intermarriage, decades of a systematic campaign of 
coerced assimilation and cultural eradication led by the state also contributed to the 
integration of the Chinese into mainstream Thai/Filipino society—for example, both 
countries have restricted Chinese-language instruction in Chinese-medium educational 
institutions since the 1940s. Behind the remarkable success of ethnic integration, 
however, Sino-Thais were subject to economic discrimination under several 
nationalistic military regimes as the victims of the government-led efforts to impose 
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economic controls over the banking system and private businesses. It was only after 
1992, with democratization and the declining political influence of the military, that all 
formal restrictions against Sino-Thais were removed. Similarly, Chinese Filipinos under 
President Ferdinand Marcos’ regime also suffered under many discriminatory policies, 
such as the closure of Chinese media and restrictions on cultural practices. Most of the 
discriminatory policies remained in place until Corazon Aquino, a Chinese mestizo, 
became President in 1986.31 
 
The Chinese communities in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma comprise only one 
to three percent of the national populations. However, this was not so in the past. The 
Chinese used to be the largest ethnic minority in Vietnam, Cambodia, and in the urban 
areas of Laos and Burma before the 1970s. In Burma, the Chinese rarely inter-married 
with local people and show significantly low levels of assimilation. Yet, in Vietnam, 
Laos, and Cambodia, intermarriage was not uncommon and a sizable proportion of the 
local population was of partial Chinese blood. Moreover, since these countries were 
deeply influenced by Chinese culture and Buddhism, ethnic Chinese there found few 
barriers to assimilation. Generally in these four countries relations between the Chinese 
and the local peoples were good. Meanwhile, the Chinese also dominated the economy 
of these four countries.32 However, in the late 1960s the Ne Win regime in Burma 
stoked up racial animosity and ethnic conflicts against the Chinese and caused an 
exodus of Burmese Chinese, particularly after the 1967 massacre.33 In the mid-1970s, 
                                                 
31
 For more details on the stories of the Chinese in Thailand and the Philippines, see Thomson (1993), 
Chan & Tong (1993), and Chua (2003: Ch.1). 
32
 Research shows that in the 1950s the Chinese in Laos controlled whole sectors of the local economy, 
namely banking, industry, and trade (Rossetti, 1997); another official source suggests that at the end of 
1974, the Hoa (ethnic Chinese) in Vietnam controlled “more than 80 percent of the food, textile, chemical, 
metallurgy, engineering, and electrical industries, 100 percent of wholesale trade, more than 50 percent of 
retail trade, and 90 percent of export-import trade” (U.S. Library of Congress). 
33
 The 1967 anti-Chinese massacre was sponsored by the government and caused thousands of Chinese to 
die in Rangoon (Smith, 1991). 
  75 
the anti-Chinese campaign along with socialist transformation campaigns by the Hanoi 
government—and then followed by the Pathet Lao in Laos and the Khmer Rouge in 
Cambodia—caused the majority of the Hoa (nearly a million), about 90 percent of the 
Sino-Laos and 85.5 percent of the Chinese Cambodians to flee or to be expelled to other 
countries. Nonetheless, as shown in Table 3-5, the remaining Chinese communities in 
these countries still controlled a relatively large part of the economy in contrast to their 
small group size and population, disregarding the harsh political, economic, and cultural 
restrictions against them. 
 
In contrast to the ethnic Chinese in Thailand and the Philippines who have largely 
integrated into the host society, the Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia have remained 
relatively alienated from the local populations and relations between the Chinese and 
indigenous peoples have been rather tense. Although such ethnic alienation was partly 
because the practice of Islam forms an obstacle to intermarriage and full assimilation 
(Anderson, 1998; Tan, 2000), it is more the legacy of colonialism. Under colonial rule 
the Chinese were assigned a special status as tax collectors and middleman traders 
below the colonialists but above the local peoples. Because of this special status, the 
Chinese gradually built close ties with the colonialists and the European traders, 
consolidating their power in almost every field of local business. At the same time, the 
Chinese were “ghettoized” from the local people under the “divide-and-rule” principle 
and various discriminative policies, such as restrictions on residence, travel, and 
employment in civil service (Wang, 1992; Yen, 2000). Altogether, those policies not 
only reinforced the processes of “minorization” of the Chinese, but also brought about 
indigenous grievance and resentment of the favorable economic position of the 
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Chinese.34 When Indonesian and Malayan nationalism was awakened in the early-20th 
century, native activists further targeted the Chinese as potential enemies and attacked 
them during mass riots.35  
 
Nonetheless, it was the Japanese occupation of Java and Malaya in the early 
1940s—and the brutal treatment of the Chinese communities—that had the most 
immediate effect on ethnic tensions and conflicts within this region. To be sure, besides 
mass killings and “screenings,” the Japanese military authorities also practiced many 
anti-Chinese policies, such as heavy taxation of Chinese businesses.36 Moreover, they 
used the local people to suppress the Chinese, which created an undercurrent of distrust 
and resentment among the Chinese towards the indigenous people. Revenge attacks by 
the Chinese-led resistance movement against the Japanese and “collaborators”— 
particularly those cooperative indigenous officials, village chiefs, and policemen— 
further intensified inter-group hostilities and conflicts. With neither the European 
colonists nor the Japanese to protect them, Chinese civilians became the target of 
violent outbursts by the local people, and they were terrorized all across Java and 
several states of Malaya from the last days of Japanese rule until the post-war period. In 
Java, the killing of the Chinese started in October 1945 and continued intermittently 
                                                 
34
 In fact, the colonialists viewed it in their best interests to keep the Chinese an economic advantaged but 
politically powerless and socially marginalized minority. On the one hand, as long as the Chinese relied 
on government protection, not only would they not challenge colonial authority, they would be beholden 
to it (Rush, 1991; Vasil, 1980). On the other hand, whenever there were social and political crises, the 
ethnic Chinese were easily scapegoated as the cause of all misfortunes (Jacobsen, 2005).  
35
 In Indonesia, “anti-Sinicism” became widespread in the early 1910s. One interesting example was the 
formation of Sarekat Islam (SI: Islamic Union) in 1911. Being one of the major nationalist organizations 
during that period, SI’s focus was not primarily Dutch rule but the dominance of Chinese traders in Java. 
As Javanese-Chinese inequalities dramatically increased in the 1910s, inter-group conflict occasionally 
erupted into violence, much of it under the auspices of SI. Two famous riots took place in 1912 in Solo 
and Surabaya and in 1918 in Koedoes/Kudus. For more details, see Brown (2005) and Chandra (2002). 
For research on Malayan nationalism, see Wang (1992: 187-96). 
36
 The severity of Japanese discrimination against Chinese varied, with Singaporean and Malayan 
Chinese suffering the worst repression while Javanese Chinese experienced relatively benign treatment. 
For more stories of the Singaporean/Malayan and Javanese Chinese during the Japanese occupation 
period, see Akashi (2002), Brown (2005), and Cheah (2002). 
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during the Dutch military actions in 1947 and 1948.37 In Malaya, the most notable 
anti-Chinese riot was in Johor in April 1945 but soon spread to other states after August 
and the end of the war (Cheah, 2002: 104-106).  
 
To conclude, compared with other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore have in the past shared many points in common regarding inter-ethnic 
relations between the Chinese and native groups including cultural and religious 
alienation, economic imbalance, and repeated experiences of ethnic violence. Needless 
to say, at the time when Indonesia and Malaysia (and later Singapore) were gearing up 
for their independence, they also faced serious challenges on how to deal with tensions 
between the Chinese and the indigenous populations and to reduce the risks of ethnic 
riots. Also, since the level of ethnic tensions was intense in these three countries, it is 
predictable that the three governments had to practice many policies pertaining to ethnic 
groups and were in many ways involved in inter-ethnic competition. Nonetheless, their 
motivations, approaches, policy goals and contents, and ultimate successes in dealing 
with ethnic conflict varied greatly. It is well known that relations between ethnic 
Chinese and the indigenous peoples in these three countries have been quite different in 
the aftermath of their independence. On the one hand, in Indonesia a high degree of 
ethnic tension still exists and riots still occur, and the Chinese minority has suffered 
from high levels of formal and informal discrimination, especially in the Suharto period. 
On the other hand, in Singapore, although the Chinese form the overwhelming majority, 
people from different ethnic groups live together peacefully and equally. Between these 
two extremes, in Malaysia, the Chinese so far have been spared physical violence, 
though inter-ethnic relations in this country are still characterized by a form of 
                                                 
37
 For details on anti-Chinese violence in the Japanese occupation years (1942-45) and the revolutionary 
years (1945-49) see Appendix B-1, Shiraishi (1997), and Touwen-Bouwsma (2002). 
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institutionalized discrimination against the Chinese. All in all, it is both interesting and 
academically valuable to compare how these three countries have coped with their 
ethnic problems and why they have followed very different trajectories. Meanwhile, 
even in each country, policy orientations and challenges have not been the same during 
different time periods and/or under different governments. Thus, a comparative analysis 
that addresses both the changes in state-majority-minority relations within each country 
and the differences between the three countries is necessary. All of these are the main 
focus of the following four chapters. 




The data in Chapter III shows that ethnic relations are closely related to policy and 
institutional discrimination or restrictions in economic, political, and cultural areas. 
Government institutions and policies have a profound influence on ethnic relations 
because, to a large extent and in the long run, they change the status of an ethnic group 
vis-à-vis others economically, politically, and culturally. The new balance or imbalance 
among ethnic groups can either improve ethnic relations or otherwise create problems 
that may lead to open confrontation among ethnic groups as well as conflict between the 
affected ethnic groups and the government. After a brief introduction of the history of 
the Chinese in Southeast Asian countries during their colonial period, this chapter will 
apply the “ethnic triangle” model to review and explain the processes in which state 
policies and institutions and the corresponding reactions of ethnic groups bring changes 
in the relationships among the state, the pribumi (indigenous Indonesian) majority, and 
the Chinese minority in post-colonial Indonesia. 
 
As shown in Figure 4-1, from 1950 to 200938 the history of Indonesia can be divided 
into three periods in terms of the nature of its state-pribumi-Chinese relations. In the 
Sukarno era (Phase I, 1950-1965)—especially during the Guided Democracy Era 
(1957-1965), a Type-6 triangle was slowly formed in which the pribumis felt cast out by 
a Sukarno-PKI/Chinese alliance.39 The 1965 Coup ended the Sukarno era and brought 
the triangular relationships into a new stage (Phase II, 1966-1998). At first, the new 
                                                 
38
 Indonesia proclaimed its independence on 17 August 1945. However, from 1945 to 1949, Indonesia 
was engaged in the independence struggle with the Netherlands until the Dutch eventually recognized 
Indonesia’s sovereignty on 27 December 1949. 
39
 As will be discussed later, the majority members of the PKI were pribumis, but the ethnic Chinese 
were also involved in this triangular game due to various reasons—and thus an “ethnic” triangle was 
formed. 
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anti-PKI and anti-Chinese military government improved its relations with the pribumis 
at the expense of the political and cultural rights of the ethnic Chinese—the latter 
became the outcast. However, as General Suharto’s power had been consolidated and 
gradually personalized, the state’s relationship to the majority pribumis worsened year 
after year, along with the further decay of state-Chinese and pribumi-Chinese relations. 
Eventually, this “unit-veto” triangle broke up during the 1998 financial crisis. In the 
Post-Suharto era (Phase IV, 1998-2009), Indonesia democratized, many discriminatory 
anti-Chinese policies were removed, and conflicts between the state and society were 
solved through institutional channels such as free and open elections. Nevertheless, 
whether ethnic relations would also improve still requires further observation.  
 
Figure 4-1: Shifts of the Ethnic Triangle in Indonesia, 1950-2009 
 
Note: “T1/2…” refer to “Type-1/2… ethnic triangle” originally introduced in Chapter II, see Table 2-1 
 
Phase I (1950-1965): Formation of the State-Minority Alliance and its Breakup 
 
In the early years of independence—i.e. during the period of 1950-1957—Indonesian 
politics was highly unstable, and the central government faced challenges from multiple 
forces. First, there were the Darul Islam rebels (1948-1962) along with several other 
groups in the Islamic movement in West Java, South Sulawesi, and Aceh, all trying to 
overthrow the central authority in Jakarta (Dijk, 1981; Ramage: 1995: 17-26). Second, 
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while the military was a crucial partner of the central government in quashing local 
rebellions, it became troublesome when it opposed government policies and when many 
of its officers sought a dominant role in politics (Hindley, 1962). Third, in parliament 
there were about one hundred parties competing for power, resulting in “a constant 
change of cabinets and government coalitions” (Sundhaussen, 1989: 431). From 
September 1950 to March 1957, there were six cabinet changes in less than seven 
years.40 To be sure, the multiple political forces could be divided into three major 
camps: the nationalists (e.g. the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, the Nationalist Party 
of Indonesia)), the Muslims (e.g. Masjumi and the Nahdatul Ulama (NU)), and the 
Socialists (e.g. the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI, the Socialist Party of Indonesia) and 
the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, the Communist Party of Indonesia)). The serious 
power struggle happened not only between camps, but also within each camp. 
Nonetheless, it should be noted that although these three competing camps constituted a 
kind of “strategic triangle” in the central government, such a triangle was based on 
political ideology and party affiliation, not on ethnic identity. On the national level, the 
central government, island rebels, and the military also constituted a larger triangular 
relationship; still, the conflict or cooperation among them was constrained by 
complicated factors such as religion, ethnicity, political and economic interests, and 
even support from foreign countries.  
 
Compared with the aforementioned social forces, the Chinese as an ethnic group was 
not salient in the political arena, as it constituted only three percent of the total 
population and its members were primarily concentrated in a few big cities.41 Although 
                                                 
40
 For details about the cabinets and politics during this period, see Feith ([1962]2007). 
41
 The ethnic issue was sensitive in Indonesia, thus no census since 1930 included information about 
people’s ethnicity until the 2000 census. Yet, according to Suryadinata’s estimate (c2004; 2005) on the 
basis of people with Chinese surnames before the 1966 name-changing regulation, the Chinese in the 
mid-1960s constituted about three percent of the total population or about 2.3 to 2.6 million people. 
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the Chinese held disproportional economic power, it was not yet considered a serious 
socio-political “problem” that needed urgent correction. In society there were no 
anti-Chinese riot reported during 1950-1956. As for the government, while it did 
practice a set of discriminatory policies to seize economic control of foreign-owned 
businesses, these were targeted against foreigners in general.42 While the policies also 
affected non-citizen Chinese, they were not specifically directed against ethnic Chinese 
citizens. Besides, these practices and other related economic policies were not always 
strong, as the government often had to pay more attention to dealing with local 
rebellions and power struggles in the cabinet. Moreover, except for limited economic 
restrictions, the ethnic Chinese faced very few institutional restrictions on their cultural 
and political activities. Admittedly, in order to integrate Indonesian society the state did 
attempt to push minorities (including the Chinese) to join the mainstream through 
national schools and institutions and through popularization of national symbols and 
national ideology Pancasila.43 Yet, due to the practice of parliamentary democracy, it 
was hard to adopt coercive assimilation policies; ethnic minorities were able to retain a 
large degree of cultural autonomy (Suryadinata, 1997; 2004). As for the ethnic Chinese, 
the relatively open socio-political atmosphere and instigation from PRC diplomats led 
to a re-sinicization of the Chinese community in terms of an increasing flow of Chinese 
literature, the opening of Chinese-language schools, a resurrection of Chinese religions, 
and the construction of temples throughout the country in the early 1950s (Jacobsen, 
2005). Some Chinese even formed several political parties to look after their interests. 
Unfortunately, only Badan Permusjawaratan Kewarganegaraan Indonesia (Baperki, 
                                                 
42
 Such as the Urgency Industrialization Plan (1951) and two regulations aimed at “indigenizing” the 
rice-mill enterprises and harbor facilities (1954). For details about economic policies during 1950-1957, 
see Brooks (1997), Glassburner (1962), Schmitt (1962), Suryadinata (2005), and Taylor (1963). 
43
 Pancasila was affirmed by Sukarno in his 1945 national speech and then it formed the basis of the 
1945 Constitution. The five tenets of Pancasila are: the belief in the one and only one God, a just and 
civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, consultative democracy, and social justice for all. 
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the Indonesian Citizenship Consultative Body, formed in 1954) developed to a certain 
scale within the Chinese community. Yet, it was still of little political influence at the 
national level. Chinese who had political ambitions had to join indigenous-dominated 
parties like the PNI, PKI, Partai Katholik (Catholic Party) and Muslim parties; they 
could not be treated as representatives of the Chinese community.44 
 
Nonetheless, the Chinese gradually became “a problem” as a result of several 
developments: the rapid expansion of the PKI, the changing political nature and power 
structure in the Guided Democracy Era (1957-1965), and the breakdown of the 
Indonesian economy in the early 1960s.  
 
Committing itself to a nationalist, anti-western and anti-capitalist position, the PKI had 
grown rapidly at the mass level since 1951, from only a few thousand to over one 
million members in mid-1950s. In order to protect themselves from repression by 
powerful factions in the military—within which voices were outspokenly 
anti-communist both in the central command and in the regions—the PKI attempted to 
build close ties with Sukarno, while Sukarno utilized the PKI to counterbalance the 
military, Muslim parties, and other opponents (Hindley, 1962; Lev, 1966; Sundhaussen, 
1989). After the 1955 national election, tensions among major political forces 
intensified when no clear victor emerged in parliament.45 After two failed coups in late 
1956 and the Permesta Rebellion in early 1957 by regional military leaders in the outer 
islands,46 Sukarno was out of patience for the chaos of party politics. In March 1957, 
                                                 
44
 Such as the cases of Ong Eng Die (Minister of Finance) and Lie Kiat Teng (Minister of Health), who 
were two peranakan cabinet members during 1950-1957 (Suryadinata, 1993). 
45
 In this election, the PNI won 22 percent of votes and got 57 (out of 257) parliament seats, Masjumi 
won 21 percent of votes and 57 seats, the NU won 18 percent of votes and 45 seats, the PKI won 16 
percent of votes and 39 seats, and other 25 parties carved up the rest 59 seats—including the 
Chinese-based party Baperki (one seat) (Feith, [1962]2007: 436). 
46
 Permesta (Piagam Perdjuangan Semesta, or Charter of Common Struggle) was a rebel movement led 
by the regional military leaders in North Sulawesi to fight against the Sukarno government. In 1958 it 
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prodded on by the military,47 Sukarno proclaimed martial law and forced the cabinet to 
resign. After Sukarno restored the original 1945 authoritarian constitution in July 1959 
and outlawed the PSI and the Masjumi in August 1960, a new “triangle” in the politics 
and the three pillars of power was confirmed: Sukarno, the supreme authority and the 
leader of Indonesia; the military, the junior partner in government that challenged the 
president quite often (backed by the Muslims); and the PKI, the staunch ally of Sukarno 
with conflicting interests with the military.48 Eventually, pressure from the military and 
the Muslims pushed Sukarno even closer to the PKI, giving the PKI opportunities to 
further expand its strength. In 1962 the PKI claimed two million members and above 11 
million members in a network of mass organizations, making it the largest communist 
party outside the Soviet bloc. The PKI was also well represented in local 
administrations as well as in several high-level councils to advise the government.49  
 
The political implication of the PKI’s expansion, however, was much more than the 
intensifying conflict of interests between the PKI and the military. The alleged 
connections between the PKI and the communist regime in China, accompanied by the 
close relations between Jakarta and Beijing as a result of Sukarno’s increasing emphasis 
on a Jakarta-Beijing axis against neo-colonialist forces, caused many Indonesians to fear 
that Sukarno’s government would be a transition toward a communist state, that the PKI 
would be the vanguard of China, and that China would eventually invade Indonesia 
(Lev, 1966b). In this context, many Indonesians distrusted the Chinese, not only because 
                                                                                                                                               
allied with Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia (PRRI, the Revolutionary Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia), another rebel movement based in West Sumatra, in a revolt in February. Both 
were defeated by the central government in military campaigns, 1958-1959, yet the rebellion sputtered on 
until 1961. For details, see Doeppers (1972) and Lev (1966: 37-54).  
47
 As Roosa (2006: 205-206) pointed out, after the 1957 local elections—in which the PKI came out as 
the first-ranked party in Central Java and the second-ranked in East and West Java—many believed that 
the PKI would win the plurality of votes if elections were held again. Thus, many anti-PKI military 
officers supported Sukarno’s acquisition of dictatorial powers in the hope that he would block the PKI. 
48
 For an excellent account of this triangular relationship, see Feith (1963: 336-342). 
49
 For example, in 1962, the deputy governors of three of the four provinces in Java were PKI members, 
and two main PKI leaders were appointed by Sukarno as advisory ministers in March (Pauker, 1965). 
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of the prevailing view among the Indonesians that the Chinese were sympathetic to the 
communists by their association with the Baperki, but also because of their Chinese 
extraction—that as long as the Chinese in Indonesia remained unassimilated, they were 
a potential “fifth column” of the PRC (Tan, 2004). It should be noted that in the late 
1950s, the majority of ethnic Chinese still had dual nationals of both Indonesia and 
China, thus their loyalties to Indonesia were often questioned.50 Largely due to this 
political concern (i.e. the loyalty issue), the government began to exercise more rigid 
control over Chinese schools and newspapers. In late 1957, the government issued a law 
prohibiting Indonesian citizens from entering foreign schools, i.e. the Chinese-medium 
schools. In April and October 1958, the government banned all Chinese newspapers and 
closed down the pro-Taipei Chinese schools due to Taiwan’s alleged involvement in the 
regional rebellions in Sumatra and South Sulawesi (Suryadinata, c2004). In 1960, 
foreign schools were converted to national schools following government regulation PP 
No.48 (Pelly, 2004).  
 
In addition to the changing political system and political nature, there were also great 
changes in the Indonesian economy during 1957-1965, which made “the Chinese 
problem” an increasingly salient issue for the pribumis. As mentioned before, the major 
businesses in Indonesia used to be controlled mostly by the Europeans—especially the 
Dutch—and some by ethnic Chinese. Although the government had practiced several 
“indigenization” policies since the early 1950s, the success of these policies was limited. 
Although indigenous businessmen were granted privileges and licenses in various fields, 
they lacked capital, managing skills, and commercial linkage to customers and suppliers. 
                                                 
50
 Under Chinese law a person was considered a Chinese citizen according to the principle of jus sanguis 
(law of the blood, meaning one’s nationality is passed from parents). This meant that the Indonesian 
citizens of Chinese descent could maintain their nationals of China. In the 1955 Bandung Conference, 
China and Indonesia signed the Dual Nationality Treaty, making provisions with ethnic Chinese with 
Indonesian citizenship to be released from Chinese citizenship. Yet, the treaty did not come into effect 
until 1962. For details, see Purdey (2006: 9-14).  
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As a result, they usually sold their names or their licenses as the nominal owners of 
ethnic-Chinese firms (a.k.a. “Ali Baba” enterprises), thus giving the Chinese good 
opportunities to expand their dominance from their traditional activities (wholesale and 
retail trade) to the fields of import and export trade and industry that had once been 
controlled by the Dutch (Siregar, 1969). The failure of economic reform in the early 
1950s gave rise to resentment and frustration among the indigenous businessmen and 
stimulated the Assaat Movement in 1956 calling for affirmative action for indigenous 
business.51 Although the movement eventually failed due to lack of support from the 
government, it fed the rise of anti-Sinicism in Indonesia in late 1950s. More importantly, 
in 1957, the deterioration in Indonesian-Dutch relations resulted in the announcement of 
an Indonesian government takeover of Dutch companies, which fatally impacted the 
ethnic Chinese. After Dutch business was eliminated, the Chinese community became 
the second largest economic power next to the state. Although the Chinese by no means 
dominated the Indonesian economy in the same way the Dutch did prior to 1957, its 
growing economic power and its foreign origin, accompanied by the fact that the 
average Chinese was better off than the average pribumi, made this community an 
obvious target for pribumi nationalists (Dick, 2002). In 1959, under pressure from the 
military, the Muslims, and other sections of economic nationalists, Sukarno first 
announced the take-over of 13 Chinese-owned banks, and then introduced Presidential 
Decree No.10 (PP10), banning aliens from maintaining residence in rural West Java and 
engaging in retail trade in all rural areas. While the ban was not applied against the 
Chinese Indonesian citizens and Sukarno also intervened to lessen the severity of the 
attacks on Chinese by the regional authority, the resulting forced evacuation of the 
Chinese community to major towns and cities was seen as a racist move aimed at 
                                                 
51
 This movement was launched by an indigenous businessman, Mohammad Assaat, and was supported 
by the Masjumi and the PSI. Later it established branches across Java and on the Outer Islands (Alatas, 
1997: 130; Feith, [1962]2007: 481-487). 
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containing the Chinese in ghettos.52 Unfortunately, the expulsion of Chinese traders 
from rural areas did not succeed in curtailing Chinese economic participation in 
Indonesia, as the Chinese could keep running their businesses by sharing profits with 
pribumi license holders through the Ali Baba system. Moreover, this anti-Chinese action 
caused serious protest from Beijing, which immediately dispatched ships to Indonesian 
ports to repatriate the Chinese. It was reported that in 1960 about 136,000 Chinese left 
Indonesia. Beijing’s drastic reaction, however, further strengthened many Indonesians’ 
fear of communism and their distrust toward the local Chinese (Mackie, 1976: 82-97).  
 
Nevertheless, what had led Indonesia to economic crisis since the start of the 1960s was 
not the failure to takeover Chinese economic power, but the government’s overall 
neglect of economic development during this period, as there were always other more 
pressing matters on the national agenda. For example, the government announced an 
eight-year economic development plan to be initiated in January 1961. Yet, its 
implementation was almost nonexistent, as eighty percent of national resources were 
devoted to the expenditures that the government considered necessary “for the 
achievement of internal security”—as well as for the campaign against the Dutch over 
West Irian (1962) and the “Konfrontasi” (Confrontation) with Malaysia over the 
formation of the Federation of Malaysia (1963-1966) (Pauker, 1963: 73). Adding insult 
to injury, in 1962-1963 there was a prolonged drought that caused crop failure and a 
great plague that destroyed all the rice plants and stocks in the country causing famine 
throughout Java (Adam, 2008: 5). When basic goods became scarce and prices 
skyrocketed, people became panicky and social tensions visibly increased. 
 
                                                 
52
 According to Somers (1965: 208-209), the total number of Chinese businesses in rural areas subject to 
this ban was 20-25,000. About half of these were in Java. During the same period, the total number of 
foreign enterprises involved in trade was about 125,000; presumably most of these were Chinese-owned. 
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To conclude, the politics of Indonesia in the 1960s was similar to the sixth type of 
ethnic triangle in Table 2-1, where there was a close alliance between Sukarno and his 
supporters on the one hand, and the PKI and pro-communist factions—including the 
ethnic Chinese—on the other; meanwhile, the majority—the military, the Muslims, and 
other non-Communist and anti-PKI pribumis—were outcast from this partnership of the 
state and the minority.53 Understandably, the majority’s complaints and grievances 
against the government and the PKI were very strong—and the hatred spilled over to the 
ethnic Chinese. By the mid-1960s, economic suffering of the people had reached 
intolerable proportions, and frequent anti-state and anti-PKI violence occurred all 
around Indonesia, particularly in Central and East Java and Bali (Lev, 1966b; Pauker, 
1965). Although most of such riots were not targeted at the Chinese, the Chinese 
became easily caught secondary targets whenever riots broke out. Meanwhile, many 
frustrated pribumis also cast blame on the Chinese “for their ostentatious way of life 
during a time of economic troubles” (Somers, 1974: 45), leading to a series of attacks 
on the Chinese community across West and Central Java in 1963.54  
 
By 1965, as Sukarno was ailing and without a successor, the military and the PKI 
increasingly conflicted, and Indonesia had become a dangerous cockpit of 
socio-political hostility. Finally, a coup occurred on 30 September, ending not only the 
Sukarno-PKI partnership but also the “Old Order” era. According to official Indonesian 
statements, the 1965 Coup (a.k.a. G30S) was initiated by some pro-PKI military officers 
who kidnapped and killed six anti-PKI generals on 30 September. Then the army, led by 
                                                 
53
 Although in the 1960s the PKI was no doubt the best organized and most militant of political groups, it 
was restricted to third place in the triangular game due to its immense political disadvantages. By the 
mid-1960s, the various “anti-PKI” elements formed a “coalition of majority,” the total power of which 
was stronger than the pro-PKI camp. For details, see Lev (1966b) and Utrecht (1969). 
54
 This wave of anti-Chinese riots began in late March in Cirebon, later in May spread to several towns in 
Central and West Java and Solo, Surabaya, Malang and Medan, and last of all came the most serious 
outbreak at Sukabumi and Cibadak on 18-19 May. For details, see Mackie (1976: 97-110). 
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Suharto, stopped the coup and arrested the “betrayers.” Yet, evidence linking the PKI to 
the coup is inconclusive, leading to speculation that its involvement was very limited. 
Some foreign scholars suggested the coup was an internal military power 
struggle—perhaps even engineered by Suharto as a pretext to destroy the PKI.55 Both 
of these accounts can be further explained by the triangular theory. In the former 
account, the tense horizontal confrontations between the majority (military) and the 
minority (PKI) in past years, along with the hope of seizing power in the post-Sukarno 
era, gave the PKI good reason to initiate a coup against the military. In the latter account, 
the coup can be regarded as vertical violence triggered by the outcast majority against 
the sitting government; it was a reaction from the outcast side against the state-minority 
alliance. No matter whether G30S was plotted by the PKI or Suharto, the final winner 
was no doubt the military—or, more precisely, the pro-Suharto factions in the military.  
 
Phase II (1966-1998): From State-Pribumi Marriage to a Stable Unit-Veto Triangle 
 
After the failed coup d’état of 1965, the right-wing military led by Suharto replaced the 
Sukarno administration as the new government.56 This development swiftly turned 
soured the formerly positive state-minority relations. Being anti-communist, the new 
government immediately carried out a large-scale anti-PKI campaign. In the six months 
following the takeover, a mass slaughter took place, mostly in Central and East Java, 
Bali, and North Sumatra, and caused the death of around 500,000 people who were 
suspected members, supporters, or sympathizers of the PKI (Cribb, 2001).57  The 
                                                 
55
 For example, Anderson & McVey (1971) argued that the 1965 coup was an “internal army affair” and 
that the PKI was not involved. Similarly, Poulgrain (1999) described it as “a limited pre-emptive strike” 
by pro-Sukarno officers against anti-Sukarno ones, and that Suharto was involved “from the start”. Roosa 
(2006) thought it may be true that some PKI leaders, such as its chairman Aidit and his subordinate Sjam, 
planned the coup against the right-wing army officers, but not the entire party leadership was involved in.  
56
 Yet, it was not until 11 March 1966 that Sukarno, under the pressure of mass protests and violence, 
finally signed an edict that gave the power to restore order to Suharto. For details, see Pauker (1967). 
57
 Some reported 1,000,000 people dead: 800,000 in Central and East Java, 100,000 in Bali, and 100,000 
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massacres in 1965-1966 were the single most cruel and bloody event of violence in 
Indonesia’s history. The event was a typical example of the fifth type of violence 
identified in Chapter II: vertical violence committed by the state (i.e. the military) 
against the PKI associated with horizontal (inter-communal) mass killings—the latter 
kind of violence was simply an inevitable consequence of a culmination of tensions 
from the previous several years and a direct reaction to the climate of fear and distrust.  
 
Associated with the purge of PKI members, anti-Chinese hostility again welled up to the 
surface. Although Indonesians rather than Chinese were the primary victims of the 
massacres, the Chinese “suffered considerably from harassment, intimidation, threats 
and loss or destruction of their property through mob attacks or uncontrolled extortion” 
during 1965 and 1967 (Mackie, 1976: 111).58 Also, as there were frequent official 
allegations that the PRC was trying to subvert the Indonesian government through 
various criminal activities, many of anti-Chinese riots were triggered or followed by the 
attacks on the PRC embassy, such as the cases in Makassar (November 1965), Medan 
(December 1965), and Jakarta (April, August, and October 1967). Although by the end 
of 1966 it appeared that the central government tried to restrain anti-Chinese sentiment 
to prevent a mass exodus of the Chinese and their capital, local officials and military 
commanders continued to carry out anti-Chinese campaigns, particularly in the regions 
where a few communists were still active, such as Aceh, North Sumatra, West and East 
Java, South Sulawesi, and West Kalimantan.59 Even after the termination of diplomatic 
relations between Indonesia and the PRC on 31 October 1967, anti-Chinese sentiment 
                                                                                                                                               
in Sumatra (c.f. Adam, 2008: 10). 
58
 Mackie (1976: 111-128) had a detailed review of anti-Chinese incidents and discriminatory policies by 
regional military commanders during 1965-1967. While the estimated total number of Chinese killed was 
not a particularly high figure by comparison with that of the pribumis at that time, the damages were 
destructive in terms of property and capital. 
59
 In Aceh, for example, 10,000 Chinese were expelled from the province. In West Kalimantan in January 
and April 1967, first 5,000 and later 350,000 Chinese were forced to move from the Sarawak border to 
Pontianak, with the intention of expelling them (Bertrand, 2004: 64; Kroef, 1968: 255).  
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was still strong; anything that had a tiny connection with “the Chinese” would expose 
the whole Chinese community to harassment, insults and extortions. For example, in 
West Kalimantan in late 1967, a killing of a Dayak by the Pasokan Gerilja Rakjat 
Sarawak (PGRS, the Sarawak People’s Guerrilla Movement) immediately stirred riots 
by Dayak tribesmen against Chinese civilians, as the PGRS consisted mainly of young 
Sarawak Chinese.60 In another case in October 1968, when Indonesians were enraged 
by an execution of two Indonesian marines by Singapore—a “Chinese” regime—the 
angry protesters not only destroyed the houses and shops of Singaporean Chinese living 
in Indonesia, but also attacked the property of local Chinese Indonesian citizens 
(Allison, 1969: 132-133). 
 
Understandably, under such anti-communist and anti-Chinese circumstances, the 
Suharto government implemented many discriminatory policies against ethnic Chinese. 
In the political arena, not only Baperki was dismissed in 1966, but almost all ethnic 
Chinese were disenfranchised in terms of the outright bans on permitting Chinese to fill 
certain public positions, such as the military, civil servants and medical specialties.61 In 
the cultural arena, originally, the government just endorsed a semi-private and 
military-backed “Assimilation Programme,” which urged the Chinese to immerse itself 
into mainstream society via intermarriages, converting to Islam, and giving up Chinese 
names (Heryanto, 1998).62  Then, the government went further to eliminate what 
                                                 
60
 The PGRS was an unintended legacy of the Indonesian confrontation campaign against Malaysia in the 
1960s; see Kroef (1968) and Mackie (1976) for details. Scholars also pointed out that this anti-Chinese 
violence was encouraged, instigated, or even organized by the military. For a detailed account of the 
manipulation part of the violence, see Davidson (2003: 61-65) and Davidson & Kammen (2002).  
61
 During the entire Suharto period, there were only two ethnic Chinese ever appointed MPR members 
(Suryadinata, 1993; 2001), and there was no Chinese Indonesian serving in his cabinets until March 1998, 
two months before his fall, that Suharto assigned Mohamad “Bob” Hasan—an ethnic Chinese timber 
tycoon who was his golfing partner—as Minister of Trade and Industry (Jakarta Post, 13 February 2001). 
62
 Although the Cabinet Presidium Decree no.127/1966 (the “name-changing” regulation) was not 
compulsory, during the 1960s there was gentle pressure from the state to urge Chinese Indonesians to 
change their names as a symbolic act of loyalty. While the Chinese who were already well-known by their 
original Chinese names did not change their Chinese names—or used two names, most of the younger 
  92 
Suryadinata (2004) called the “three pillars of Chinese culture”—Chinese media, civic 
associations, and schools. In 1965, all Chinese newspapers except the government- 
sponsored Yindunixiya Ribao (the Indonesia Daily) were closed down.63 In 1966, all 
Chinese social and political associations were banned. From 1966 onwards, all Chinese 
schools were closed and all ethnic Chinese children had to go to national schools. 
Finally, Presidential Directive (Inpres) No.14/1967, the “Basic Policy for the Solution 
of the Chinese Problem,” officially defined Chinese ethnic identities and their essential 
character as being problematic for national integration and unity, and therefore required 
Chinese customs of worship to be carried out “in an inconspicuous manner within the 
family circle only” (Pauker, 1968: 142). As dealing with the Chinese “problem” became 
the “basic policy” of the New Order regime, it legitimized and “institutionalized” all the 
forthcoming discriminatory policies and restrictive practices against ethnic Chinese. 
Following that, Presidential Decree (Keppres) No.240/1967 announced on 17 December 
banned Chinese writings in any form, Chinese names, and the celebration of Chinese 
festivals. After that, all publications in Chinese characters were not permitted to be 
imported into Indonesia; carrying materials printed in Chinese characters and Chinese 
medicines into Indonesia became the same kind of crime as carrying narcotics and arms, 
according to its custom regulations listed on the visitors entry form (Suryadinata 1997). 
 
Yet, in the late 1960s, the government did not introduce policies to reduce the economic 
strength of the Chinese. Quite to the contrary, in its official formulation of economic 
policy in June 1967, the government encouraged the mobilization of domestic foreign 
capital (i.e., of Chinese non-citizens) for the purposes of national development and 
                                                                                                                                               
generation of Chinese Indonesians (born after 1965) adopted Indonesian-sounding names. 
63
 The editors of Yindunixiya Ribao were native Indonesians who were related to the military newspaper 
Berita Yudha. Yindunixiya Ribao was known to be a tool of the government to convey the official voice 
and announce new restrictions to the Chinese community, especially to those who did not read Indonesian. 
Ironically, latter on it took on a key role in mediating information within the Chinese community during 
an era when no other Chinese news media were allowed (Hoon, 2006: 97). 
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promised to protect the lives, property, and businesses of all Chinese. Although the 
government also proposed phasing out foreign capital in certain sectors over the 
following decade, it offered ample opportunities for Chinese non-citizens to apply for 
naturalization before the phase-out—via the simplified naturalization procedures or via 
Suharto’s personal favor (Bertrand, 2004: 65). Obviously, there were contradictions 
between policies in the economic arena and policies in the political and cultural arena. 
The reason for such contradictions was simple: the new government had to push 
economic development in order to achieve both economic and political stability as soon 
as possible, but it lacked capital to implement its economic programs. Since the Chinese 
had huge capital and played a key role in the economic sector, the government could not 
but tolerate Chinese economic power and had to formulate economic policies that were 
not entirely consistent with its political objectives. 
 
Nevertheless, contrary to terrible state-minority and majority-minority relations, 
state-majority relations in the late 1960s seemed much more promising, particularly 
when President Suharto proclaimed programs for economic recovery and political 
reforms attacking corruption in 1968. In the economy, the government dismantled 
numerous government regulations of the Sukarno era and relied more on market forces 
to stimulate trade and production, while also set up several institutes to organize a more 
solid base for the pribumi businessmen.64 In politics, the new government allowed free 
expression of ideas, press and book publishing, and political debates on sensitive issues. 
All such attempts showed that the new government not only represented the interests of 
the majority pribumis but also was willing to work in alliance with various elements of 
the society—the military, the urban middle class, Muslims, and students (Dick, 2001). 
                                                 
64
 Such institutes included Himpunan Pengusaha Pribumi Indonesia (HIPPI, Indonesia’s Indigenous 
Business Association), Himpunan Pengusaha Muda Indonesia (HIPMI, Indonesia’s Young Businessmen 
Association), and Kamar Dagang dan Industri Indonesia (KADIN, Indonesia’s Chamber of Commerce 
and Trade). 
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Although the tight money policies adopted were at first painful and highly unpopular, 
the rate of inflation fell sharply and production increased rapidly in 1968 (Mackie & 
MacIntyre, 1994). The seemingly recovering economy and the relative openness of the 
government pleased the pribumis, and state-pribumi relations turned improved.  
 
All in all, in the early years of Suharto’s New Order era, the ethnic triangle of Indonesia 
was similar to the type-7 situation introduced in Chapter II: that the state married (or, at 
least, in date with) the majority pribumis, while both sides of this new couple disliked 
the third party—i.e. the ethnic Chinese. Unfortunately, the honeymoon between the state 
and the pribumis was very brief. After the military consolidated its ruling position, it 
appeared to be unwilling to share power with the aforementioned social forces. Starting 
in 1969, Suharto decreed a series of restrictions on political parties and organizations, 
including a ban on political activities in rural areas except at election time. Meanwhile, 
the government claimed that Golkar—an army controlled semi-official party65—was not 
a “political” organization and thus was not covered by the restrictions. As a result, 
Golkar became the only party that could act at any time in any place without restrictions 
(Allison, 1970). Nonetheless, in the 1971 parliamentary election, while Golkar got 62.8 
percent of votes and two-thirds of the seats but all “old order” nationalist parties polled 
very poorly, the Muslim parties combined still got 27.1 percent of votes and showed 
great capacity to retain their traditional supporters in the face of pro-Golkar pressures 
(Table 4-1). This outcome pushed the government to go a step further. In 1973, the 
government forced nine political parties to combine into two new ones: the NU, 
Parmusi (Indonesian Muslim Party, formed in 1968), and other Islamic groups were 
regrouped as the Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, the United Development Party); 
                                                 
65
 Golkar (Sekretariat Bersama Golongan Karya, Secretariat of Functional Groups) was founded by army 
interests in October 1964. 
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while the PNI, Murba (Party of the Masses), and other Christian and Catholic parties 
were regrouped as the Partai Demokrasi Indonesia (PDI, the Indonesian Democratic 
Party) (Samson, 1974). As all but Islamic parties had already become politically 
insignificant at that time, this regrouping program was obviously targeted against the 
Islamic parties. Since there were confrontations between moderate and radical, secular 
and traditional, elements of various Islamic parties, by reducing them to a condition of 
such disunity and weakness, they were expected to be unable to mount any effective 
challenge to Golkar in subsequent elections.  
 
Table 4-1: Indonesian Parliamentary Election Results, 1971-2009 





































Golkar 62.8 236 62.1 232 64.3 242 73.2 299 68.1 282 74.5 325 22.4 120 21.6 128 14.5 107 
PPP 27.1 94 29.3 99 27.8 94 16.0 61 17.0 62 22.4 89 10.7 58 9.2 58 5.3 37 
PDI/PDI-P 10.1 30 8.6 29 7.9 24 10.9 40 14.9 56 3.1 11 33.7 153 18.5 109 14.0 95 
PKB -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 12.6 51 10.6 52 4.9 27 
PAN -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7.1 34 6.4 52 6.0 43 
PD -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 7.5 57 20.9 150 
PK/PKS -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 1.4 7 7.3 45 7.9 57 
Total 100 360 100 360 100 364 100 400 100 400 100 425 100 462 100 550 100 560 
*Figures for PPP and PDI are based on the combined votes of parties that were merged in 1972-1973 into 
these 2 groupings. 
Sources: Ananta, et al. (2005: 14, 16-17, 22, 28) ; Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU, General Elections 
Comission); Hindley (1972); Liddle (1978; 1988); Hein (1983); MacIntyre (1993); Bird (1998). 
 
Nonetheless, the relations between Suharto and the majority pribumis were deteriorating 
not only because of the power struggle at the elite level, but also because of the 
government’s failure to eliminate corruption—or, more precisely, the high-level leaders 
were unwilling to do so. Although Suharto had proclaimed reforms on attacking 
corruption, there had been no real sanctions against corrupt high officials and bigwigs. 
Also, the New Order Government’s attitude towards ethnic Chinese businessmen was 
not much different from the Old Order government’s attitude. Even worse, the notorious 
“Ali Baba” approach of cooperation between the Chinese and the pribumis in the Old 
Order era had advanced a new alliance called the “Cukong System”—in which the 
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indigenous partners, now being upgraded to the bureaucratic elite, provided not only 
licenses but also protections and facilities in joint ventures with Chinese businessmen, 
at the expense of indigenous businessmen. 66  Beginning in January 1970, public 
dissatisfaction was expressed in a series of anti-corruption demonstrations by students 
and intellectuals, but all failed to increase government responsiveness.67 In 1973, anti- 
government and anti-Chinese sentiments became pronounced as a result of an economic 
policy that opened the door to foreign investment. Because of this policy, many U.S. 
and Japanese factories sprang up in and around Jakarta, usually on a joint-venture basis 
with Chinese Indonesian partners, creating severe competition for pribumi businessmen, 
especially the Muslim small-business class—who were also affronted by Suharto’s 
announcement of the 1973 marriage law, which seemed to be in conflict with Islamic 
law (Mackie & MacIntyre, 1994). At this point, the state-pribumi marriage ended and 
state-pribumi-Chinese relations shifted to the worst type of triangular situation, the 
type-8 “unit veto” triangle, in which all three bilateral relations were negative. Along 
with several anti-government protests by Islamic students during the last three months 
of 1973, anti-Chinese riots also occurred in Palu and Bandung.68 Finally, a violent anti- 
government protest, “the Malari Riot,” took place in Jakarta during the visit of Japanese 
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka in January 1974, with ethnic Chinese property the main 
focus of the violence, ending with 11 dead, over 800 individuals detained, more than 
100 buildings burned or gutted, and thousands of shops looted (Hansen, 1975: 152). 
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 The “Ali Baba” approach can be seen as merely “deals” between the pribumi license-holders and the 
Chinese who actually run the businesses; while the “cukong system” contains government high officials’ 
or military generals’ involvement. “Cukong” in Chinese (Hokkien) refers to a capitalist who loans out his 
capital for use by others; but “cukong-ism” in Indonesia has taken on an anti-Chinese connotation. 
67
 See Hindley (1971) and Samson (1973) for details. Later, in 1971, another wave of student protests 
was staged again against the Taman Mini Indah project, an expensive theme park in which Suharto’s wife 
Siti Hartinah held a substantial interest. See Boudreau (2004: 111-114) for student protests in the 1970s. 
68
 The riots in Palu on 27 June was triggered by a Chinese shop owner who used a paper with Koran to 
pack—which was regarded as impiety. The riots in Bandung on 5 August was triggered by a car accident 
in which a Chinese driver knocked down a pribumi on the road, which stirred thousands of pribumis went 
on a rampage through the main Chinese business district of Bandung. For details, see Samson (1974). 
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The Malari Riot had far reaching effects. Fearing that the various “sources of 
instability”—the growing Islamic opposition forces, energetic student activists, and 
repeated anti-state protests and violence—might easily overwhelm the regime at any 
time, immediately after the Malari Riot the government provoked a harsh crackdown of 
arrests, followed by the banning of public meetings, the closure of 12 dailies—including 
the crusading newspaper Indonesia Raya that had supported Suharto in 1965 to 1967, 
and restrictions on foreign investment (Dick, 2001: 211-212; Hansen, 1975: 148-156). 
Since then, the New Order regime quickly shifted to an authoritarian system in which 
political power was centralized in Suharto while society-based forces were largely 
excluded and rendered almost powerless to influence state policies or the power 
distribution at the top. In other words, the political base of the government narrowed 
sharply as its former supporters became antagonized by its increasing reliance on 
exclusion, coercion and repression. Although Suharto and the high-ranking 
officials—most of whom were chosen by Suharto—were from the pribumi majority, 
they were by no means representing any corporate interests of the pribumis. As for its 
ethnic triangular situation, Indonesia was still trapped in the type-8 unit-veto triangle. 
According to the triangle theory, such a stressful situation was not supposed to be 
sustainable for long. However, by tight restrictions on the opposition movement, 
depoliticization of society, the promise of economic development, and the containment 
of “the Chinese problem”, Suharto “successfully” kept this ethnic triangle—as well as 
his regime—stable for a long period, until the mid-1990s.  
 
First, regarding the conflicts between the pribumis and the government, Suharto first 
tried to incapacitate the student activists with Ministry of Education Regulation SK028 
(1974) and the Campus Normalization Law (1978). Under these two regulations, all 
kinds of political activities at universities were forbidden, and troops could enter 
  98 
campuses to arrest students whenever an alleged political event took place.69 One 
immediate outcome of the repression of student movements, however, was the loss of 
support from intellectuals. In the 1971 election many secular intellectuals actively 
supported Golkar in order to counterbalance the political influence of Islam. But in the 
1977 election such supporters were hard to find in the universities or non-government 
institutes and presses. On the other hand, the PPP obtained approximately 30 percent of 
the votes in the election—two percent higher than in 1971—and got 99 of the 360 
elected seats in the Parliament (see Table 4-1). In order to reduce the power of political 
Islam, beginning in 1978 the government undertook a national indoctrination program 
to inculcate Pancasila values in all citizens. In 1984 the government further submitted 
five Pancasila-related draft bills to Parliament, including “the Political Parties and 
Golkar Amendment Bill” and “the Mass Organization Bill”, which stipulated that all 
political parties and mass organizations had to adopt Pancasila as their sole ideological 
principle. The intent of the government to divorce Islam from politics by subordinating 
Islam to a secular state ideology infuriated the Muslims, especially the fundamentalists. 
From 1981 to 1985, various kinds of anti-government violence took place around 
Indonesia.70 Yet, such disturbances did not succeed in forcing the government to 
abandon the bills. In 1985, all five bills were passed. Along with the repression of 
student movements and the depoliticization of Islam, the systematic and comprehensive 
control of mass media via issuing licenses, censoring news texts, and controlling the 
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 For example, in late 1977, there were many student-led anti-government protests around the country. 
On 18 January 1978, the student council at Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) issued a “white book” 
criticizing the government and calling for Suharto to be replaced. To stop such activities, in February 
troops occupied ITB campus, and a series of arrests of student leaders followed in Bandung, Yogya, 
Surabaya, Jakarta and Medan (Liddle, 1978: 175-185).  
70
 Such violent incidents included an attack on a police station in Cicendo on 11 March 1981, a hijacking 
of a Garuda airliner bound from Palembang to Medan on 28 March 1981, violent protests led by the PPP 
supporters in Jakarta in March 1982 and sporadic instances of violence in Jakarta and Central Java 
afterwards, the “Tanjung Priok incident” in Jakarta in mid-September 1984, and a number of bombings 
and incendiary attacks around Java in 1984 and 1985. For details, see Friend (2003: 190-194); Hein (1983: 
182); Suryadinata (1990: 27-30); Weatherbee (1985: 188-189); Weatherbee (1986: 143-144). 
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career track of journalists continued throughout the whole Suharto era. A wide range of 
press media were forced to close down because their reports enraged the government.71  
 
Other than political manipulation and coercion, the New Order regime also benefited 
from the oil boom in 1973-1974. The world-wide rise in oil prices brought vastly 
greater revenues into the government’s coffers than ever before, and thus the 
government had more resources to distribute and to carry out development plans.72 
Because the government had the power to decide who could access these financial 
resources, contracts, and licenses, it had unprecedented power to bestow patronage upon 
its supporters and to threaten its opponents or critics. Meanwhile, the various economic 
programs, along with the increased export earnings from oil and foreign investment, 
contributed to overall growth. Over 1974-1981, Indonesia’s annual GDP growth rates 
averaged 7.5 percent, up from 2.0 percent during 1961-1965 and 6.5 percent during 
1966-1973.73  Economic progress in a number of areas—exports, salary, inflation 
control, rice production, and standard of living—was also improving. In 1982, 
Indonesia for the first time graduated from the ranks of the poorest low-income 
countries into the ranks of the (lower-)middle-income countries according to the World 
Bank’s categorization, with an estimated per capita income of almost $600 per year 
(Hein, 1983). As people’s lives became better, the social pressure that the government 
faced also decreased. 
 
The economic boost from high oil prices finally went abated after 1982 due to the 
global recession. Nonetheless, the Indonesian government then had accumulated enough 
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 For numerous examples, see Bertrand (2004), Djiwandono (1995), Gazali (2003), Hein (1983), Kitley 
(2002), Liddle (1987), and Weatherbee (1985).   
72
 For examples, see Liddle (1977). 
73
 Author’s calculation based on the data from IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (1980-2008); 
Sundrum (1986: 42); Sundrum (1988: 43). See Appendix C for the annual data. 
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capacity to apply macro-economic adjustment measures to moderate the impact of the 
oil crisis. Starting in 1985, the government began another wave of economic reform, 
aimed at reducing its dependence on oil by encouraging exports in other sectors.74 The 
series of reforms brought another wave of rapid growth, with its annual GDP growth 
rates averaging 7.2 percent from 1989 to 1995, up from 4.6 percent from 1982 to 1988 
(Appendix C). In particular, this wave of growth was contributed to more by non-oil 
exports, which in 1989 already accounted for 60 percent of total exports—80 percent of 
such exports were from industrial products rather than traditional basic commodities 
(Hein, 1990: 226). Indonesia’s rapid and sustained economic growth during this period 
impressed the world; in 1993 it was classified as a “high-performing Asian economy” 
(HPAE) by the World Bank. Accompanying economic development, there were also 
improvements in social welfare, as reflected in the decline in the incidence of poverty 
and considerable progress in primary care and education (Thee, 2001: 165-180). In 1976 
40 percent of Indonesia’s population was below the poverty line, while in 1996 only 11 
percent of the people were below the line. According to the World Bank (1999), poverty 
was reduced more rapidly in Indonesia than in any other Third World country in the 
same period (cf. Suhandinata, 2009). Most important of all, unlike in many developing 
countries, Indonesia’s rapid growth was not accompanied by worsening income 
distribution. At least until 1995, the relative inequality of Indonesia still remained low, 
and the Gini ratios showed no clear upward trend (Hill, c2000; Thee, 2001). According 
to Schwarz (2000: 80), the wealth distribution during the New Order was better than it 
had been previously; it was “reasonably ‘equal’ by international standards”. In a 
nutshell, in the 1980s and early 1990s, Suharto was successful in enhancing Indonesia’s 
economy, and this achievement helped him keep the regime stable. 
                                                 
74
 The scope of the reform was very broad, see Hein (1989), Hill (c2000: ch.6), Liddle (1987; 1988), 
MacIntyre (1993; 1994), Mallarangeng & Liddle (1996), and Weatherbee (1986) for details. 
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While managing state-majority relations via a carrot-and-stick strategy (i.e. promising 
economic growth but suppressing the opposition forces at the same time), the state also 
had to handle the tensions between the pribumis and the Chinese, otherwise such 
tensions would continue to be the main source of social chaos. Since past 
inter-communal conflicts had resulted mostly from the Chinese community’s economic 
superiority (or pribumi’s relative deprivation), many policies were introduced starting in 
1974 to reduce the economic strength of the Chinese. For example, a resolution of the 
Cabinet publicized in January 1974 made it mandatory for foreign investors operating in 
Indonesia to take the form of joint ventures in which the equity participation of pribumi 
individuals or companies had to be at least 20 percent—and the percentage was to be 
raised to 51 percent within ten years (Gurney, 1983). Since ethnic Chinese were not 
counted as pribumi, this resolution forced the Chinese-owned enterprises to shift part of 
its share to the pribumis. Also, Presidential Decree No.10/1979 and No.14A/1980 gave 
indigenous companies priority in obtaining government contracts: for small projects, 
only pribumis were allowed to bid; for big government projects, a special team called 
Team 10 was set-up to decide on project allocations, in which the pribumis were often 
favored (Schwarz, 2000). Starting in 1981, the government further required contractors 
to use locally produced goods and pushed larger firms to take on smaller, pribumi-run 
firms as suppliers, distributors, agents, sub-contractors and retailers (Hein, 1982: 207). 
 
It should be noted that in 1976 the Bank of Indonesia issued a publication specifying 
different conditions for extending credit to the pribumis and non-pribumis. To obtain 
certain permits or official documents, Chinese Indonesians were required to show proof 
of citizenship, while other Indonesians were not. Originally, this was only a 
discriminatory financial regulation that was aimed against ethnic Chinese who were 
asking for an extension of their credit. However, in 1979 it developed into requiring all 
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Chinese Indonesians to re-register their citizenship. Not only did the Chinese have to 
follow more difficult procedures to obtain ID cards or citizenship documents, but also 
their new ID cards contained special codes. As a result, even though most Chinese did 
not use Chinese names, and many of them did not look Chinese due to generations of 
intermarriage, they were still easily recognized as ethnic Chinese through their ID 
cards—and were discriminated against in almost all social spheres (Liddle, 1997; Siegal, 
1998). Not to mention that the government practices of cultural assimilation toward 
ethnic Chinese were even more coercive in the late 1970s and 1980s than in the early 
1970s. Meanwhile, because the Chinese community had been depoliticized since 1965, 
there were no credible sociopolitical leaders or NGOs to represent the Chinese minority 
or protect their interests. While there were a few government-affiliated or 
government-sponsored “broker-type” institutes such as the Centre for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS, 1971), Badan Komunikasi (Bakom, Communication Body, 
1977), and Prasetya Mulya (Noble Promise, 1980),75 which were supposed to be 
channels for Chinese input into politics, such institutions served more to advocate the 
assimilation of the Chinese than to promote the interests of the Chinese community. 
While the interests of the Chinese community could also be articulated through ethnic 
Chinese tycoons who had connections with pribumi authorities, it seemed that these 
economic elites were, at best, influential in the economic field but not in other fields 
(Suryadinata, 2005).  
 
It is worth discussing the orientation of Suharto’s ethnic policies and the impacts of such 
policies on the ethnic Chinese community and on pribumi-Chinese relations. As already 
stated, from the last years of the Sukarno era to Suharto’s regime, the relationships 
between the ethnic Chinese and the pribumis had been tense as a result of 
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 For details, see Suryadinata (1993: 306, n12; 2001: 504-505). 
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cultural/religious and economic differences. Facing “the Chinese problem”, the Suharto 
government’s attitude was quite contradictory. On the one hand, the state tried to 
assimilate the ethnic Chinese into the mainstream through strong-arm assimilation 
policies so that there would be no cultural differences between ethnic Chinese and the 
native population. On the other hand, economic indigenization policies aimed at 
reducing the wealth gap (economic differences) between ethnic groups required the 
“pribumi-non-pribumi” dichotomy to be institutionalized and perpetuated. Obviously, 
the Indonesian government faced a dilemma between its cultural goals and economic 
demands. Even worse, concerning its various economic demands, the government faced 
the additional dilemma of encouraging the Chinese to participate as fully as possible in 
the economy for the good of overall economic growth or excluding the Chinese from 
development projects to protect the indigenous business class. As a result, government 
policies toward ethnic Chinese were not always consistent.  
 
In hindsight, Suharto’s strong-arm approach to assimilating ethnic Chinese was, to a 
certain degree, “successful” in expunging Chinese cultural identity. Most of the 
Chinese—particularly the younger generation Chinese Indonesians who were born in 
(or after) the 1960s and were required by law to go to Indonesian schools—had very 
few chances to learn Chinese (Mandarin or dialects) or experience traditional festivals 
in the public sphere; thus they became quite alien to Chinese culture. In this author’s 
interviews in Jakarta and Tangerang in 2007, 18 of the interviewees—all of whom were 
below 45 years old—stated Bahasa Indonesian as their first language, and only six 
people could speak some Chinese (Mandarin or dialects). As for their national identity, 
four of them identified themselves merely as “Indonesian citizens” and the other 14 
identified themselves as “Indonesian Chinese”—and even among these 14 people, nine 
emphasized that “our nation is Indonesia” and five commented that their Chineseness 
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“was not strong” (interview note, April 2007). 76 Although the sample size of these 
informal interviews was small, the outcome of the interviews was similar to Wen’s 
survey result (2003)77 and, to some degree, confirmed Suryadinata’s observation (2008: 
2) that a large number of ethnic Chinese “have been Indonesianized, if not indigenized” 
and that their way of thinking is “more Indonesian than Chinese.” 
 
On the other hand, Suharto’s nationalist economic policies were unsuccessful in 
reducing the economic power of the Chinese. Firstly, the various restrictions, at most, 
only blocked the new Chinese businessmen from entering into the economy but did not 
hurt the existing Chinese tycoons much because they were already in partnership with 
influential pribumis. Moreover, without the competition of the newcomers, existing 
Chinese tycoons were able to further build up strong and mutually beneficial bonds and 
backdoor relations with Suharto, his family members, regional military commanders, 
provincial governors, and government ministries. They became a class of very wealthy 
owners of vast business conglomerates through such patron-client relations (Bertrand, 
2004). Furthermore, in the mid-1980s, together with economic openness policies aimed 
at encouraging exports in non-oil sectors, the government also loosened up on the 
pribumi-non-pribumi distinctions in economic matters in order to encourage Chinese 
investment in productive activities. Along with the decrease of government intervention 
in the market, the role of the ethnic Chinese was increasing. Then, when the government 
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 The interviews were conducted with the help of a Chinese Indonesian who was a high-ranking official 
in the P.T. Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Corp, which belongs to the Sinar Mas Group—the third biggest 
Indonesian conglomerate founded by a Chinese tycoon Eka Cipta Widjaja. The 24 interviewees were 
either from the P.T. Indah Kiat Pulp & Paper Corp, or the Sekolah Pelita Harapan (a 12-year National 
Christian School founded by the Lippo Group, the largest Indonesian conglomerate founded by another 
Chinese tycoon, Mochtar Riady), or the PT. Tekevisi Anak Space Toon (a local affiliation of a nationwide 
TV station TV Edukasi). The interviews were mainly in English and some in Indonesian (with translator).  
77
 In Wen’s survey of 168 Chinese Indonesians in 2002, 75 percent of the respondents believed 
“Indonesia is my country” and 67 percent of them would stay in the country during difficult times, while 
only seven percent of respondents would emigrate or flee to other countries. 98 percent of people 
communicated with their friends in Bahasa Indonesian and 66 percent of people believed “it is ok to 
marry the pribumi”. 
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stipulated banking deregulation in the late-1980s, Chinese tycoons who owned capital 
began to dominate the banking sectors.78 As a result, in 1993 the Chinese-run private 
enterprises contributed 44 percent of Indonesia’s annual GDP, whereas state enterprises 
contributed 24.4 percent and Indonesian-run enterprises contributed less than 10 percent 
of Indonesia’s annual GDP (Chang & Wang, 2000: 311). Another report in 1994 showed 
that 18 of the 25 richest Indonesian conglomerates were of ethnic Chinese origin, while 
three of the top ten richest Chinese businessmen in Asia were Indonesian nationals 
(Heryanto, 1998: 112, n10). 
 
As for ethnic relations, Suharto’s policies failed to ease tensions between the Chinese 
and the pribumis and between the state and the pribumis. First, although ethnic Chinese 
had become culturally less Chinese, the majority pribumis continued to retain separate 
identities of “we/pribumi” and “they/Chinese” and stereotype ethnic Chinese as selfish 
“economic creatures” (Hoon, 2006; Natalia, 2008; Ramage, 1995). As socio-politically 
marginalized outcasts, the Chinese did not have any means to correct this stigmatization 
(Chua, 2004). Second, discriminatory policies against ethnic Chinese in politics 
confined most Chinese to the economic field, unintentionally increasing their economic 
power and further isolating them from the economically weaker pribumi masses. To be 
sure, except being hired by some private institutes and enterprises, a large part of the 
ethnic Chinese could not but choose to run retail trade in small towns among the earliest 
places of Chinese settlement. Such enterprises were small grocery shops and family 
businesses; the majority of the Chinese were as poor as—or only slightly wealthier 
than—the pribumis. However, the Chinese-owned retailers were so visible that they 
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 For example, the Salim Group owns Bank Central Asia (BCA)—Indonesia’s largest private bank; The 
Lippo Group owns Lippo Bank; the Sinar Mas Group owns Bank International Indonesia (BII); the Rudy 
Ramli family has Bank Bali; and the Usman Atmaja family has Bank Danamon (Diao & Tan, 2001: 
131-137). For more information, see Dick (2002: 153-193) and Thee (2002: 194-243). 
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fostered an image of “ethnic Chinese dominating the economy” (Diao & Tan, 2001: 
135). Moreover, since the late-1980s, along with limited political liberalization, public 
access to information about the economy and government behavior has increased. The 
pribumis became more aware of the rise of Chinese conglomerates, the numerous 
“dirty” negotiations between ethnic Chinese and crooked officials, the privileges of 
Suharto’s relatives and cronies, the benefits they got by “cooperating”, as well as the 
opulent lifestyles of the rich elite.79 As a result, despite the statistical evidence of 
constant Gini indices and the fact that the New Order policies had also created a class of 
rich indigenous people,80 there was a widespread perception among the pribumis that 
economic growth, particularly during the late New Order era, created gross inequalities 
between ethnic groups. Even worse, although under Suharto’s authoritarian rule it was 
believed that neither the Chinese nor the pribumis could share political power with 
Suharto, a very small number of Chinese tycoons, with their wealth and close links to 
Suharto, did exercise a relatively high degree of influence in government economic 
decisions (Freedman, 2000). This in turn created even more resentment among the 
pribumis, especially among the less successful businessmen who were supported by 
Islamic groups and the opponents of the Suharto’s administration (Schwarz, 2000). As 
more and more pribumis felt that they were deprived both economically and politically 
and they were very dissatisfied with the status quo; the close Suharto-Chinese links 
“brought together anti-Chinese sentiment with the desire to oppose Suharto, to end 
corruption, and to see a greater redistribution of wealth” (Kingsbury, 1998: 12).  
 
As a matter of fact, pribumi criticisms against KKN (corruption, collusion and nepotism) 
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 For some early criticisms of Chinese economic dominance, see Liddle (1988); Hein (1990); Emmerson 
(1991); and McKendrick (1992).  
80
 For example, the Kodel (by Fahmi Idris) and Bukaka Teknik Utama (by Fadel Mohammad) Groups 
were two big pribumi groups that grew rapidly after 1985 (McKendrick, 1992: 103-110).  
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and mass anti-KKN movements, although suppressed in the 1980s, seemed to revive in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s along with the rise of pribumi middle-class.81 Although 
such strikes or protests were small-/medium-scale and were by and large peaceful, they 
were a clear sign of the weakening of the government to suppress opposing complaints 
of the ordinary people. Even worse, there was a decline in the military’s support of 
Suharto, as a number of military figures expressed sympathy for protesters and made 
statements that could be interpreted as indirect criticism of Suharto (Emmerson, 1991). 
In other words, at this time, Suharto faced pribumi pressure from both above and below, 
as well as from both within and outside the ruling class. In order to offset the decreasing 
military support, starting in 1989 Suharto initiated a range of politically-motivated 
moves to appease the pribumis—especially the Islamic groups.82 Unfortunately, these 
pro-Islamic policies came too late and were insufficient to save Suharto’s waning power. 
Along with people’s growing fear of uncertainty in Suharto’s already-too-long rule, 
state-society conflicts became more and more frequent, large-scale, and violent. As the 
government could not overcome the escalating unrest, it had to resort to the use of force, 
thus making the incidents even more deadly, such as the cases of the Nipah tragedy 
(Sampang, 1993), the Haur Koneng incident (Majalengka, 1993), the Medan 
demonstration (April 1994), the Situbondo riots (October 1996), and the Tasikmalaya 
riots (December 1996).83 By 1996, it was clear that a broad anti-Suharto opposition had 
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 As Hein (1990) pointed out, another main reason for the revival of pribumi criticism was that 
economic growth had engendered trends toward more pluralism in political life by dramatically enlarging 
and diversifying the country’s pribumi middle-class. 
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 Such policies included passing laws that enshrined the role of Islamic education and a greater power 
for shar’iah courts in 1989, supporting the founding of Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia (ICMI, 
the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association) in December 1990, performing the Hajj in 1991, 
forming Democracy Forum led by Wahid of NU in April 1991, launching new Islamic financial 
institutions like Bank Mualamat Indonesia in October 1991, supporting the founding of PT Manajeman 
Musyarakah Indonesia in March 1992, and encouraging the Islamization of the military since 1993. For 
details, see Emmerson (1991), Hussin (2008), Mallarangeng & Liddle (1996), and McKendrick (1992). 
83
 For numbers of the deaths, see appendix B; for more details of the Nipah tragedy and the Haur Koneng 
incident, see Tadjoeddin (2002); for the Medan demonstration, see Yang (2006); for the Situbondo riots 
and the Tasikmalaya riots, see Liddle & Mallarangeng (1997). 
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formed, with the PPP and Megawati’s PDI the two major components. The 
government’s intervention in the internal struggle in the PDI by supporting Suryadi (of 
the pro-Suharto faction) as a new leader in rump convention in Medan and forcibly 
evicting supporters of ousted Megawati from PDI headquarters in Jakarta on 27 July 
immediately triggered serious mass riots (Liddle & Mallarangeng, 1997). Then, during 
the 1997 election campaign, disputes between Golkar and the PPP made the campaign 
the most violent and destructive one in Indonesian election history, as rallies dissolved 
into riots almost daily from late March to 23 May (election day) (Bird, 1998: 168-172). 
While eventually Golkar won 74.5 percent of the vote, anti-government riots by PPP 
supporters and Muslims continued to occur occasionally. 
 
Along with the growing incidence of the state-society clashes, ethno-communal 
violence was also increasing in the 1990s, within which anti-Chinese violence was one 
of the biggest takers of human lives.84 It is worth noting again that the tension between 
the ethnic Chinese and the pribumis was a perennial problem in Indonesian politics, and 
anti-Chinese riots used to occur periodically in the past. The New Order regime was no 
exception. Yet, except for a wave of anti-Chinese incidents in several cities of Central 
Java in November 1980,85 most of riots that included violence against ethnic Chinese in 
the 1980s were small-scale local riots with no record of deaths.86 Also, from 1985 to 
1993, there had been no anti-Chinese “mass riots.” However, since 1994, anti-Chinese 
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 According to research by Varshney, Panggabean, and Tadjoeddin (2004), while anti-Chinese violence 
accounted for only five percent of all incidents of collective violence in 14 provinces of Indonesia 
between 1990 and 2003, its share of deaths was 13 percent—the third largest taker of human lives, after 
Muslim-Christian and Madurese-Dayak violence (57 percent and 29 percent, respectively). Among all the 
deadly anti-Chinese violence, only one case occurred after the fall of Suharto in 1998.  
85
 This wave of riots was triggered by a fight between the son of a wealthy Chinese and a pribumi on 19 
November 1980 in Solo, Central Java. In the following three days, thousands of pribumis terrorized the 
Chinese business district, wrecking shops and cars. The local army sought to quell the riots and shot one 
of the youths, leading to the spread of the riots to Semarang, Pekalongan, Kukus, Magelang, and other 
smaller towns of Central Java, until night curfews were reinforced in early December (Pauker, 1981). 
86
 Such as incidents in Ujung Pandang and Medan in April 1980 and some spillover riots of the Tanjung 
Priok incidents in 1985. See Appendix B for details. 
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riots had become increasingly frequent. Seemingly slight disputes between Chinese 
shopkeepers and pribumi customers (e.g. Banjarmasin, July 1995), or the tearing of 
pages from the Qur’an by a Chinese (e.g. Pekalongan, November 1995), or rumors of 
unconfirmed stories such as the beating of a Muslim girl (e.g. Purwakarta, November 
1995; Kadipaten, June 1997), or a Chinese woman’s complaint over the noise made by 
Muslims (e.g. Rengasdengklok, January 1997), could spark riots and looting aimed at 
the whole Chinese community and their properties. Moreover, in the aforementioned 
anti-government mass protests and conflicts, which had nothing to do with the ethnic 
Chinese, their properties became a very handy outlet for mass looting when the situation 
became uncontrolled. For instance, the 1994 unrest in Medan unfortunately turned into 
one of the most serious anti-Chinese riots in North Sumatra, ending with four Chinese 
dead, a dozen Chinese-owned factories and over 150 stores destroyed. Similarly, in a 
mass protest against high ticket prices for a rock concert in Bandung (January 1996), in 
the July incident in Jakarta (1996), in the riots in Situbondo and Tasikmalaya (October 
and December 1996), and in the riots around Java during the 1997 election campaign 
period, while the corrupt police, local government, and Suharto were the ones to blame, 
rioters consciously differentiated between the Chinese and others, targeting their houses 
and business assets rather than official government buildings. Such a phenomenon not 
only displayed pribumi resentment against the ethnic Chinese, but also demonstrated the 
accumulated frustrations and failures of government policies in easing ethnic tensions.  
 
The anti-state and anti-Chinese violence also indicated that even before the financial 
crisis in Thailand began to cast shadows over Indonesia in July 1997, the social and 
political situation in Indonesia had already been highly unstable. Social turbulence and 
political uncertainty, unfortunately, made Indonesia the worst affected Southeast Asian 
country in the Asian financial crisis. From mid-1997, the rupiah fell much further 
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against the US dollar than any other internationally traded East/Southeast Asian 
currency. By 1 January 1998, its nominal value was just 30 percent of that in mid-1997. 
Indonesia’s stock market decline in US dollar terms was also the greatest over this 
period. By 1 January 1998, its stock market index was only 17 percent of what it was in 
mid-1997 (Hill, c2000: 269). In addition, according to IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
Database (1980-2008), Indonesia’s economy contracted by 13 percent in 1998, about 
double that of Malaysia (-7.4 percent). Under this dire situation, mass riots began to 
break out in East and West Java in January 1998, quickly spreading to Central Java in 
late January, and to Sulawesi, Sumatra, Maluku and West Irian Jaya in February. After 
Suharto was elected to another presidential term in March, large student protests took 
place across Java and in Ujung Pandang, and spread to campuses of universities across 
Indonesia in April. On 10 May, protests in Medan led to rioting and looting, warning the 
government of the danger of anarchy. On 13 May the Jakarta police shot six students at 
Trisakti University, triggering massive anti-Suharto riots in Jakarta and several other big 
cities like Medan, Padang, Palembang, Solo and Yogjakarta in the next three days. In 
addition to causing 1,202 deaths, the May riots also caused a great loss of capital, and 
about 150,000 people fled Indonesia during this period.87 Once again, the ethnic 
Chinese were particularly targeted in this wave of violence; their shops were looted or 
burned on a scale unseen since the 1970s. Moreover, the mobs not only looted Chinese 
properties but also attacked Chinese temples and raped Chinese women, complicating 
the violence “beyond pure economic jealousy and moving it into the realm of 
ethno-religious hatred” (Bird, 1999: 34-35). Although Suharto announced his 
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 According to Kompas (3 June 1998), the most severe May 1998 riots in Jakarta recorded 1,026 houses, 
4,676 other buildings (shops, offices, markets etc), and 1,948 vehicles burned. As for the deaths, the final 
report of the Joint Fact-Finding Team (TGPF) listed the number of deaths in the Jakarta area identified by 
various sources as either 1,190 (Volunteer Team for Humanity [TRuK]), 463 (Jakarta Military Command), 
451 (the police), or 288 (the Jakarta Government) (cf. Coppel, 2008: 119). Meanwhile, the riots in Solo 
resulted in 30 deaths, 20 missing, 338 buildings destroyed, and 919 vehicles burned. 
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resignation on 21 May, anti-Chinese riots continued throughout 1998. Beyond Java—in 
East and West Nusa Tenggara, South Sulawesi, West Kalimantan, and on Sumatra from 
Bagansiapiapi to Medan—small incidents and disputes repeatedly escalated into larger, 
several-day-long episodes of destruction to Chinese-owned businesses and properties.88 
 
Phase III (1998-2008): A Romantic Triangle in the Democratization Era 
 
The May 1998 riots and the downfall of Suharto seemed to bring Indonesia back to the 
1950s—i.e. in the first four or five years after 1998, the political situation of Indonesia 
under Reformasi (Reformation) appeared to be highly unstable and rudderless; the 
central government faced multiple daunting challenges resembling those in the period of 
1950-1957. To begin with, there were serious power struggles among elites, which 
resulted in five presidents in six years—from Suharto to B.J. Habibie (May 
1998-October 1999) to Abdurrahman Wahid (October 1999-July 2001) to Megawati 
Sukarnoputri (July 2001-October 2004) and finally to Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono 
(October 2004-present)—and even more frequent shifts of cabinets. To a large degree, 
the repeated rotations of leadership and administration resulted from Indonesia’s 
electoral system, which almost guarantees that no party can secure a majority in the 
parliament, and Indonesia’s quasi-parliamentary structure, which requires the president 
obtain support in the parliament (particularly before 2004).89 As a result, since 1999 the 
party that received the most popular votes in each parliamentary election covered only 
one-third to one-fifth of the support ratio (PDI-P with 33.7 percent in 1999; Golkar with 
21.6 percent in 2004; and Democratic Party (PD) with 20.9 percent in 2009).90 Due to 
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 For more details about anti-Chinese violence during this period, see Appendix B. 
89
 For a comparison of political parties and parliament of the Reformasi era with those of the 1950s, see 
Fealy (2001: 97-111). 
90
 Data were from Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU, General Elections Comission Indonesia). Also see 
Ananta, et al. (2005), Liddle (2000), Liddle & Saiful (2005), Mietzner (2009), Pepinsky (2009), 
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the lack of a dominant party in the parliament, the president became a product of 
political negotiation and balance of power among major parties, and s/he had to form a 
coalition government among political parties in order to sustain broad support in the 
parliament. However, as Malley pointed out (2002: 124-125), “the deep personal 
differences among party leaders, and ideological ones among the parties, [inhibited] the 
formation of stable coalitions.”91  Subsequently, not only did significant shifts in 
leadership occur, but the central government also found it difficult to rule effectively, 
not to mention to proceed with political reforms (such as eliminating corruption) and 
facilitate the recovery of the economy.92  
 
Moreover, partly because of the retreat of the central state but also due to the process of 
decentralization,93 separatist-related violence erupted with renewed strength in Aceh 
(1999-2004), East Timor (1998-1999), and Irian Jaya (1999-2001), while 
inter-communal strife also exploded in several parts of the country, notably in Central 
and West Kalimantan (1999-2001), Central Sulawesi (1998-2001), and Maluku 
(1999-2002). The details of how the central state dealt with those separatist movements 
and regional ethno-religious violence, although also important, are not the main theme 
of this thesis. Nonetheless, one thing is for sure, continuing ethno-religious violence not 
only caused huge losses of lives and materials, but also made Indonesia’s transition to 
                                                                                                                                               
Platzdasch (2009), and Schwarz (2004) for details about these three elections. 
91
 President Wahid’s rise and decline could well reflect the political situation during this period. See 
Barton (2002), McIntyre (2001), and Mietzner (2001) for details. 
92
 It was until 2003 that GDP and national income per capita returned to 1996 levels. Data on poverty 
reduction and the unemployment rate were also disappointing. One estimate had poverty at 15 percent in 
mid-1997, just before the crisis began. It soon jumped to 33 percent in late 1998, then dropped slowly to 
16 percent in 2005, but increased to 18 percent again in 2006 due to rising rice prices (Kingsbury, 2007). 
Also, rates of open unemployment still stood at 9.8 percent or 10.5 million in 2007 (Booth, 2008). 
93
 In April 1999, Habibie issued two decentralization laws: law no.22 on local governance and law no.25 
on fiscal balance between the central government and the regions, allowing greater legislative powers for 
regional assemblies, especially in the field of taxation, education and law-and-order. These two laws were 
implemented during the Wahid era, thus launching the process of decentralization. For the causal 
relationship between decentralization and regional violence in the post-Suharto state, see Davidson 
(2005). 
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democracy more complicated. For one, it made post-Suharto governments unable to 
effectively assert civilian control over the traditionally powerful military, as the military 
served as “the only institution holding the country together” (Straits Times, 16 March 
2005).94 Although the military’s dual-function doctrine was repudiated in 1998, the 
police were removed from military control in 1999, and its “reserved” seats in the 
legislatures was abolished in 2004, the military still retained considerable autonomy in 
relation to budgeting and defense policy and its political influence remained extensive. 
As a result, there was little progress in holding military officials accountable for their 
involvement in widespread corruption and their perpetration of massive human rights 
abuses during and after the Suharto era (Honna, 2008; Webber, 2006).  
 
Even so, in the last decade, there still were many policy and institutional reforms in 
Indonesia that brought huge political and social changes to the country. Undoubtedly, 
the most important change was the transition to a democratic system: political freedoms, 
such as organizing political parties and mass media, were permitted in February 1999 
(by Habibie); the Ministry of Information, an instrument to control the media during 
Suharto era, was abolished in 2000 (by Wahid); and a major constitutional reform was 
made in August 2002 (under Megawati), which introduced direct presidential elections 
and replaced the 200 reserved seats of the MPR with the elected members of a new 
legislative body, the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD, Regional Representative 
Council). Since 1999, Indonesia has experienced a series of free and fair elections for 
the country’s legislature and, for the first time in 2004, direct election of the president. 
Meanwhile, Indonesia also has made substantial progress in protecting civil liberties via 
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 Also according to Sukardi’s findings (2005) on social violence in post-Suharto Indonesia, serious 
conflicts took place in areas that were governed by civilian governors, such as Maluku, Central Sulawesi 
and Central Kalimantan. In contrast, low incidents of violent conflicts happened in areas that were run by 
military, such as Bali, North Sumatra and West Java. 
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constitutional amendments and daily practices. Although some particular restrictions on 
political expression still remain and human rights abuses by security forces happen 
occasionally, Indonesia today enjoys relative superiority in terms of “accountability and 
public voice” when it is compared to other Southeast Asian countries on the basis of the 
World Bank’s evaluation. Indonesia is also the only Southeast Asian county to receive 
the “free” distinction in 2008 in Freedom House’s annual survey of political rights and 
civil liberties. Meanwhile, since late 2003, the government began to take more serious 
measures to combat corruption. The founding of the Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi 
(KPK, Corruption Eradication Commission) in December 2003 as an independent body 
with wide investigative and prosecutorial powers to tackle corruption, Yudhoyono’s 
appointment of Sri Mulyani Indrawati95 as Finance Minister in December 2005 and the 
subsequent campaigns to clean up the Finance Ministry, the Taxation Directorate and 
the National Custom Service, and the trials and imprisonments of several prominent 
national level figures since 2006, 96  also provided some encouraging signs of 
Indonesia’s anti-corruption reform. Although Indonesia remains a rather corrupt place, 
the progress has been noticed by foreign analysts and businessmen—and their 
perceptions about the country are also improving. In 2008, Transparency International 
lifted Indonesia 17 ranks, from 143 to 126 (on a scale of 180), on its annual Corruption 
Perceptions Index. Also according to the World Bank, Indonesia’s record on control of 
corruption in 2008 was better than that of the Philippines. 
 
                                                 
95
 Sri Mulyani Indrawati was a US-educated economist who worked for many years as a senior IMF 
official during the Suharto era. The appointment of Indrawati and another economist, Boediono, to take 
charge of economic and financial affairs also signaled the government’s commitment to professionalism 
in economic policy. See Liddle & Saiful (2006: 138). 
96
 For example, Former Minister of Religion Said Agil Husein al-Munawar was jailed in 2006 for 
corruptly using Mecca pilgrimage money, and former Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries 
Rokhmin Dahuri, was jailed in 2007 for running an off-budget slush fund (Kuncoro, 2008). Former 
central bank governor Burhanuddin Abdullah was given an eight year sentence in 2008 for giving $10 
million to members of parliament, and a Competition Commission member, Mohammad Iqbal, was 
arrested after taking money from a television network director (Freedom House, 13 October 2008) 
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As Indonesia moved toward democratization while also facing pressure to restore 
business confidence, governmental attitudes and policies toward the ethnic Chinese also 
began to undergo changes. To begin with, on 16 September 1998 Habibie issued 
Presidential Decree No.26/1998 on the Revocation of the Termination of Pribumi and 
Non-Pribumi, which instructed ministers and chiefs within the bureaucracy to scrap all 
discriminatory practices against the ethnic Chinese, including the use of the labels 
“pribumi” and “non-pribumi”. On 21 February 1999, he openly urged the abolishment 
of a regulation that required the Chinese Indonesians to produce the SBKRI (Certificate 
of Citizenship) introduced in 1958. On 5 May, Habibie issued Presidential Decree 
No.4/1999, lifting the ban on the use of Chinese and announced the establishment of an 
independent committee for investigation of the May riots. Later in October 1999, the 
government allowed the opening of Chinese language tuition classes and the formation 
of ethnic Chinese political parties and civic associations (Bertrand, 2004: 70). 
  
After Wahid came to power, he immediately promoted a prominent Chinese Indonesian 
economist, Kwik Kian Gie, as Coordinating Minister for the Economy, Finance and 
Industry (October 1999-August 2000).97 Then, on 18 January 2000, Wahid issued 
Presidential Decrees No.4 and No.6/2000 on the Revocation of Presidential Directive 
No.14/1967, thus assuring the ethnic Chinese of their rights to celebrate their traditional 
festivals, to publish Chinese newspapers, and to openly practice cultural and religious 
beliefs. Following this Decree, in February 2000 the ethnic Chinese, for the first time in 
over three decades, could celebrate Imlek (Chinese New Year) publicly without any 
restrictions. Wahid and his cabinet members even attended the Imlek celebration in 
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 Unfortunately, until Kwik was shuffled in August 2000, his team was generally given poor marks for 
its inability to coordinate the policies of its own officials and for its lack of commitment to agreements 
with the IMF. Yet, being an important member of PDI-P, Kwik was later appointed by Megawati as State 
Minister and Head of the National Planning Board from July 2001 to October 2004 (Liddle, 2001).  
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Jakarta. Two months later, his Minister for Home Affairs, Surjadi, issued a new 
instruction (No.477/805/Sj) repealing the Ministerial Instruction of 1978, which 
recognized only five religions but excluded Confucianism—a move interpreted as an 
informal recognition of Confucianism as one major religion in Indonesia. In 2001, 
Wahid further declared Imlek an optional holiday (in January) and lifted the 1978 ban on 
the display of Chinese characters and the importation of Chinese publications (in 
February). Nonetheless, because Wahid only had very limited power, which he did not 
hold on to for long, he did not revoke more regulations and rules perceived to be 
discriminatory toward ethnic Chinese (Suryadinata, 2006: 220-221).  
 
Like Wahid, Megawati did not revoke many existing discriminatory decrees. However, 
she made progress in some areas. For example, the MPR in November 2001 passed a 
constitutional amendment that removed the requirement that the president be 
“indigenous” and replaced it with a condition of citizenship (Bertrand, 2004: 70). In 
2002, Megawati issued Presidential Decree No.19/2002, declaring Imlek as a public 
holiday beginning in 2003. She also declared her support for Chinese education and for 
Sinology departments to be established in Indonesian universities. Since then, Chinese 
language as a subject has been included in some school curricula and Chinese studies 
centers have been established in various universities (Hoon, 2004). Nonetheless, despite 
these positive signs of Chinese cultural freedoms and political rights, there were about 
60 discriminatory laws and ordinances still in force in 2004, including the requirement 
for ethnic Chinese to possess SBKRI every time they apply for official documents such 
as identity cards or passports—which Habibie had promised to abolish in 1999.98 In 
fact, this and many other discriminatory regulations continued to exist until July 2006 
                                                 
98
 In April 2004, Megawati declared once again the abolishment of the SBKRI policy. However, officials 
at the local level still continued to require Chinese Indonesians to produce SBKRIs when applying for 
official documents (Jakarta Post, 15 April 2004; Turner & Allen, 2007: 118). 
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(during the Presidency of Yudhoyono), when the Parliament passed Law No.12/2006 on 
Citizenship, ending discrimination against ethnic Chinese and making it punishable “if 
officials [shall] not treat [Chinese Indonesians] on a par with other citizens” (Straits 
Times, 12 July 2006).99 In October 2008, the Bill for the Elimination of Racial and 
Ethnic Discrimination was also passed.  
 
Ten years after Reformasi, it is clear that the democratization process has changed both 
the dynamics of the relationship between the state and the society and the dynamics 
between the ethnic groups. First, the institutionalization of open elections offers the 
opportunity for effective rotation of power and for people to express their dissatisfaction. 
Due to the existence of a broad consensus among the elites—most of whom were 
secular-nationalist-oriented—regarding the unity of Indonesia and the maintenance of a 
democratic system, while the power struggles among major political forces were severe, 
the elections were conducted without major incidents of violence100 and the results 
were basically accepted. With the recognition of institutionalized elections, the promise 
of the vote has the power to influence people’s perceptions toward the government, their 
political behavior, and the relatively harmonic relations between the state and 
society—i.e. voters at least have a say by choosing to elect candidates they like and 
punishing those who disappoint them, so they need not riot. Even though there are 
tensions between the state and society from time to time, these tensions do not hurt the 
overall stability of Indonesia. Meanwhile, democracy also helped bring moderate 
Islamist parties into the mainstream while marginalizing radical Islamist groups. In the 
past, both the Sukarno and the Suharto administrations—the secular-nationalist 
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 Winarta (2008) discussed these laws in more detail. 
100
 One unfortunate exception occurred in 2009, when five demonstrators were killed in Papua as 
Indonesia voted in April. As already stated, Papua is a province in which a separatist movement remains 
strong. Nonetheless, this outbreak “pales in comparison to the bloodshed that once dominated Indonesia’s 
political scene” (Freedom House, 15 April 2009). 
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governments—had very tense relations with the majority Indonesian Muslims. Now, 
concerned about attracting more votes, the major nationalist parties have increasingly 
moved toward a pro-Islamic ideological middle-ground by assuming 
“nationalist-religious” platforms. Consequently, Islam-oriented parties are more willing 
to accommodate or even cooperate with nationalist parties. According to an estimate, 
about two-fifths of local elections have been won by coalitions forged between Islamist 
and secular parties (Economist, 2 April 2009). The results of national elections also 
show that more and more Muslim voters believe that their religious interests can be 
sufficiently represented by the pluralist Muslim parties or even by the nationalist parties 
(Platzdasch, 2009). In all, as Webber argued (2006: 405), despite a process of cultural 
Islamization and the rise of Islamist terrorism after 9/11, “neither at the level of the 
political orientation of the major Muslim organizations nor at that of mass attitudes, has 
Islam been a negative force in respect of Indonesian democratization.” 
 
As for the ethnic Chinese, the anti-Chinese riots in 1998 delivered a “devastating 
psychological blow” and a “wake-up call” to the Chinese community (Zhou, 2003). 
Many Chinese Indonesians who had always carried their Chinese identity lightly and 
thought of themselves as Indonesians suddenly realized that they had actually been 
treated as aliens—and as such deserved to be looted. It was under such a scenario that 
the following democratization also encouraged the Chinese to re-orientate themselves 
and to defend themselves via collectively and actively participating in politics and social 
affairs. To begin with, the abolishment of the bans on cultural practices has brought a 
“restoration of the three pillars of Chinese culture” (Lembong, 2008; Suryadinata, 2008). 
First, Chinese social-cultural associations have sprouted like mushrooms around the 
country, including those based on Chinese surnames, kinships, clans, provinces/districts, 
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religions, and even hobbies and alumni.101 Second, there has been a re-emergence of 
Chinese language media—the press, radio, and TV broadcasts. Although many Chinese 
dailies and magazines eventually ceased publication within two years due to the 
shortage of readers, writers, and advertisements, the potential market is still reasonably 
promising in major cities such as Jakarta, Surabaya, and Medan. Third, Chinese 
language education has experienced an unprecedented boom since 1999. Not only has 
the teaching of Mandarin in various schools been permitted, but new bilingual and 
trilingual schools have also been set up. In fact, because of the recent economic rise of 
China, learning Mandarin has become a popular pursuit among both young ethnic 
Chinese and pribumis in Indonesia as in other Southeast Asian countries, triggering a 
proliferation of after-school and after work Mandarin courses in big cities.102  
 
Besides the restoration of Chinese culture, ethnic Chinese also realized the need to have 
better social involvement and political participation if they wanted to protect their 
interests. In the beginning, many activists were eager to form political parties, leading to 
the birth of Chinese-led parties after the May 1998 riots. Unfortunately, these new 
Chinese-based parties failed to obtain strong support from the Chinese community. 
Besides the fact that the leaders of those parties were mainly self-appointed and were 
either unknown or unrecognized in the Chinese communities at large,103 the memories 
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 There are at least 400 such associations currently active in Indonesia. Although they tend to be local in 
nature, two have developed on a national scale: Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghoa Indonesia (PSMTI, 
the Indonesian Chinese Social Association, formed in September 1998) and Perhimpunan Indonesia 
Keturunan Tionghoa (INTI, the Association of Indonesians of Chinese Descent, formed in February 
1999). 
102
 According to Dawis (2008), there are at least fifty such trilingual schools in Jakarta alone, which gives 
an impression that there is a renaissance of Chinese culture. Nonetheless, both Dawis (2008) and Hoon 
(2008) emphasized that these new bilingual/trilingual schools by no means can be treated the same as 
those full-fledged Chinese-medium schools in the pre-Suharto era, as there have been significant social 
changes in the New Order and the Chinese community to a large extent has been Indonesianized. 
103
 For example, PBI was led by a then 50-year old businessman, Nurdin Purnomo (alias Wu Nengbin), 
the owner of travel agencies in Jakarta and Bali; PARTI was established by a then 39-year old 
businessman, Lieus Sungkharisma (alias Li Xuexiong), whose business in Glodok was destroyed in May 
1998 (Suryadinata, 2001: 512). The main founders of these parties included activists, professionals, 
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of persecutions in the mid-1960s, political oppressions perpetrated by the New Order, 
and the May 1998 riots were so vivid for many Chinese that they felt party politics was 
still dangerous (Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 March 1999). Some of the Chinese 
elites—such as Kwik Gian Gie, Sofyan Wanandi (a leading businessman), and Surya 
Paloh (a media tycoon)—even expressed their non-support of exclusive Chinese 
political parties because such “would only heighten the sense of ethnic separateness” 
(Hoon, 2008: 85). Moreover, since Chinese Indonesians only represented less than five 
percent of the whole population and were mainly concentrated in rather limited urban 
areas, political parties that merely made appeals to Chinese Indonesians based on ethnic 
identity and community interests found it hard to even sustain their status as qualified 
political parties in elections.104 In fact, among the Chinese-based parties, only Partai 
Reformasi Tionghoa Indonesia (PARTI, the Chinese Indonesian Reform Party) and 
Partai Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Indonesia (PBI, the Indonesian Unity in Diversity Party) 
remained active after one year of establishment, and PBI was the only party qualified to 
run the 1999 elections. Sadly, the majority of ethnic Chinese seemed to believe that their 
aspirations could be channeled more effectively through mainstream parties than 
through ethnic-based ones.105 While the PBI was successful in winning support from 
Batak and Dayak (who also suffered discrimination in West Kalimantan) and eventually 
got one seat in the DPR (People’s Representative Council), two seats in the provincial 
                                                                                                                                               
university students, and businessmen running small-/medium-sized companies, none were “Mr. BIGs”. 
104
 The electoral rule required a political party to have branches in half the districts in nine of Indonesia’s 
27 provinces in order to run in the current elections and to won two percent of seats in parliament in order 
to run in the next election (Freedman, 2003: 444). Since the Chinese Indonesian community was not large 
enough and was too concentrated, it was hard for a Chinese-based party to expand its branches to half the 
districts in nine of Indonesia’s 27 provinces and to enter into the electoral game in the first place. 
105
 In a poll by Sinergi magazine in January 1999 (with 78 percent respondents being Chinese 
Indonesians), 57 percent respondents chose PDI-P, 35 percent National Awakening Party (PKB), 32 
percent National Mandate Party (PAN), and 5 percent Golkar. Similarly, in another survey of Chinese 
voters taken in various cities by Tempo magazine in February 1999, 70 percent chose PDI-P, 36 percent 
PAN, 15 percent PKB, and 13 percent Golkar. On the contrary, in a poll of people identifying themselves 
as ethnic Chinese conducted by Kompas from 17-27 April 1999, PBI received only about 0.34 percent of 
the total national vote. Suryadinata estimated this represented about 12 percent of the Chinese vote, 
presuming all the votes it received came from Chinese (cf. Purdey 2003: 434). 
  121 
legislature, and seven seats in the regency legislature, this success was not enough for 
PBI to get on the ticket in the 2004 elections (Jakarta Post, 29 March 2004). 
 
Nonetheless, the failure of the Chinese-based parties by no means indicated that ethnic 
Chinese continued to be subject to discrimination or that they remained alienated from 
politics. Quite the contrary, in the past decade many major political parties took the 
initiative to promote ethnic Chinese candidates in the nomination process mainly 
because they wanted to attract more financial contributions, but also because they felt “a 
forced political correctness attached to recruiting minorities” (Tjhin, 2009). Many 
well-known ethnic Chinese elites also chose to join the existing indigenous-dominated 
parties that were more able to help give them access to power. In the 1999 elections, 
four Chinese Indonesians standing for such parties won seats in the MPR, including 
Kwik Kian Gie (Jakarta Post, 15 March 2004). This encouraged more ethnic Chinese to 
participate in the following elections: while in the 1999 elections there were only about 
50 Chinese Indonesian running for office, in the 2004 elections there were 172.106 
Moreover, in the 2009 general elections, in Jakarta only, as many as 58 candidates of 
Chinese descent were found to compete with other candidates, and two won seats in the 
Parliament (Jakarta Post, 12 June 2009). Also, ethnic Chinese candidates running in 
local contests were elected district heads in East Belitung (in 2005) and Singkawang (in 
2007).107 Admittedly, the above successful cases were rare and only happened in 
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 At the provincial level, 20 candidates (out of 920) were ethnic Chinese; in the parliamentary elections, 
120 candidates were ethnic Chinese (2.7 percent of the total), representing 17 political parties (out of 24) 
(Jakarta Post, 29 March 2004; Schwarz, 2004). 
107
 In August 2005, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama became district head of East Belitung, backed by a coalition 
of two small parties—the New Indonesia Party of Struggle and the Bung Karno Nationalist Party. Basuki 
won 37 percent of the vote while the Chinese Indonesian population in this district was only around 10 
percent. Local media highlighted the support for Basuki from various ethnic groups and his provision of 
free basic education and health care in East Belitung. In another case in 2007, Hasan Karman from the 
New Indonesia Struggle Party became district head of Singkawang, a region in West Kalimantan with one 
of the highest distributions of Chinese Indonesians (62 percent of the population) and where the deputy 
governor, Christiandy Sanjaya, was also of ethnic Chinese descent (Purdey, 2009; Tjhin, 2009). 
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districts with large Chinese populations relative to other ethnic groups, while many 
ethnic Chinese who joined the indigenous-led parties were soon disappointed.108 
Nevertheless, the fact that ethnic Chinese were accepted by the major pluralist parties as 
well as indigenous voters shows that relations between the Chinese and the native 
Indonesians were improving.  
 
Compared to party politics, at the NGO level the trend of inter-ethnic cooperation was 
even more promising. In the post-Suharto era, many multiethnic NGOs were formed to 
push institutional and legal reforms to end discrimination against Chinese Indonesians 
and other minorities and better protect human rights while also providing assistance, 
legal counseling, and advocacy for all victims of ethnic discrimination. For example, 
Solidaritas Nusa Bangsa (SNB, Homeland Solidarity), which was established in June 
1998 by Ester Indahyani Jusuf (a lawyer of Chinese descent) and her husband (the late 
Arnold Purba, a lawyer of Batak descent), organized the victims to create the 
Organization of May Riot Victims (PKKM) as part of the rehabilitation, and pushed a 
draft Anti-Racial and Ethnic Discrimination Act to the DPR. During 2000 and 2001 it 
also co-operated with Gerakan Perjuangan Anti-Diskriminasi (GANDI, the 
Anti-discrimination Movement)—another multiethnic NGO formed in November 1998 
in Ciganjur under Wahid’s support—and other NGOs to push the MPR to amend the 
discriminatory words in the Constitution (Effendi, 2009; Sardini, 2003; Thung, 2004). 
Admittedly, the NGOs were not so successful in effectively persuading policy-makers to 
amend discriminatory laws and regulations. Yet, they were active at the local level, 
functioning as what Varshney (2001; 2002) called “agents of peace”—that they built 
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 For example, Frans Tshai was a member of PDI-P and won the general election in his hometown 
Bogor in 1999. However, in the end, the Bogor seat went to a non-Chinese member for some unknown 
reasons. Feeling that they were betrayed, a number of Chinese Indonesians—mostly younger ones—left 
the PDI-P, including Frans Tshai and Inghie Kwik (son of Kwik Kian Gie). See Purdey (2003: 435). 
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bridges between ethnic groups and encouraged mutual understanding and positive 
interaction via their diverse programs and activities.109 Moreover, because the NGOs, 
unlike political parties, were not playing zero-sum games, they were more flexible in 
building co-operative networks with other NGOs that care about similar issues, thus 
becoming more powerful at managing social tensions and promoting inter-ethnic peace.  
 
Taking Gedangan Forum (ForGed)—a local-level inter-ethnic NGO in Salatiga, whose 
main actors and sponsors include ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs—as an example, 
immediately after the May riots, it held a seminar “The Position of the Chinese in the 
New Indonesia” on 15 July 1998 with the purpose of encouraging people to accept 
differences and ensuring that no ethnic group is targeted as victims of mass riots. 
Meanwhile, it also dispensed charity, such as food supplies to those vulnerable to 
hunger, and supported victims during the insecure political situation. That said, what 
ForGed did in Salatiga was to promote communication between ethnic Chinese and the 
indigenous Indonesians and to encourage the Chinese community to become actively 
involved in social affairs so that they would be welcomed by the locals—which was, in 
Varshney’s words (2001: 375), making “everyday forms of engagement” or 
“neighborhood-level peace” possible. Moreover, by serving the economic needs, the 
support for communal peace became more solidly expressed than merely “the object of 
quotidian interactions.” Furthermore, such charitable activities also received support 
from religious leaders. As every religious group in the region was involved in ForGed’s 
activities, it successfully built up inter-ethno-religious civic networks at both the mass 
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 For example, in addition to organizing seminars and conferences, SNB also conducts a series of 
weekly one-hour talk show broadcasts every Wednesday through one of the most popular radio stations in 
Jakarta, Radio Jakarta News FM, and invites experts and public figures to discuss issues directly or 
indirectly related to ethnic discrimination. As for the publications, besides a biweekly leaflet called Seri 
Pendidikan Anti-Diskriminasi (Anti-Discrimination Education Series) that has been published since 
November 1998, SNB also publishes a journal titled Nusa Bangsa four times a year (Thung, 2004: 
225-228). 
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and the elite levels. Later on ForGed further strengthened its movement capability by 
building linkages with other NGOs, intellectuals, and media. As the media always 
covered their activities in positive ways, ForGed obtained the support of the Salatiga 
people in protests, peace actions, joint prayers and activities to oppose violence. In 
recent years, ForGed has become active in the local political arena (Sardini, 2003: 
324-330). In another case, when Solidaritas Pemuda Pemudi Tionghoa Untuk Keadilan 
(SIMPATIK, the Chinese Youth Solidarity for Justice) was formed in December 1998, it 
was just a small association of ten young Chinese Indonesians. However, it flexibly 
cooperated with other native Indonesian groups, noticeably among the younger 
generation, such as Suara Ibu Peduli (Voice of Concerned Mothers), Kaliyana Mitra 
(Kaliyana Friends), Jaringan Kerja Budaya (Cultural Projects Network) and the 
women’s wing of the NU. Through these connections, they made their voices heard in 
every dialogue, seminar, and conference on social and political issues (Nagata, 2003).  
 
To sum up, the ethnic triangle of Indonesia since 1998, by and large, has been slowly 
but steadily upgraded from the worst Type-8 “unit-veto” triangle, to the Type-2 
“romantic triangle”—if not yet the ideal Type-1 ménage à trois triangle (refer to Table 
2-1). This dramatic progress shows that the above-mentioned state policies and actions 
toward democratization have basically satisfied the expectation of the majority of the 
society, while they have also provided an environment in which two ethnic groups with 
unpleasant interactions in the past may have more positive interactions now. To be sure, 
besides the fact that the level of vertical violence (people vs. state) has greatly 
diminished during the past five years, the current (2009) election results also clearly 
reflect the significantly increased level of public satisfaction with the central 
government, for it is the first time that an incumbent government party (PD) has been 
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able to come in first in a post-Suharto parliamentary election (Mietzner, 2009). 
Meanwhile, a remarkable decline in anti-Chinese violence in the post-1998 era also 
reflects that Pribumi-Chinese relations have been improving. With the exception of 
localized incidents in the period of transition (i.e. the Habibie era) and one rather big 
incident in Selat Panjang in 2001,110 there have been no extreme anti-Chinese riots 
since May 1998. This is surprising, particularly given that in this time Indonesia has 
experienced some of the worst socio-economic difficulties in its modern history.  
 
However, it should not be taken for granted that the pribumi-Chinese tensions have been 
totally removed. Although the government has gradually abandoned the assimilation 
policy and recognized the equal legal rights of ethnic Chinese, many issues still remain 
to be solved. First, in society the institutional and policy changes do not necessarily 
bring attitude changes of the majority pribumis toward the ethnic Chinese. On the one 
hand, mainly due to religious differences,111 social contact between the Chinese and 
pribumis remains rather limited. Consequently, as Natalia observed (2008: 145), “the 
acceptance of the Chinese by the dominant non-Chinese group is only superficial….the 
discrimination, the stereotyping, the negative image of the Chinese still exists despite 
official statements saying otherwise…” On the other hand, the revival of Chinese 
culture and identity in recent years may further distance the Chinese from mainstream 
society. Moreover, in the economy, there is an impression that the disparity in the 
distribution of wealth between Chinese and pribumis—one of the main causes 
                                                 
110
 This unfortunate exception occurred on 18 February 2001, when a gambling dispute between the local 
people and the government triggered an anti-Chinese riot in Selat Panjang, Riau. A police station, housing 
for families of policeman, and many houses of the Chinese were burned and as many as 16 Chinese 
Indonesians were killed during the riot. More than 2,000 Chinese fled to Pekanbaru, Karimun Island, and 
other locations (Varshney, Panggabean & Tadjoeddin, 2004: 26). 
111
 According to the 2000 census, at most only five percent of ethnic Chinese were Muslims, while the 
majority of ethnic Chinese were either Buddhist (54 percent) or Christian (35 percent). Understandably, 
the religious difference includes the differences in dining habits, lifestyle, and customs, all of which 
would exclude the chances for interaction between members of both ethnic groups.  
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contributing to ethnic tension—is widening.112 Whether or not this impression is just 
another prejudice deserves careful research. Yet, it is true that most ethnic Chinese 
tycoons, despite considerable difficulties in the aftermath of the Asian Crisis, have 
survived by reorganizing their trimmed empires, and have even strengthened their 
economic influence vis-à-vis indigenous businessmen along with the process of 
democratization and economic globalization (Dieleman, 2008). Such a “revival of 
Chinese entrepreneurs” signals a “widening economic gap between ethnic groups”, 
which indeed has a negative impact on ethnic harmony.  
 
Some disturbing signs have also appeared for Chinese Indonesians in recent years. In 
May 2006, an anti-Chinese protest was sparked in Makassar, South Sulawesi, after the 
death of a 20-year-old pribumi housemaid, allegedly tortured by her Chinese Indonesian 
employer. Several protesters even pelted stones at stores owned by ethnic Chinese in the 
Jalan Gunung Lati Mojong area (Jakarta Post, 11 May 2006). Later in August, dozens 
of university students in Makassar once again held mass protests and threatened to expel 
ethnic Chinese from the city after a male Chinese Indonesian was accused of attempting 
to rape his indigenous maid (Jakarta Post, 8 August 2006). As an editorial piece in The 
Jakarta Post (16 May 2006) stated, such incidents “can be seen as an expression of 
anger and frustration with the current economic hardships faced by many people. The 
tortured maids are a symbol of the weak, while the suspect is a symbol of those who use 
their power to trample on the less fortunate.” In a similar vein, in February 2008, just 
two days before Imlek, the Mayor of Pontianak issued Decision No.12/2008, prohibiting 
the display of fireworks and public performances of dragon and lion dances during the 
festival in order to avoid stimulating conflicts. This decision was made under pressure 
                                                 
112
 Based on a survey by Tempo in February 2002, cf. Suryadinata (2008: 15). 
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from the Gerakan Barisan Melayu Bersatu (the United Malay Front Movement), a 
group which had taken a hard-line anti-Chinese stance and called for a ban on Chinese 
language and characters in public places (Hoon, 2009). Such cases reflect the 
continuingly vulnerable Pribumi-Chinese relations, and how difficult it is for both local 
and central governments to manage such tensions. 
 
Nonetheless, the Indonesian government’s response to the protests in Makassar in 2006 
also provided some positive indications that the current government might be more 
capable of handling such ethnic tensions than past ones. Immediately after some 
protesters attacked the Chinese-owned stores, the Mayor of Makassar, Ilham Arief 
Sirajuddin, visited the scene of the crime and appealed to the crowd to disperse. 
Vice-President Jusuf Kalla, himself a native of Makassar, also called on the people to let 
justice take its course. The chief of the Makassar police promised the protesters that the 
police would process the case transparently (Indonesia Matters, 9 May 2006). After the 
combined appeals and promises, the number of protesters declined to only a few dozen 
people and no further riots have occurred since—indicating that most people were 
willing to trust the government. Meanwhile, several community leaders and leading 
figures of inter-ethnic NGOs also played a crucial role in placating the victims’ families 
and easing the anger of indigenous protesters, thus cooling down the tense situation. 
This once again shows that some kind of inter-ethnic peace-keeping network, as 
Varshney proposed, has been built in Indonesia.  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviews the changes in the state-pribumi-Chinese relations in Indonesia 
from 1950 to 2009. In the early years of Phase I (1950-1965)—i.e. in the early 
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1950s—the Chinese as an “ethnic group” was not salient in the political arena, meaning 
that the state-pribumi-Chinese triangle did not then exist. Yet, from 1957 onward, a 
type-6 triangle gradually emerged in which the Sukarno government and the PKI were 
close partners while the anti-PKI military factions and other non-communist pribumis 
were cast out. In this triangular game, the ethnic Chinese were regarded to be in the 
pro-PKI camp mainly due to their alleged connections with communist China. 
Meanwhile, the increasingly prominent economic power of the ethnic Chinese after 
Dutch businesses were eliminated caused grievances among the pribumis, particularly 
when Indonesia was experiencing deep economic crisis at the start of the 1960s. 
Frequent anti-Sukarno and anti-PKI violence occurred, and in many cases the ethnic 
Chinese were also targeted. After the 1965 Coup, the right-wing military led by Suharto 
formed a new government and brought Indonesian politics into the next stage.  
 
In Phase II (1966-1998), the ethnic triangle of Indonesia gradually shifted from the 
type-7 triangle of state-pribumi marriage to the type-8 unit-veto triangle. Originally, the 
Suharto government tried to improve its relations with the majority pribumis by 
proclaiming political and economic reforms and implementing many discriminatory 
policies against ethnic Chinese in politics and cultural affairs. However, besides the 
continuingly tense relations between the state and the Chinese and between the Chinese 
and the pribumis, finally in 1973 the honeymoon between the state and the pribumis 
ended as Suharto appeared to be unwilling to share power with various social forces, 
particularly Islamic groups. Surprisingly, this unit-veto triangular situation sustained for 
more than two decades, mainly due to Suharto’s tight restrictions on various kinds of 
social movements and the promise of economic development. During this period, the 
ethnic Chinese also endured cultural and economic restrictions as well as political 
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discrimination. However, Suharto’s policies not only failed to reduce the economic 
power of the Chinese, but also failed to ease the tensions between the Chinese and the 
pribumis. During the entire New Order era, anti-government and anti-Chinese protests 
and violence occurred periodically, and such violence became more frequently and 
deadly after 1994. Finally, the May 1998 riots forced Suharto to step down and brought 
Indonesian politics into the third phase. 
 
In Phase III (1998-2009), Indonesia moved toward democratization, and governmental 
attitudes and policies toward the ethnic Chinese as well as the management of 
state-society and inter-ethnic relations also changed. Along with various political 
reforms, state-pribumi relations were improving, as shown in the reducing incidents of 
anti-government violence and the increasing support for the government in elections. 
Also, state-Chinese relations were improving, and the ethnic Chinese became much 
more active in participating in cultural, social, and political affairs. Inter-ethnic 
cooperation at the party and NGO level increased, and anti-Chinese riots were rarely 
seen, yet communication and mutual learning at the mass level were still limited. In 
other words, the ethnic triangle in the post-Suharto era was close to the type-2 triangle 
in which the government is more capable of dealing with ethnic tension.  
 
To conclude, while what future will hold for Indonesia in general and for Chinese 
Indonesians in particular is uncertain, this chapter reveals several issues that will 
continue to affect the ways in which the state, the indigenous majority, and the Chinese 
minority interact, and the ways in which the state handles ethnic tension. The first issue 
is that government policies and institutions have deeply affected, if not determined, 
ethnic relations. These institutions and policies not only provided the parameters for 
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ethnic interactions, but also changed the cultural, political, and economic status of an 
ethnic group—and thus either improved ethnic relations or created problems that may 
lead to conflict between ethnic groups. As for the ethnic Chinese, they are now enjoying 
remarkable freedom and their ethnic rights are basically protected by law. However, it 
should be noted that freedom from legal discrimination and oppression does not 
automatically bring freedom from racism and hatred. As Turner and Allen (2007: 124) 
pointed out, “changing legislation is a mechanical operation that can be executed swiftly 
and unequivocally, but transforming deeply held mindsets will be a far longer process, 
beset by division and uncertainty.” Since the seeds of racism planted in the Suharto 
years are still deeply rooted among the indigenous Indonesians, it is difficult to remove 
the prejudice that they hold against the ethnic Chinese in a short time. Nonetheless, the 
experience of past years shows that while anti-Chinese sentiment may still be set off by 
a range of issues, the indigenous Indonesians now tend to resort to violence less often 
than they used to—and the current government is more capable of controlling the 
overall security than the previous ones. Finally, both positive state-society relations and 
harmonious ethnic relations require the support of a stable political environment and 
good economic growth as two bases. The policies initiated by the government are of 
critical importance in this regard. If the government can deal with political and 
economic issues in appropriate ways and facilitate economic development and 
democratic consolidation, ethnic tension between the indigenous majority and the 
Chinese minority can be further eased—even if they may not be totally eliminated. 




Similar to Chapter IV, this chapter applies the concept of the “ethnic triangle” to review 
and interpret the changes in the relationships between the state, the Malay majority113, 
and the Chinese minority in Malaysia. As shown in Figure 5-1, from its independence in 
1957 to the year 2008, Malaysia experienced three “paradigm shifts”—i.e. three 
changes in its triangular relations. In Phase I (1957-1969), the country first moved from 
the state-Chinese “marriage” to the “unit veto” situation. Then, in Phase II (1970-1987), 
a marriage of the state and the Malays was formed while the Chinese were cast out. 
Since the late 1980s (Phase III, 1988-2008), due to the ups and downs of state-Malay 
relations, Malaysia’s triangular situation has become rather ambiguous, swinging 
between the “ménage a trois” triangle and the “romantic” triangle; in the latter case the 
Chinese play the balancer between the state and the Malays.  
 
Figure 5-1: Shifts of the Ethnic Triangle in Malaysia, 1957-2008 
 
  Note: “T1/2…” refer to “Type-1/2… ethnic triangle” originally introduced in Chapter II, see Table 2-1 
 
The following sections will present how state policies and institutions and the 
resulting responses of the Malay and the Chinese communities in each phase impact 
                                                 
113
 In many documents the term Bumiputra is used to refer to the Malay majority. Bumiputra in Malay 
means “sons of the soil”, which is more a legal concept embracing Malays and other indigenous groups in 
East Malaysia. Similar to “the pribumis” in Suharto’s Indonesia, under the NEP this category of people 
was accorded special privileges unshared by non-Bumiputras (ethnic Chinese and Indians). 
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both state-society and (inter-)ethnic relations. It will also highlight the key turning 
points that stimulated the government to change its policy orientations in the following 
phase. A short summary will be provided at the end of the chapter. 
 
PHASE I (1957-1969): the Breakdown of the State-Chinese Marriage 
 
According to a population estimate of peninsular Malaya in 1957, the Malays 
represented slightly less than 50 percent of the total population, the Chinese 37 percent, 
and the Indians 11 percent (Phang, 2000: 96). In other words, when Malaysia became 
independent, the Malays constituted only half of the Malaysian population while 
non-Malays accounted for the other half. Many observers believed that the close 
numerical balance between the Malays and non-Malays—mainly the Chinese—would 
be an important mechanism in maintaining reasonably good ethnic relations. As long as 
both communities recognize that “neither would gain through a resort to open struggle,” 
the Malays and the Chinese would live in a relationship of “uneasy but tolerant 
symbiosis” (Snider, 1968: 961). 
 
In addition to demographic balance, there were several other reasons scholars were 
optimistic about future ethnic harmony in Malaysia, namely the similar backgrounds 
and the experience of cooperation of the elites of the major ethnic groups. In the last 
days of negotiating with the British, the elites of three ethnic groups, mostly 
Western-educated, conservative and strongly nationalistic, gradually formed a coalition 
(a.k.a. the Alliance114), though disagreements and conflicts of interests on many 
communal issues ensued (Means, 1991; Ho, 2002). Using the language of the ethnic 
                                                 
114
 The three ethnic-based political parties in the Alliance were: the United Malays National Organization 
(UMNO, formed in 1946 by the Malay elite), the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA, formed in 1949 
by English-educated Chinese business elites), and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC, formed by the 
Indian elite).  
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triangle model, during the independence negotiations the non-Malay minorities joined 
in marriage with the Malay majority (Type-5 triangle). This “couple” eventually 
expelled the outcast “state” (the British government) and became the new “state”. Since 
the Alliance government represents both the majority and the minorities, it is reasonable 
to expect an ideal “ménage a trois” situation (Type-1 triangle) to develop in post- 
independence Malaysia, or at least that the coalition government would act as a balancer 
between ethnic groups and thus maintain a stable “romantic triangle” (Type-2 triangle).  
 
Unfortunately, during the period from 1957 to 1969, neither a Type-1 nor a Type-2 
triangle existed in Malaysia. First, there had been no positive linkages between the 
Malays and the Chinese at the grassroots level. Both ethnic groups had been segregated 
during the colonial period, and their interactions were extremely limited due to religious 
differences—the Malays were Muslim by birth, while about 96 percent of the Chinese 
were Buddhist or Taoist (Lee, 1986: 70). Even worse, the relationship between the two 
groups had deteriorated as early as the 1930s when the Chinese supported the British 
plan of centralizing colonial government power from the local Sultans, and then again in 
1947 when the Chinese echoed the British plan of forming a Malayan Union and 
granting full citizenship rights to non-Malays (Lee & Heng, 2000). The repeated 
“betrayals” of the Chinese reflect the conflicts of interests between the two groups. Thus, 
to a certain degree, the process of negotiating the “substance” of independence per 
se—such as the status of Islam as the official religion, Malay and/or English as the 
official language, citizenship rights of the non-Malay population, and “special rights” 
for the indigenous Malays—deepened divisions between the ethnic groups. Although in 
the end the elites of both sides came to a peaceful compromise,115 the relations between 
                                                 
115
 Although somewhat reluctantly, the Chinese elites accept the principle of “politics for the Malays, 
economy for the Chinese”—the Chinese were granted limited citizenship rights and were guaranteed to 
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the two groups at the grassroots level were injured greatly. Meanwhile, the economic 
imbalance between ethnic groups also contributed to another more serious obstacle to 
ethnic peace in Malaysia in the 1950s and 1960s. Nevertheless, it would be false to say 
that the Chinese have been dominant in Malaysia’s economy since the colonial period. 
According to research, at the time of independence, most of Malaysia’s economy was 
controlled by foreign capital, including about 70 percent of the import and export trade, 
60 percent of tin output, and 75 percent of large plantations. On the other hand, the 
Chinese were powerful only in the distributive trades and light manufacturing (Heng & 
Sieh Lee, 2000: 124-127). Yet, it is also true that the Malay community was 
economically backward at the time. The concentration of Malays in agriculture, fishing, 
and other low-productivity occupations,116 compared to the Chinese in the professions 
and modern economic sectors, made it inevitable that Malay income levels would 
increase much more slowly than Chinese income levels would without effective 
redistribution packages from the state. 
 
However, what made many Malays frustrated was that the government under Tunku 
Abdul Rahman (1957-1969) failed to pursue the mission of economic re-distribution. 
Because most of the first-generation UMNO leaders were either landed aristocrats or 
local bureaucrats who lacked business experience and financial management skills, they 
relied heavily on Chinese elites in shaping economic policies.117 As a result, the MCA 
                                                                                                                                               
keep their position in the economy in return for the acceptance that politics would be primarily the 
domain of the Malays. Islam was made the official religion, but Malaysia was not to be an Islamic state. 
Both Malay and English would be the official language for ten years (until 1967), at which point it would 
be Malay only. Islamic law and Syariah courts were to be established, but they would apply only to the 
Muslims. Article 153 of the 1957 Constitution institutionalized “special privileges” for the Malays in 
respect to education, positions in public service, and the issuance of business permits and licenses. Yet, 
outside the government, the use of Chinese language and the properties of the Chinese were safeguarded, 
and Chinese investment and enterprise were also guaranteed not to be curtailed. See Parmer (1966). 
116
 The Malays made up 62 percent of agricultural workers, but only 4.3 percent of architects, 7.3 percent 
of engineers, and 6.8 percent of accountants (D. Brown, 1994: 218). Also, Malay business constituted 
only 10 percent of the total, and accounted for only 1.5 percent of the invested capital (Lim, 1985: 256). 
117
 Before Dr. Mahathir Mohamad became prime minister in 1981, the three former prime ministers were 
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leaders not only lobbied the Tunku to commit to a laissez-faire economic system, but 
also blocked projects aimed at advancing the welfare of Malays. 118  The liberal 
economic inclinations of the Tunku administration, along with urbanization and the 
huge demand for general infrastructure, opened up unprecedented opportunities for 
Chinese business expansion—particularly in the construction, banking, and property 
development sectors. Some Chinese businesses even succeeded in becoming large 
conglomerates, involved in nearly every kind of business. During the same period, no 
solid class of Malay entrepreneurs could be properly regarded as having emerged, as 
most sectors of the economy had been taken over by more skillful and experienced 
groups while the state did not act to help the Malays to catch up with the Chinese. 
Consequently, the wealth gap between the Malays and the Chinese grew.  
 
Even worse than being “kidnapped” by the Chinese elites in economic affairs, the 
Tunku government also appeared to appease the Chinese by further compromising on 
political issues. One obvious example is the modification of the electoral system. Based 
on its 1954 initial formulation, there was a so-called “rural weightage” system that 
allowed rural constituencies to have as little as half the number of voters in urban ones 
because of size and difficulties of communication compared to urban areas. Given that 
most Malays lived in rural areas and non-Malays (mainly Chinese) were concentrated in 
the urban areas, this design was to ensure Malay superiority in elections. However, in 
1957 the Reid Commission limited disparities among constituencies to within 15 
                                                                                                                                               
all from families with either a royal or aristocratic background: Tunku Abdul Rahman was the son of the 
24th Sultan of Kedah; Tun Abdul Razak was the son of a major chieftain of Pahang; and Tun Hussein Onn 
was the son of a Menteri Besar (Chief Minister) of Johor. Hussein Onn and Razak were brothers-in-law. 
See Wariya (1989: 160) or Means (1991: 19, 54). 
118
 For example, the then MCA president (1961-1974), Tun Tan Siew Sin, was pivotal in protecting 
Chinese business interests. As Minister of Commerce and Industry (1957-1959) and Minister of Finance 
(1959-1974), Tun Tan persuaded the Tunku to implement special Malay rights policies on a very limited 
scale, regardless of the severe pressure from Malay economic nationalists. In 1963, he even prevailed on 
the Tunku to dismiss Minister of Agriculture Abdul Aziz Ishak who proposed a radical plan to help Malay 
farmers lessen their dependence on Chinese millers. For further discussion of the MCA’s influence in 
economic affairs during this period, see Jesudason (1990: ch.3) and Lee & Heng (2000: 204-205). 
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percent above and below the average constituency electorate in each state under the 
principle of “fairness.” This reduction of rural weightage, along with the relaxation of 
citizenship conditions around the same period, resulted in a decrease in Malay voting 
strength in the subsequent elections (Lim, 2002; Lim & Ong, 2006). As shown in Table 
5-1, Malays lost a huge enfranchisement advantage in the 1959 general election, going 
from 34 percent (1955) to 7 percent after most non-Malays obtained citizenship during 
independence; this advantage had become almost insignificant by 1969 (3 percent). The 
sizeable Malay delineation advantage in 1955 (12 percent) based on the 2-to-1 rural 
weightage was also reduced sharply to insignificance in the 1959, 1964 and 1969 
elections (0.6 to 2.3 percent) based on the lower Reid-recommended rural weightage 
rule. The decrease in Malay electoral advantage on the other hand implied an increase in 
Chinese voting strength in elections during the same period, which explained the rise of 
several Chinese-based opposition parties in the 1960s. 
 
Table 5-1: Institutional Sources of Malay Electoral Advantage, 1955-2004 
 1955 1959 1964 1969 1974 1986 1995 1999 2004 
a) % of Malay in National Population 49.8 50.0 50.0 52.9 53.2 55.2 58.1 59.3 61.3 
b) % of Malay Electorate in Peninsular 84.2 57.1 54.4 55.7 57.9 55.3 56.3 56.7 57.2 
c) % of Malay Electorate in Federation -- -- -- 47.8 47.7 47.0 46.9 47.9 47.2 
d) Enfranchisement advantage (b-a) +34.4 +7.1 +4.4 +2.8 +4.7 +0.1 -1.8 -2.6 -4.1 
Total Constituencies in Federation -- -- -- 144 154 177 192 193 219 
Total Constituencies in Peninsular 52 104 104 104 114 132 144 144 165 
No. of Malaysia-majority Constituencies 50 60 59 60 79 92 97 98 113 
e) % in Peninsular 96.2 57.7 56.7 57.7 69.3 69.7 67.4 68.1 68.5 
f) % in Federation -- -- -- 41.7 51.3 52.0 50.5 50.8 51.6 
g) Delineation Advantage (e-b) +12.0 +0.6 +2.3 +2.0 +11.4 +14.4 +11.1 +11.4 +11.3 
Total Electoral Advantage (d+g) +46.4 +7.7 +6.7 +4.8 +16.1 +14.5 +9.3 +8.8 +7.2 
Note: “enfranchisement advantage” is the difference between the percentage of Malays in the electorate and the 
percentage of Malays in the population [b-a]; “delineation advantage” is the difference between the 
percentage of Malay-majority constituencies and the percentage of Malays in the electorate [e-b]. 
Sources: Lim (2002: 128-129); Lim & Ong (2006: 155). 
 
To sum up, by the late 1950s in Malaysia both state-majority and majority-minority 
relations were highly negative. The Malays were gradually disillusioned with the 
government’s promise of protecting their political privileges and advancing their 
economic interests. Although their special positions and rights were assured by the 
  137 
Constitution and by governmental policies such as favorable minimum recruitment 
ratios in certain key sectors of civil service and advantageous allocation of scholarships 
and licenses, those seemed not enough to satisfy the expectations of most Malays. 
Meanwhile, tensions between ethnic groups surfaced as the Malays became aggrieved at 
not sharing in the economic growth Malaysia enjoyed, while the Chinese complained of 
their social status as second-class citizens (Case, 1991: 460). On the other hand, the 
state-Chinese relationship was relatively close and positive, as the state relied on 
Chinese capital and their business aptitude while the Chinese needed the protection of 
the state and enjoyed power sharing in the government. Using the language of the ethnic 
triangle model, the triangular relations of Malaysia in this period could be described as a 
Type-6 situation in which the majority is the outcast facing a close marriage of the state 
and the minority. Obviously this triangular situation was highly unstable and tended to 
crash easily as the majority would try to reverse the status quo by any means.  
 
Nonetheless, the breakup of the state-Chinese marriage resulted less from the challenges 
of the Malays than from the inner divisions among the Chinese and a steady erosion of 
the credibility of the MCA as representative of the Chinese community. Initially, the 
grassroots Chinese expected that the MCA would be able to defend and enhance cultural, 
political and economic interests of the whole community. However, because the UMNO 
was dominant within the Alliance, and because the UMNO faced severe stress from its 
Malay community, the MCA became less and less capable of delivering goods to their 
communal client—especially after 1960. In the parliamentary elections of 1959, the 
Alliance lost considerable mass support while Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS, 
Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, founded in 1956), with its uncompromising articulation of 
Malay and Muslim aspirations, won 13 seats and became the major Malay opposition 
party. The PAS even gained control the governments of Kelantan and Terengganu in the 
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state elections (Smith, 1960). To counter the appeals of the PAS, the government 
decided to tilt itself towards the majority Malays and launched several pro-Malay 
programs during the 1960s. For example, the 1961 Education Ordinance required 
national public exams to be given only in English and Malay and ended financial 
support and official accreditation of Chinese primary and secondary schools that refused 
to convert to a Malay or English medium (Freedman, 2001; Lee, 2008). In politics, the 
1962 constitutional amendment relaxed the Reid limits on rural weightage and allowed 
the 2-to-1 weightage in some cases (Lim, 2002; Lim & Ong, 2006). In economy, the 
first Bumiputra Economic Conference was held in Kuala Lumpur in 1965. Then, the 
state established several institutions, such as Majlis Amanah Ra’ayat (MARA, the 
Council of Trust for the Indigenous), Bank Pertanian (Agricultural Bank), and Bank 
Bumiputra, to help Malays venture into economic activities (Hussin, 1990: 48; 
Suryadinata, 1997: 83). As the UMNO became less willing to bargain, the MCA could 
do little to satisfy the growing demands of its Chinese electorate. Gradually, there was a 
growing sense of frustration among members of the Chinese community, and the MCA 
became alienated from the Chinese grass roots. Although the MCA was still in the 
Alliance, it could not bridge the state and the Chinese minority any more. As more and 
more Chinese turned their political support to the Chinese-based opposition 
parties—first the Singapore-based People’s Action Party (PAP) and then the Democratic 
Action Party (DAP, formed in 1965) and the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan, 
formed in 1968), the state-Chinese marriage ended in divorce, and 
state-majority-minority relations shifted to the worst type of triangular situation, the 
Type-8 “unit veto” triangle. 
 
According to the ethnic triangle model, when a country falls into either a Type-6 or 
Type-8 triangular situation, both the vertical anti-state activities and the horizontal 
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inter-communal mass conflicts are likely to occur—some of which tend to be violent. 
What happened in Malaysia during 1957-1969 supports this assumption. Yet, because 
there were institutionalized elections and party competitions in Malaysia, people could 
express their dissatisfaction by supporting the opposition parties in elections. 
Consequently, other kinds of anti-state activities were relatively moderate in scale. Two 
events mentioned in the literature were the “Utusan Melayu strike” in 1961 and the 
Sarawak disturbance in 1966. The former occurred when a Malay language newspaper 
Utusan Melayu, which had been a major voice of Malay nationalism in the 1940s and 
1950s, was forcibly taken over by UMNO leaders. The latter took place when the 
central government deposed the elected state government of Sarawak which was then 
under the control of an opposition party—the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) (Crouch, 
1996: 78-79, 86). Although a state of emergency had been proclaimed at the state level 
in Sarawak in 1966, neither of these two events caused serious crisis. 
 
Compared to anti-state activities, riots between the Malays and the Chinese were more 
frequent and violent during this period. Particularly, all riots began in the cities where 
the Malays were outnumbered by three or four to one by the Chinese, and none occurred 
on the east coast of Malaysia where the Malays vastly outnumbered Chinese (Horowitz, 
2001: 148-149, 392-393). One earlier example is the Pangkor riot in May 1959. 
According to Snider (1968), the number of the Chinese on Pangkor Island then was 
about 6,000 (out of a total population of about 8,000). While the causes and damages of 
this riot were not clear, the riot resulted in a large-scale evacuation of about 2,000 
Chinese from the island. Other ethnic violence—such as riots in Singapore (1964), 
Wellesley (1964), Penang (1967), and Kuala Lumpur (1969)—also occurred in the cities 
where Malays felt threatened by the Chinese both demographically and economically. 
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This proves Proposition-3 of the ethnic triangle model: that the more salient the ethnic 
minority in politics, the economy, or population, the more likely (inter-)ethnic riots will 
take place. The negative impact of the degree of significance of the minority on 
(inter-)ethnic relations can be further proved by the fact that the communal riots in 
Malaysia became more deadly after Singapore joined the Federation with a large 
Chinese population in 1963. In 1964, one communal conflict in Wellesley on 12 July 
caused the death of two people, and two other riots in Singapore in late July and early 
September caused the death of thirty people (Leifer, 1964; Starner, 1965). The 
extremely tense socio-political atmosphere eventually forced Singapore to separate from 
Malaysia in 1965. Yet, ethnic polarization has deepened even further and seemed 
irreversible.119 As the public increasingly became aware of political, economic, and 
ethno-religious cleavages between ethnic groups, a new generation of elites from both 
the Malay and Chinese sides came to the political scene with a greater concern for the 
“core values” of their own communities and often with a heightened awareness of the 
opportunities to manipulate mass support for themselves by appealing to ethnic 
concerns (Case, 1991; Means, 1991). Moreover, after the breakup of the marriage with 
state, along with the inspiration of the PAP triumph in Singapore, the Chinese were 
more ambitious in politics, which made the Malays feel even threatened.  
 
Even worse, in the mid-1960s Malaysia had already fallen into the “unit-veto” 
triangular situation, in which both the Malays and the Chinese had lost faith in the 
regime—the Malays did not believe the state was able to safeguard their “special 
position” while the Chinese did not believe the state was willing to protect them in the 
                                                 
119
 According to Jesudason (1990: 68-69), the PAP’s banner “Towards a Malaysian Malaysia” implicitly 
criticized Malay political hegemony and contributed to the politicization of the Chinese population, thus 
brought about ethnic polarization. For a more detailed history of this period, see Baker (2008). 
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face of Malay violence (Collins, 1998: 267-268). A so-called “security dilemma”120 
occurs and ethnic relations become extremely fragile. To a certain degree, both the 
Penang riot in 1967 and the 1969 riots were starting from the harsh reactions of the 
Malays against the political activities held by the Chinese parties, resulting in deadly 
violence between both communities. To be sure, the Penang riot emerged from a strike 
by the left-wing, mainly Chinese, Labor Party against the currency devaluation in 
November 1967. When the mass of the strike approached a Malay residential area in the 
city, a fight between demonstrators and shopkeepers occurred and two Malays were 
killed, which led Malays to seek revenge. The continuing outbreaks of violence rapidly 
assumed communal overtones and spread across the relatively peaceful rural areas of 
the nearby mainland. By the end of December, when the crisis had finally ended, 29 
people had died, over 200 had been injured, and some 1,300 had been arrested 
(Horowitz, 2001: 254-255; Ott, 1968: 130). Similarly, the riots on 13 May 1969 and 
afterwards—riots which brought Malaysia to “the darkest period in [its] national 
history”121—were triggered by a Chinese political parade. In that year, Malaysians 
experienced their first parliamentary election after Singapore’s independence. In this 
election three Chinese-dominated opposition parties (the DAP, the PPP122, and Gerakan) 
got 25 out of 104 seats in Peninsular Malaysia and became the biggest opposition bloc 
in the parliament, while the Alliance’s share of seats shrank from 85.6 percent in 1964 
(or 89 out of 104 seats) to 63.5 percent (66 seats)—less than two-thirds of the total (see 
Table 5-2). On 13 May, a celebration of the Chinese victory stimulated fights between 
Malays and Chinese in Kuala Lumpur and several big cities in western Malaysia. From 
                                                 
120
 The concept of the “security dilemma” is commonly used in studies of international relations. It 
occurs when two (or more) states each feel highly insecure vis-à-vis other states. Although none of the 
actors want the current situations to deteriorate, each tends to interpret the other’s actions as threatening 
and tends to react harshly in order to make it safer. Unfortunately, such reaction usually causes even 
harsher reactions from the other side, thus creating an ironic cycle of escalating of conflict (Posen, 1993). 
121
 Described by the Tunku, cf. Hussin (1990: 53). 
122
 Parti Progresif Penduduk Malaysia (the People’s Progressive Party), which was formed in 1953.  
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13 May to late July, the riots caused 196 deaths and injured 1,109; 9,143 people were 
arrested for various offences ranging from murder and arson to breaking curfew.123  
 
Table 5-2: Malaysian Parliamentary Election Results, 1959-2008 
 1959* 1964* 1969* 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 1995 1999 2004 2008 
Seats and Vote Won by the Government** 
1) Total seats 104 104 104 154 154 154 177 180 192 193 219 222 
2) No. of seats 74 89 66 135 130 132 148 127 162 148 198 140 
3) % of seats 71.2 85.6 63.5 87.7 84.4 85.7 83.6 70.6 84.4 76.7 90.4 63.1 
4) % of vote 51.7 58.5 49.1 60.7 57.2 60.5 55.8 53.4 65.2 56.5 63.9 50.3 
Difference (3-4) 19.5 27.1 16.7 27.0 27.2 25.2 27.8 17.2 19.2 20.2 26.5 12.8 
Seats Won by Major Parties (opposition parties in grey setting) 
UMNO 52 59 51 61 70 70 83 71 89 72 110 79 
MCA 19 27 13 19 17 24 17 18 30 28 31 15 
Gerakan -- -- 8 5 4 5 5 5 7 7 10 2 
DAP -- -- 13 9 16 9 24 20 9 10 12 28 
PAS 13 9 12 12 5 5 1 7 7 27 7 23 
Keadilan/PKR -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 5 1 31 
Opposition Total 30 15 38 19 24 22 29 53 21 45 21 82 
Note: * Figures are only for Peninsular Malaysia. ** “Government” means the Alliance Party from 1959 to 1964, the 
Alliance and the Sarawak United People’s Party for 1969, and the Barisan Nasional (BN) since 1974. 
Sources: Zakaria (2000) for 1959-1999; G. Brown (2005c); the Election Commission of Malaysia (SPR). 
 
PHASE II (1970-1987): The Consolidation of the State-Malay Marriage 
 
The May 1969 riots could be seen as a major watershed and turning point in the history 
of Malaysia. Above all, it marked the end of consociational democracy and the start of 
an era of “Bumiputraism” when the Tunku was replaced by the Malay nationalist Tun 
Abdul Razak. Under Razak, not only did many aggressively pro-Malay elites like Dr. 
Mahathir Mohamad and Musa Hitam—who had been publicly disgraced by the 
Tunku—return to political prominence, but the government’s overall political, 
socio-economic, and cultural policy orientations and projects—especially those relating 
to ethnicity—also changed radically. As a result, the relationships between the state and 
ethnic groups also changed dramatically. 
 
                                                 
123
 According to Crouch (1996), among the 196 dead, only 25 were Malays while 143 were Chinese. In 
addition, most of the injured people were Chinese. The figure was based on the official report and seemed 
to be underestimated. The real figure could have been four times as high. See Hussin (1990: 54). For 
further details of the 1969 general elections and the violence afterwards, see Ratnam & Milne (1970). 
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To begin with, there were fundamental changes in the economic development programs. 
In reviewing the May 1969 riots, the government concluded that the root cause of the 
riots had been the economic disparities between the Malays and the Chinese. In 1970, 
the mean monthly income of Malay households was RM172, and the per capita Malay 
income per month was RM34, a sharp contrast to the Chinese figures of RM394 and 
RM68, respectively. Meanwhile, Chinese economic assets then made up 30.4 percent of 
the commercial sector, 43.3 percent of the transportation sector, and 52.8 percent of total 
fixed assets in the construction sector of the country (Heng & Sieh Lee, 2000: 131-132). 
An official report in the same year also showed that the total number of Malay-owned 
business firms was only 365 compared with 10,489 for others, with approved capital of 
RM48 million and RM1,219 million, respectively (Second Malaysia Plan, 1971). In a 
nutshell, the economic gap between the Malays and the Chinese was obviously huge. 
Although since 1960s the government had introduced several institutions and 
affirmative projects to help the Malays enhance their economic capabilities, those 
measures were largely ineffective and inadequate.  
 
Thus, in July 1969 the state announced a comprehensive economic affirmative action 
program, the New Economic Policy (NEP), to be undertaken in 1971, aimed at 
providing socioeconomic bases for national unity by eradicating poverty and 
establishing greater economic equity among the country’s ethnic communities. Two 
ambitious goals were that by 1990, the occupations of Malaysians would reflect the 
ethnic composition of the country, and by the same year, 30 percent of the country’s 
corporate share capital would be owned by Malays while restricting the non-Malay 
share to 40 percent and the foreign share to 30 percent (Second Malaysia Plan, 1971). 
The implementation of the NEP, however, required vigorous state involvement in new 
sectors of the economy. The state not only created numerous agencies and corporations 
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for training, funding, and employment of Malays in diverse fields, 124  but also 
established and operated a wide range of productive enterprises. The number of state 
owned enterprises (SOEs) grew from 109 in 1970 to 362 in 1975, 656 in 1980 and 1,014 
in 1985 (Lee, 2000: 18). In addition, the state also aggressively redistributed corporate 
assets in favor of the Malays—including making shares available to the Malays at 
preferential rates and obliging private companies to train Malays for managerial 
positions (Collins, 1998: 266, 276 n23). In order to increase Malay participation in the 
private sector, a notorious regulation, the Industrial Coordination Act (ICA), was 
instituted in 1975 which forced non-Malay manufacturing firms with more than 
RM100,000 in shareholders’ funds and with more than twenty-five workers to divest at 
least 30 percent of their equity to Malay shareholders. Also, the number of Malays in 
their workforce had to reflect the Malay population in proportion to the country’s 
population (i.e. at least 50 percent).125 In the same period, many new bureaucratic 
bodies were also created to monitor and influence the behavior of private business; the 
size of such bodies ballooned from 140,000 in 1970 to 520,000 in 1983 (Lee, 2000: 18).  
 
Meanwhile, in order to enhance the Malays’ competitiveness in modern economic 
sectors, it was also necessary to provide more opportunities for Malays to obtain higher 
education. Thus, the government not only sponsored more scholarships for Malays to 
pursue studies in colleges and universities, but also set ethnic quotas for university 
                                                 
124
 For instance, the National Corporation (PERNAS) was established in 1969 and the Urban 
Development Authority (UDA) was set up in 1971 to offer start-up capital for new Malay companies in 
construction, finance, insurance, manufacturing, transportation, and even retail industries in which the 
Malays were under-represented. Later, Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB, the National Equity 
Corporation) and Amanah Saham Nasional (ASN, the National Trust Fund) were formed in 1978 and 
1981, respectively, to purchase companies in the name of the Malay community; shares in these ventures 
were limited to Malays. These are just some examples among many (Baker, 2008; Jamaludin, 2003; Leete, 
2007). 
125
 The ICA was amended slightly in 1977: firms with more than RM250,000 in shareholders’ funds and 
employing more than twenty-five workers had to obtain manufacturing licenses; firms with more than 
RM500,000 in fixed investments had to comply with the 30 percent Malay equity restructuring (Heng & 
Sieh Lee, 2000: 138). In addition, during the NEP era, the government also created and empowered 
hundreds of public enterprises to acquire economic resources on behalf of Malays. 
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entrance, which benefited the Malays and hindered non-Malays.126 In addition to the 
existing University of Malaya, many universities were opened, within which Malay 
students formed 65 to 90 percent of the total student population (Means, 1991: 26).127 
Consequently, the proportion of Malays at the higher education level increased 
immediately. Over the period 1970-1975, the Malay increase in degree courses was 58 
percent and 85 percent received a diploma (Third Malaysia Plan, 1976: 399-404). In 
1975, Malay tertiary enrollment increased 65 percent from the total Malay enrollment in 
1970, while that of non-Malays declined from 50 percent to 35 percent during the same 
period. Out of a total intake of 14,254 into the five universities, Malays made up 57.2 
percent, Chinese 36.6 percent, and others 6.2 percent (Hussin, 1990: 59). 
 
Besides the changes in the economy and education, there were also changes at the 
socio-cultural level. After the 1969 riots, the government realized the need to unite this 
multiethnic society so that communal violence would never happen again. In July 1969, 
the Department of National Unity (DNU) was formed, and one of its main actions was 
to announce the Rukunegara (the Principles of Nationhood)—belief in God, loyalty to 
King and Country, upholding the Constitution, rule of law, and good behavior, and 
morality—as the national ideology in August 1970.128 Meanwhile, for the first time the 
government began to seriously take the inculcation of a national identity to promote a 
sense of belonging to the country among the ethnic groups—something that had been 
neglected under the Tunku. Not surprisingly, the so-called “national identity” was based 
                                                 
126
 Within the universities, there also existed an informal quota system, which reserved a high percentage 
of places in popular programs, such as economics, law, and engineering, for Malays. Many Chinese 
students had no choice but to read subjects they had no interest in (DeBernardi & Tarnowski, 1995: 87).  
127
 It should be noted that the affirmative action in the economy and education were not implemented 
only after 1971, but also had been introduced in the 1960s. However, given that in the 1960s the Alliance 
government was trying hard to please both the Malays and the Chinese, it introduced many policies that 
initially seemed heavily weighed in favor of Malay interests to “impress the Malays” but later were 
implemented slowly in an effort to “placate non-Malays.” Unfortunately, such measures became largely 
ineffective and/or inadequate, and the government satisfied no group (Bass, 1970: 158-159; Lee, 2005: 
212-213). 
128
 For serious debates on national ideology and nation-building in 1969-1970, see Milne (1970: 563-73). 
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on the views of the Malays; and its important elements were consistent with Malay 
nationalism. Its implementation included the assimilation of ethnic Chinese as well as 
the tight control of the society. To be sure, in September 1969 the government 
announced the National Educational Policy, which was aimed at “gradually convert[ing] 
the language of administration and English-medium educational institutions to Malay” 
(Crouch, 1992: 27). Starting in 1970, Bahasa Melayu became the sole medium of 
instruction in the national primary and secondary schools while the use of Chinese in 
public education system was rejected. Although private Chinese vernacular schools still 
coexisted with the government-run schools, they were marginalized and compelled to 
have a Malay-centered curriculum (Freedman, 2000). Moreover, in 1971 the First 
National Culture Congress announced the National Culture Policy, which proposed 
basing national culture on Islam and “the indigenous culture of this region.” 
Subsequently, cultural activities of Chinese such as lion dances in traditional festivals, 
literature not written in the Malay language, and the usage of Chinese characters in shop 
signboards, were all restricted. The government also renamed roads with Malay names 
as a means of “repudiating the contributions of non-Malay Malaysians” (Kua, 1992: 
75-81; Shamsul, 1998: 146).  
 
Furthermore, as an Islamic revival was gathering steam in Malaysia in the late 1970s, 
and as the opposition PAS continually accused UMNO members as being kafir 
(infidels), overt state involvement in Islamic issues became a matter of political 
necessity. Between 1979 and 1984, the government introduced a series of policies and 
projects supportive of Islam and Muslims including a pledge of RM26 million toward 
the establishment of the Southeast Asian Islamic Research Center based in Malaysia, the 
introduction of Islamic religious knowledge as a subject in national education exams, 
the official launching of National Dakwah Month, the sponsoring of the built of 
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magnificent mosques, the establishment of the Islamic Bank of Malaysia, Islamic 
Insurance schemes, and an Islamic Economic Foundation, the formation of Islamic 
think tanks, such as the Islamic Resources Group and the Special Islamic Enforcement 
Group, the establishment of International Islamic University in Kuala Lumpur, and the 
expansion of the National Council for Islamic Affairs to the Division of Islamic Affairs 
(Hussin, 1990: Ch.5; Mariappan, 2002; Means, 1991; Shamsul, 1997; Singh, 2007). 
During the same period, however, other ethnic groups found it increasingly difficult to 
build temples, churches, and burial grounds (DeBernardi & Tarnowski, 1995: 88). 
 
The emphasis of “Malayness” as national identity was supposed to bring about criticism 
from the Chinese community. However, amendments in 1970 to the Sedition Act (1948) 
prohibited certain “sensitive issues”—the special rights of Malays, the language policies 
and privileges of royalty—from public discourse. In other words, it was illegal for 
anyone, including parliamentarians, to question policies regarding Malay rights and 
privileges. Then in 1971, the Constitutional Amendment Bill institutionalized this 
pattern of Malay political supremacy. In practice, the government produced a series of 
acts or amendments to reduce the scope of political activity among groups that might 
challenge the government.129 In the 1970s and 1980s, hundreds of dissenters were 
detained without trial under these acts including many Parliament members and elites of 
the opposition parties. Also, these acts seemed to be applied particularly to Chinese but 
only lightly to bumiputras (Crouch, 1996: 81-84). Meanwhile, the government added up 
a considerable impediment to media freedom through various restrictive laws. For 
example, following the Control of Imported Publications Act (1958, amended in 1972) 
                                                 
129
 Such acts included the Election Offences Act in 1954 (amended 1969), the Emergency (Public Order 
and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance in 1969, the Universities and University Colleges Act in 1971 
(UUCA, amended 1975), the Internal Security Act in 1968 (ISA, amended 1972), the Official Secrets Act 
in 1972 (OSA, amended 1986), the Local Government Act in 1976, the Societies Act in 1966 (amended 
1983 and 1987), and the Police Act in 1967 (amended 1988). For details of these restrictive regulations, 
see Milne (1976), Rodan (2004: Ch.2), and Rogers (1971; 1972). 
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and the Printing Presses and Publications Act (1984), the Minister of Home Affairs 
could censor or ban any imported publication “deemed prejudicial to public order, 
national interest, morality, or security” and could suspend or revoke a permit or 
publication license annually (Rodan, 2004: 23-24). Another way to control the mass 
media was through ownership of shares of major media groups—and then acquiring the 
ability to insert management more sympathetic to the government. In the 1970s and 
1980s, the major parties within the ruling coalition were all in on the act of purchasing 
shares of the leading press companies.130 In addition, the Minister of Information had a 
monopoly over radio and television until 1985 (Christie & Roy, 2001; Crouch, 1996: 
84-88). Of course, the government always justified those repressive institutions and 
policies under the name of social peace and order, as debates or activities related to 
sensitive issues might flare up ethnic tensions and could easily turn into violence.  
 
Nonetheless, the most far-reaching changes occurred in the political arena. Following its 
worst-ever showing in the 1969 election, the ruling coalition resorted to extensive 
changes to the political system to safeguard its continued rule. In 1974 the Alliance was 
replaced with Barisan Nasional (BN, the National Front) which consisted of not only 
the three traditional ethnic-based parties UMNO, MCA, and MIC, but also Gerakan 
with wide non-Malay support in Selangor and Penang, PPP with its strong base in Perak, 
and several parties from Sabah and Sarawak.131 The main purpose of the expansion of 
the ruling front was to ensure UMNO/Malay political supremacy in two ways. First, by 
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 For example, the largest English, Malay and Chinese newspapers were owned by the Fleet Group, an 
investment arm of UMNO. The Star, the second largest English-language newspaper, was owned by 
business interests aligned with the MCA, and the Tamil press was controlled by supporters of the MIC.  
131
 Even the PAS was brought into the BN for a brief period from 1973 to 1978. See Hussin (1990: Ch.4) 
for details. It should be noted that in the 1969 election, the Alliance suffered serious losses in Penang, 
Perak, Selangor, and Terengganu. Thus, the widespread cooptation of the opposition assemblymen/MPs 
not only helped the BN to reverse its electoral losses in these states but also enabled the regime’s leaders 
“to remain within the bounds of constitutionality in the task of restructuring the political system in order 
to reduce the saliency of communal issues and bolster its political primacy” (Barraclough, 1985: 316). 
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coopting former foes at both the federal and the state levels—a fruitful means of 
neutralizing dissent132—the BN could reduce political conflicts among the elites. The 
resulting elite stability then contributed to political quiescence and ethnic 
peace—critical ingredients for the implementation of other socio-economic policies 
(Chee, 1974; Milne, 1975). As the BN occupied the vast middle ground of Malaysian 
politics, it left the remaining opposition parties polarized along the margins, from 
Islamism to socialism. Because the political views of the opposition parties were 
ideological oil and water, they could not cooperate to bring down the BN. As a result, 
despite a sizeable popular vote, formal opposition in Malaysia turned to be of only 
marginal importance (Indorf, 1979). Secondly, because there were over a dozen political 
parties in the BN and the power position of these parties was highly asymmetrical, the 
internal structure of the BN had a complex hierarchy. Being the largest Malay-based 
party, the UMNO steadily monopolized power in the BN (Chee, 1973; G. Brown, 
2005b). On the other hand, with the challenges of Gerakan and PPP within the BN, the 
MCA as the only effective vehicle of political representation for Malaysian Chinese in 
the government was further threatened. In the following years, serious friction between 
the MCA and Gerakan as well as severe intra-party power struggle in the MCA greatly 
hurt the image of the MCA.133 Although this benefited the opposition DAP (in the 1978 
and 1986 elections, shown in Table 5-2), the representational fragmentation of the 
Chinese community led to the consequent relegation of Chinese politics to “an 
increasingly peripheral position within the Malaysian polity” (Heng, 1988: 261).  
                                                 
132
 For example, Lim Kean Siew, a former leader of the Labor Party of Malaya, joined MCA in the early 
1970s, while Ibrahim Ali, a leader of the 1974 student demonstration and ex-detainee under the ISA, 
joined UMNO in 1981; Anwar Ibrahim, founder and President of the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia 
(ABIM, Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1971) and also an ex-detainee under the ISA for his part 
in the Baling peasant demonstrations, joined the UMNO in 1982 (Bass, 1983). Cooptation proved to be an 
effective strategy against the DAP, which suffered from unprecedented elite efflux in the 1970s and early 
1980s. For details, see Barraclough (1985). 
133
 For details about conflicts among the Chinese parties in the BN and within the MCA, see Bass (1983); 
Chee (1973; 1974); Indorf (1979); Milne (1975); von der Mehden (1982); Zakaria (1985; 1986).  
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Yet, what marginalized the Chinese minority in an even more fundamental way was the 
Constitutional (Amendment) Act (No.2) of 1973. Noticing the threat of the Chinese 
voting strength on Malay political superiority in the 1960s’ elections, the 1973 Act 
completely removed the constitutional limits to rural weightage, thus allowing rural 
weightage without clearly limiting it. As a result, the disproportion between the largest 
(mainly Chinese urban) and smallest (Malay rural) constituencies was so great that 
some non-Malay majority constituencies had more than three times the population of 
the smallest Malay majority constituency (Freedman, 2000). Table 5-1 shows that the 
1974 re-delineation led to a sharp increase in Malay-majority constituencies from 60 to 
79, which constituted 69.3 percent of the total for Peninsular Malaysia and 51.3 percent 
of the total for the country; the level of delineation advantage was decreased to about 
the 1955 level and was maintained in subsequent (1984 and 1994) delineations. 
Together with its plurality electoral system and the electorate’s tendency of ethnic 
voting, Malay electoral superiority was ensured. Also, as the ruling coalition always ran 
only one candidate from its member parties in each constituency, the number of Chinese 
candidates in the political arena was effectively minimized (Freedman, 2000; 2001).  
 
Now it is worth discussing how much the state, through the above-mentioned economic, 
socio-cultural and political policies and institutions, actually secured the BN 
government as well as moderate state-society conflict and ethnic tension after the 1969 
riots. First of all, the design of the electoral system not only tilted the ethnic balance of 
electoral power clearly in favor of the Malay majority (as already mentioned), but also 
consolidated the UMNO-dominant BN ruling coalition. As shown in Table 5-2, the 
electoral system had awarded the Government between 25.2 percent and 27.8 percent of 
parliamentary seats over its share of votes in all the elections in the 1970s and 
1980s—and this big “bonus” had been further enlarged by rural weightage, as the 
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resulting increase in the value of the rural vote had mainly benefited UMNO and other 
bumiputra parties in the BN. As the BN had continuously been able to secure its 
two-thirds majority in parliament since 1974 and thus controlled the government and the 
constitution, the remaining problems—such as UMNO’s succession crisis in the 1970s 
and 1980s134 and the threat of Islamic extremists in the early 1980s135—became rather 
controllable.  
 
Secondly, regarding the managing of ethnic tensions, the NEP is often believed quite 
successful at defusing Malay-Chinese confrontation via development of the economy 
and decreasing the (inter-)ethnic wealth disparity. Accessed by standard macro-level 
measures, Malaysia’s economic performance in the 1970s and 1980s was impressive. 
By the injection of large-scale foreign investment and the discovery of new deposits of 
oil and gas along the eastern coast of the peninsula and offshore Sarawak, its GDP grew 
at an average of over 8 percent per annum between 1971 and 1984 (except 1975, see 
Appendix C). National growth led to higher income for most Malaysians. Household 
incomes during this period increased fourfold; the mean monthly household income for 
the Malays grew from RM172 in 1970 to RM852 in 1985 and for the Chinese from 
RM394 to RM1502, respectively. Although aggregate Chinese incomes still stayed well 
above that of Malays, the income gap was reduced from 2.3 times to 1.76 times between 
1970 and 1985. As a result, the percentage of Malaysians living below the poverty line 
declined significantly from 49.3 percent in 1970 to 20.7 percent in 1985. Importantly, 
                                                 
134
 The succession crisis began in 1973 when UMNO’s Deputy President Tun Dr. Ismail died suddenly. 
After several rounds of power struggle among elites, Tun Hussein Onn became UMNO’s deputy leader. 
Hussein became Prime Minister in 1976 after Razak died in January of that year; he stepped down in 
1981 and was succeeded by Dr. Mahathir. From 1981 until the late 1980s, another serious contest 
continued for the deputy presidency of UMNO (and thus de facto the position of deputy prime minister) 
between Musa Mitam and Tengku Razaleigh Hamzah. See Chee (1974) and G. Brown (2005b) for details. 
135
 In early 1980 the Islamic extremists seemed to be a threat to national security as some radical 
members made several suicide attacks on non-Muslim temples and government buildings in 1980 and 
“the Baling affair” in 1985. For details, see Bass (1984), von der Mehden (1981), and Zakaria (1985; 
1986). It was under this context that the government introduced a series of pro-Muslim policies in the 
early 1980s. 
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the poverty rates in 1970 were substantially higher among the Malays than among the 
Chinese. Roughly two-thirds of Malay households were living below the poverty line 
(64.8 percent), while poverty rates among the Chinese were 26 percent. The difference 
between the two groups was 38.8 percent. But by 1985 the poverty rates had declined to 
28.7 percent and 7.8 percent, respectively, for the Malays and Chinese, with 20.9 
percent difference (Table 5-3). In terms of the ethnic ownership of share capital, the 
Malays share rose substantially, from just 2.4 percent in 1970 to 19.1 percent in 1985 
while over the same period the Chinese share only slightly increased from 27.2 percent 
to 33.4 percent (Table 5-4).  
 
Table 5-3: Mean Monthly Household Income and Poverty Rates, 1970-2007 
 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1997 1999 2004 2007 
Mean Monthly Household Income (in Ringgit, RM)1 
Malay 172 345 492 852 931 1604 2038 1984 2522 3156 
Chinese 394 787 938 1502 1582 2890 3737 3456 4127 4853 
Indian 304 538 756 1094 1201 2140 2896 2702 3215 3799 
All Groups 264 514 693 1095 1163 2008 2607 1371 3249 3686 
Disparity ratio (C/M) 2.29 2.28 1.91 1.76 1.70 1.8 1.83 1.74 1.64 1.54 
Poverty Rates2 
Malay 64.8 -- 39.3 28.7 23.0 -- -- 12.4 8.3 -- 
Chinese 16.0 -- 16.5 7.8 5.4 -- -- 1.2 0.6 -- 
Indian 39.2 -- 20.5 10.1 7.6 -- -- 3.5 2.9 -- 
All Groups 49.3 -- 29.2 20.7 16.5 -- -- 8.5 5.7 -- 
Difference (M-C) 38.8 -- 22.8 20.9 17.6 -- -- 11.2 7.7 -- 
Disparity ratio (C/M) 2.5 -- 2.4 3.7 4.3 -- -- 10.3 13.8 -- 
Sources: 1Leete (2007: 167), Shari (2000: 116), Phang (2000: 112); 2Jamaludin (2003: 157), Leete (2007: 139, 141) 
 
Table 5-4: 
Ownership of Share Capital (at Par Value) of Limited Companies (%), 1970-2004 
 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998 2004 
Malay 2.4 9.2 12.5 19.1 19.3 20.6 19.4 18.9 
Individuals 1.6 -- 4.3 11.7 14.2 18.6 17.7 -- 
trustees 0.8 -- 8.2 7.4 5.1 2 1.7 -- 
Chinese 27.2 -- -- 33.4 45.5 40.9 38.5 39.0 
Indian 1.1 -- -- 1.2 1.0 1.5 -- 1.2 
Local Entities* 6.0 -- -- 7.2 8.5 8.3 7.1 8.0 
Foreign residents 63.4 53.3 42.9 26.0 25.4 27.7 31.8 32.5 
Note: * State and federal governments and other locally controlled companies; nominee companies only from 1990. 
Sources: Jomo (1990: 158-159); Jomo (1997: 245); Lee (2000: 37); Leete (2007: 162). 
 
However, the NEP seems not wholly successful in fulfilling its original goals. First, 
Table 5-3 shows that while ethnic disparities in poverty rates from 1970 to 1985 
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narrowed markedly in absolute terms (i.e. the “difference”), they have widened at lower 
levels in relative terms (i.e. the “ratio”). The incidence of poverty was especially 
prevalent among the Malays, who had an average monthly income of about half that of 
the Chinese. Also, Table 5-4 shows that while by 1985 the overall Malay share of the 
economy had risen to 19 percent, only 11.7 percent was held by individuals—the rest 
was held by government-organized trustees. In other words, the number of Malay 
entrepreneurs remained underrepresented. Moreover, the NEP was supposed to 
restructure the ethnic pattern of employment—i.e. to move the Malays from farmers and 
fishermen to occupations in modern sectors that were more varied and open to 
economic opportunity (Baker 2008: 340-341). However,while the state created a large 
amount of job opportunities for the Malays within the public sector—which increased 
from 68 percent between 1970 and 1977 to 83 percent between 1977 and 1980,136 the 
rest of the majority of the Malays continued to be employed in agriculture and remained 
underrepresented in administrative and managerial occupations. While the number of 
Malay professionals and skilled labor had increased, they were still disproportionately 
overrepresented in the lower unskilled categories. In 1985, the proportion of Malay 
registered professionals (including architects, engineers, accountants, dentists, doctors, 
veterinary surgeons and lawyers) was 22.2 percent of the total. Although the proportion 
had risen dramatically from 4.9 percent in 1970, it was still far below that of the 
Chinese (61.2 percent). As such, the Malay middle class remained an insignificant 
segment of the Malay community (Lee, 2000; Maznah, 2005).  
 
Most important of all, as many scholars have pointed out, since the NEP and other 
socio-cultural policies were ethnically-based, the practice of these policies actually 
                                                 
136
 Many managerial jobs were superfluously created in public and statutory bodies to absorb Malay 
graduates even though some were not qualified to hold such positions (Maznah, 2005: 12). 
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contributed to the “institutionalization of ethnic enclaves” in the society and the 
polarization of the Malay and Chinese communities (Balasubramaniam, 2005; 
Freedman, 2001; Lee, 2005). Although unlike the Indonesian government, the BN 
government did not put special codes on the ID cards of the Chinese, it emphasized 
cultural-religious differences and ethnic consciousness in all levels of schooling, in 
membership of political parties and parallel social associations, and in various economic 
settings. As a result, few people in Malaysia could actually transcend their ethnicity 
(Jomo, 1990). Areas of face-to-face social contact, mainly through friendship and 
neighborhood circles, were still limited for the majority of people in Malaysia; mixed 
marriages across ethnic barriers rarely occurred due to high socio-cultural dislocations 
and costs for the Chinese to convert to Islam (Mariappan, 2002: 216). Ethnic enclaves 
were pervasive not only in public service and business sectors, but also in the education 
sector. In fact, student interactions across ethnic lines on campuses worsened since the 
quota system had created a sense of alienation among the Chinese academic community 
(Maznah, 2005: 13). Furthermore, the preferential policies formulated and the manner in 
which they were pursued caused frustration and resentment among the Chinese towards 
both the state and the Malays (Lee, 2000). In this sense, the NEP was not a promising 
instrument for alleviating ethnic mistrust and tensions. 
 
All in all, the triangular relationship in Malaysia during 1970-1987 was similar to the 
situation of the seventh type of ethnic triangle described in Table 2-1, in which there is 
one positive relationship between the state and the majority Malays and two negative 
relationships between the state and the minority Chinese and between the Chinese and 
the Malays. By the aforementioned preferential policies in favor of the Malays in 
economy, education, and even in politics (elections), and by co-opting past dissenters 
into the ruling coalition, the state gradually won the support of the majority of 
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Malays—as can be seen in the election results (refer to Table 5-2). Although starting in 
the early 1980s conflict between the UMNO and the PAS over the issues of an Islamic 
state as well as elections and by-elections at the federal and state level became more 
intense and in some instances led to violence—such as the cases in 1980 and 1985 (see 
Appendix B-2), the PAS, as a largely rural and peasant based political party, was less 
attractive to urban and professional Malays, and could not yet challenge the UMNO’s 
position within the Malay community (Azeem, 2005: 51-63).  
 
On the other hand, the Chinese minority became the outcast from this “marriage” of the 
state and the majority. According to the triangle theory, in this context one should 
foresee complaints and resistance from the Chinese in opposition of the state—and such 
grievances may occasionally spill over to the Malays. Indeed, during this period there 
was severe criticism of the state’s rural weightage system and affirmative action in 
education. In the former case, after the 1974 re-delineation, even MCA leaders voiced 
concern about the obvious mal-apportionment of the constituencies, heightened 
perceptions of political inequalities and worsened ethnic polarization. Strident criticisms 
from the DAP and MCA brought about a wave of arrests of MPs and party officials of 
these two parties in 1976 (Lim, 2002). In the latter case, the restriction on Chinese 
students enrolling in university led to a call for a privately-funded Chinese-medium 
university, Merdeka University, in 1978, but this was rejected by the UMNO on the 
grounds that teaching through Chinese would conflict with the goals of a unified 
national system of education (Indorf, 1979). “The Merdeka University Issue” continued 
to be a major stumbling block to the relationship between the state and the Chinese 
community in the following years. Although under pressure from the MCA, in 1981 the 
government allowed the Chinese community to establish Tunku Abdul Rahman College, 
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in which the medium of instruction would be English; however, this concession did not 
satisfy the Chinese much.137  
 
In the mid-1980s, as the redistributive grip of the NEP reached its peak and the 
economic recession bit in, the Chinese community was hit hardest and thus 
state-Chinese relations deteriorated even further.138 In the 1986 general election, the BN 
performed disastrously in the constituencies in which the Chinese were the 
majority—while there were only 24 such constituencies out of 132 in Peninsular 
Malaysia, the BN won only six of them (G. Brown, 2005b: 10-12). Eventually, the 
state-Chinese conflict reached a peak in the fall of 1987 when the MCA, in conjunction 
with the DAP, associated with 15 Chinese civil society organizations to protest against 
the government’s decision to appoint 54 non-Mandarin-speaking Chinese to positions in 
Chinese-medium primary schools. To the Chinese, this decision symbolized a 
systematic program by the government to undermine their language. However, the 
collaboration between the MCA and DAP was seen by the UMNO as a clear breach of 
BN discipline and thus tensions arose. It should be noted that in the same year the 
UMNO leadership of Mahathir was challenged from within by Tengku Razaleigh 
Hamzah; the power struggle between Mahathir’s Team A and Razaleigh’s Team B 
intensified when the narrowly defeated Team B petitioned the High Court to declare the 
April party election results invalid in June. The continuing internal divisions and the 
pending lawsuit all left the leadership feeling vulnerable (Mauzy, 1988: 213-219). 
Meanwhile, in society ethnic relations had become fragile under the impact of the 
recession of the previous years. Within this context, Chinese anti-government protests in 
                                                 
137
 For details on “the Merdeka University Issue” as well as Chinese resentment of the education policy 
during this period, see Collins (1998), Esman (1994), Ganguly (2003), and Means (1991).  
138
 Between 1984 and 1987 there was a 4.8 percent drop in Chinese mean household income but a slight 
increase of 1.9 percent for the bumiputra. According to G. Brown (2005b: 10), it was the first time that the 
declining incomes of the Chinese relative to the national average was accompanied by an absolute 
decline.  
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four west coast states in October stimulated a series of UMNO Youth-organized 
counter-protests and anti-Chinese demonstrations in Kuala Lumpur. The disturbance 
finally caused one Chinese death and two inhuries. Ethnic tensions “rose to boiling 
point and set off panic buying of foodstuffs, a phenomenon widely viewed after 1969 as 
preliminary to dreaded communal blood-letting” (Case 1991: 467). Fearful of renewed 
ethnic clashes, on 27 October Mahathir declared a state of emergency, carried out 
“Operation Lalang” (Weeding Operation), and arrested 119 political activists from all 
parties and from NGOs under ISA. Three major newspapers, The Star, Watan, and Sin 
Chiew Jit Poh, were also shut down in October.139 
 
PHASE III (1988-2008): The Ups and Downs of the State-Malay Relations 
 
Although Operation Lalang was notorious for violating human rights and press freedom, 
it effectively silenced critics and brought Malaysia back from the brink of ethnic 
conflagration. Admittedly, at the Malay elite level, the “Team A vs. Team B” conflict 
continued with the official registration Team B’s political party, Semangat 46 (Spirit 
of ’46; reflecting the spirit of the UMNO when it was founded in 1946), on 5 May 1989. 
In the 1990 national elections Semangat 46 forged a losing dual coalition with the 
opposition parties, and this opposition front won over 46 percent of the popular vote in 
total—or 53 out of 180 parliamentary seats—which was the best performance of the 
opposition since 1969 (Nathan, 1989; 1990). Nonetheless, with the economy returning 
to high growth, averaging over nine percent annual GDP growth from 1988 on (until 
1996, see Appendix C), Semangat 46 displayed continued loss of strength. By 1992 
Mahathir had firmly consolidated his power; his leadership style was reassessed as 
                                                 
139
 In the end, 49 activists were served with two-year detention orders; among them 34 were Chinese, 
including the leader of the opposition DAP Lim Kit Siang. For a detailed eco-political analysis of the 
situation in Malaysia in 1987, see Collins (1998), DeBernardi & Taronwski (1995), Ganguly (2003), 
Mauzy (1988), and news reports from the Straits Times and Asiaweek during this period.  
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“benevolent, ably containing political pressures, easing ethnic tensions, and driving the 
economy through its fifth consecutive year of expansion” (Case, 1993: 185).  
 
For the Malaysian Chinese, the country’s economic and political development since 
1988 also led to the improvement of their socio-economic status and their relationships 
with both the state and the majority Malays. To begin with, in the late 1980s Mahathir 
turned out to be more active in advocating a relatively more inclusive national identity 
that could better incorporate the three major ethnic groups. In February 1991 Mahathir 
announced “Vision 2020”, in which he encouraged all people, regardless of their 
ethnicity and religion, to participate in the national development programs with the goal 
of a fully industrialized and true Bangsa Malaysia (Malaysian nation),140 Through 
“Vision 2020”, Mahathir gave assurance that the government would show more 
flexibility and greater tolerance toward the non-Malay communities in respect to their 
language, education, and cultural heritage. Since then, the celebration of Chinese 
festivals and the display of Chinese cultural symbols in public were no longer restricted. 
In 1993, Mahathir (and other major UMNO leaders) even attended Lunar New Year 
ceremonies “in a flaming red shirt to reflect the color of prosperity, not only for the 
Chinese community, but also that being enjoyed by the country” (Case, 1994: 123). In 
1996, the new Private Higher Educational Institution Act allowed the incorporation of 
private colleges and approved twinning programs with foreign universities, thus 
opening up more opportunities for higher education at home for the Chinese—the lack 
of which used to be a major Chinese grievance (Hwang, 2003: 247; Lee, 2004: 86). 
Because the ethnic quota system was not applied to private educational institutions, it 
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 According to Mahathir, Bangsa Malaysia means “people who are able to identify themselves with the 
country, speak Bahasa Malaysia and accept the Constitution.” To realize it, people should “start accepting 
each other as they are, regardless of race and religion” (cf. Zakaria & Suzaina 2005: 58). In other words, 
Bangsa Malaysia denotes a nation-state in which people maintain their own cultures, values and religions, 
and accept each other’s differences while also sharing an overarching identity of being Malaysian and 
being loyal to the country, its constitution and its language (Collins 1998: 273; Hwang, 2003: 245-246). 
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was estimated that Chinese students constituted over 80 percent of the total enrollment 
of the major private colleges.141 More importantly, along with Vision 2020, in 1991 
Mahathir also announced the National Development Plan (NDP) to replace the 
twenty-year-old NEP, which set no time frame for the attainment of the thirty percent 
Bumiputra ownership target but instead placed the priority of a seven percent annual 
growth target believed necessary for Malaysia to become “a fully developed country” 
by 2020 (Case, 1994: 120-125; Jamaludin, 2003: 160-164). In other words, the NDP 
shifted NEP’s emphasis on inter-ethnic redistribution to economic growth through 
privatization. Although the Malays still received favorable treatment in rights to land, 
employment in public services, and placement in higher education establishments, 
scholarships and licenses, they were less assisted by preferential state policies. At the 
same time, the state encouraged greater inter-ethnic business cooperation by awarding 
concessions to favorite Chinese-owned companies. As a result, a new breed of Chinese 
businessmen emerged as major corporate players in the 1990s—among them were 
Vincent Tan Chee Yioun (Berjaya Group Bhd), Ting Pik Khiing (Ekran Bhd), and the 
Yeoh family (YTL Corporation Bhd) (Gomez et al., 2001: 70-71). 
 
The changing government attitude and policies toward the Chinese in education, culture, 
and the economy signaled the tranquility of state-Chinese relations and was one factor 
that helped the BN secure significant electoral support from the Chinese in the whole 
1990s and early 2000s. However, the major factor that contributed to this change was 
the internal split of the Malay community. As stated before, since the 1970s, using 
carrot and stick strategy—i.e. co-opting the opposition elites who were willing to 
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 Estimated by Mr. Choong Woei Chuan, Head of Resource & Information Affairs of Dong Zong 
(interview note, 13 December 2006). Also, there were three Chinese-medium colleges founded in the 
1990s: Southern College (1990), New Era College (1997), and Han Chiang College (1999). For details 
about the government’s educational policies favoring the Chinese community, including recognizing 
diplomas and degrees obtained through the MCA-sponsored TAR College for employment in public 
service, and the official intentions of practicing such policies, see Hwang (2003: 250-258). 
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cooperate while suppressing the ones who did not cooperate—the UMNO had steadily 
consolidated its position within the Malay community. In society, the opposition PAS 
could never really challenge the UMNO’s supremacy in the general elections. At the 
elite level, although there were conflicts among the UMNO leaders, such conflicts were 
restricted within the UMNO. However, starting in the late 1980s, the confrontations 
among UMNO leaders become more and more intense, and members of the defeated 
faction would leave the UMNO and form new political parties to continue the fight 
against the UMNO in the federal and state elections. In other words, in the 1990s 
factionalism, or the Malay split, fought out not only at the elite level within the UMNO, 
but also at the broad party and electoral level. One case is the aforementioned Semangat 
46 in the early 1990s. Unfortunately, Malaysia’s booming economy helped the UMNO 
won voters back in the 1995 elections, while the opposition parties suffered heavy 
losses at both the federal and the state levels.142  As most of its leaders sought 
reconciliation with the UMNO, Semangat 46 was eventually dissolved in 1996. 
 
Although Mahathir’s supremacy within the UMNO was further consolidated after the 
1995 election, his dispute with Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim gradually 
emerged in the mid-1990s. In fact, ever since Anwar became Deputy Prime Minister in 
1993, there had been persistent speculation regarding their conflicting views on 
governance (Chin, 1997; Mohamed Jawhar, 1995). Their conflict reached climax during 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, as Anwar supported the IMF plan and advocated a free 
market approach for recovery whereas Mahathir favored currency and foreign 
investment controls. Anwar’s relationship with Mahathir got even worse due to Anwar’s 
continuous criticism of cronyism, nepotism, and corruption in Mahathir’s administration, 
                                                 
142
 The BN government won 162 of 192 seats in Parliament and 65 percent of the total votes—12 percent 
more than the 1990 election (see Table 5-2). For details of the 1995 election and the demise of Semangat 
46, see Chin (1997: 183-184), Hwang (2003: 182-224), Mohamed Jawhar (1996), and Weiss (2002). 
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leading to the expulsion of Anwar from the Cabinet and from the UMNO in September 
1998. While Anwar failed to challenge Mahathir within the UMNO, he still won support, 
particularly from the younger generation middle-class Malays. After he led a protest of 
nearly 100,000 people in Kuala Lumpur demanding reformasi (reform) and Mahathir’s 
resignation, Anwar was arrested on the charge of corruption and sodomy.143 The arrest 
of Anwar and subsequent street-level clashes between police and protesters was, to most 
Malaysians, “a shocking departure from established political norms” (Felker, 1999: 
46-47). The spontaneous demonstrations in the Capital in 1998-2000 also revealed deep 
divisions within the Malay community. 144  Meanwhile, numerous anti-government 
websites emerged on the Internet as alternative channels to voice the reformasi, which 
forced Mahathir to further tighten the control of media and society.145  Yet, the 
reformasi continued and reached its peak when Anwar’s wife launched a new 
multi-ethnic political party, Parti Keadilan Nasional (Keadilan, the National Justice 
Party; later known as Parti Keadilan Rakyat, PKR or the People’s Justice Party), on 4 
April 1999 and sought cooperation with the DAP, PAS, and other opposition parties to 
contest the BN in the 1999 elections.  
 
The repeated internal split of the Malays has offered some positive possibilities for 
Malay-Chinese relations. As the Chinese community plays a crucial role, especially in 
closely contested seats as the swing vote in determining which faction within the Malay 
community is going to rule, both the government and the opposition coalition need the 
support of the Chinese side (Baker, c2008: 386). As a result, the competing Malay 
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 For Anwar’s trial, see Felker (2000: 49-50), Martinez (2001: 195-196), and Marzuki (2007: 35-37). 
144
 In some cases rallies or protests turned violent and resulted in many injuries and arrests, such as what 
happened in October 1998 and April 1999. For details see Felker (1999; 2000). 
145
 For details about social movements and the government repressions during this period, see Weiss 
(2003) and Rodan (2004). The government’s human rights violation record made the Malaysian legal 
system “one of the five worst in Asia” in 2000 based on the Hong Kong-based Political Economic Risk 
Consultancy ranking (Martinez, 2001: 196). 
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parties not only cannot take too communal a stand, but they also have to make efforts to 
win the trust of the Chinese—and from elites and from grassroots Chinese.  
 
It should be noted that in the past—since the colonial period—Malay-Chinese 
cooperation mainly occurred at the political and economic elite level but only on a 
limited basis at the grassroots. At best, such elites formed separate ethnic-based political 
parties, obtained votes from their own community, and then built a grand coalition to 
share power (as in the case of the BN); yet, trans-ethnic voting during elections was 
rarely seen. Even in the 1980s—such as during the 1982 and 1986 elections—when the 
PAS tried to co-opt the DAP, it encountered serious criticism from the party rank and 
file and was skeptically received by most Chinese (Mukerjee, 1982; Mauzy, 1987). It 
was only in the 1990s, particularly after the mid-1990s, that inter-ethnic political 
cooperation at the mass level became possible due to the easing of tensions between the 
Chinese and Malays, as more and more Malays did not regard the Chinese as being as 
demographically and politically dangerous and economically privileged as they used to 
be. First, due to their noticeably lower growth rate than that of the total population, the 
percentage of Chinese in the total population declined rapidly from 35.6 percent in 1970 
to 26.9 percent in 1991 and further to 24.5 percent in 2000 (Table 5-5). While the 
Chinese still accounted for a quarter of the nation’s population, their numbers were not 
large enough to display political challenge or claim leadership (except in Penang) as 
they had been in 1969. Second, even without its dwindling population size, it became 
clear that, after the two-decade practice of institutional discrimination and restrictions, 
the Chinese would not be able to challenge Malay political supremacy anymore. Third, 
although big Chinese enterprises were still dominant in the economy, a group of Malay 
elites had also gained a proper place, resulting from two-decades of the NEP. While this 
group was relatively small, the image that the Malays were raising contributed to the 
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reduction of Malay animosity toward the Chinese and the dampening of potential 
Malay-Chinese conflict.146 Moreover, during the 1990s there was growing evidence of 
inter-ethnic business ties, even among SMEs. Also, unlike those nominal partners in the 
1960s and 1970s, in the 1990s Malay partners in these relationships appeared to be 
equally competent. Such links indicated two facts: that an independent Malay middle 
class had been created, and that there was a greater openness to ethnic cooperation in 
business for mutual benefit among the new generation of Malaysians (Gomez, 2008: 
48-50; Gomez et al., 2001). 
 
Table 5-5: Demographic Transition in Malaysia, 1970-2000 
Chinese Population 1957* 1970 1980 1991 2000 
Number (in thousand) 1500.0 3719.1 4414.6 4945.0 5691.9 
% of total population 37.0 35.6 32.1 26.9 24.5 
Annual Growth Rate   1970-80 1980-91 1991-2000 
All groups -- -- 2.8 2.6 2.6 
Chinese -- -- 1.7 1.0 1.6 
Note: *Only in Peninsular Malaysia 
Sources: Department of Statistics Malaysia (1972, 1983, 1995, 2001). 
 
The improving Malay-Chinese relationship was verified during the Asian Financial 
Crisis. Under the shadow of anti-Chinese riots in neighboring Indonesia, various rumors 
about ethnic violence flooded the Internet in early August 1998, all of which ended after 
police arrested four people for spreading the false information. In general, ethnic 
tensions were muted throughout 1997-1999, while the contending political forces also 
avoided manipulating ethnic sentiments (Felker, 1999). Another case to examine the 
Malay-Chinese relationship was the controversies created by Suqiu and David Chua. In 
early September 1999, Suqiu, the Malaysian Chinese Organizations’ Election Appeals 
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 According to the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE), of the top 10 firms in 2000, three were 
Chinese-owned (seven were government-owned); of the top 50 firms, 20 were Chinese-owned (19 
government-owned) while only seven were Bumiputera-owned; of the top 100 companies, 49 were 
Chinese-owned (cf. Gomez, 2004). Nonetheless, there were still three Malays listed on the Malaysian 
Business’s “top 20 richest business people in 2001”: Abdul Rashid Hussain (at number 11), Azman 
Hashim (at 16), and Shamsuddin Abdul Kadir (at 19) (while 16 others were Chinese and one was Indian) 
(cf. Lee & Tham, 2007: 921-923). 
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Committee, submitted a 17-point appeal of the 1999 general election, which included a 
call to take steps to abolish all aspects of the bumiputra versus non-bumiputra 
distinction (Felker, 2000: 53). Almost one year later in August 2000, David Chua, 
deputy chairman of the National Economic Consultative Council (NECC), in an 
interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review said that for Malaysia to be 
competitive, quotas in certain sectors of the economy and public services need to be 
reviewed—which was an attack on Malay special rights. Statements by Suqiu and Chua 
did create some ethnic tension, as UMNO Youth organized a small gathering in 
Putrajaya to demonstrate against David Chua and Suqiu and some of UMNO Youth 
members also threatened to burn down the Selangor Chinese Hall premises (Felker, 
2000: 53; Lee, 2004: 93-96). Yet overall, such hostile reaction was not widespread, 
indicating that it was less likely for a communal call to evoke the same degree of 
political response as in the mid-1980s. It was exactly under such (ethnically harmonious) 
circumstances that in 1999 and 2007 the PAS could try to tone down its long-standing 
Islamic state agenda, to hold community dialogues with ethnic Chinese, and to 
implement more non-Muslim friendly policies—such as land for temples and Chinese 
schools and spaces for public celebrations of traditional Chinese festivals—in the states 
where the PAS ruled in order to attract Chinese votes in the elections, without fear of 
any backlash against it from the Malay community (Lee, 2004: 93; Lee, 2008: 195). 
Although after the 9/11 the partnership between the DAP and PAS broke off for a while 
due to the latter’s renewed calls for an Islamic state, communication links remained 
between party members, particularly among younger leaders (Welsh, 2004: 152), 
indicating a rather durable Malay-Chinese relationship even during the difficult times.  
 
To sum up, in the 1990s both the Mahathir administration and the Malays in general 
changed their attitudes and policies toward the Chinese community, leading to a gradual 
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improvement in state-Chinese and Malay-Chinese relations. However, within the Malay 
community, there were repeated splits of different factions of elites and their grassroots 
supporters, causing ups and downs in state-Malay relations. As a result, the ethnic 
triangular situation of Malaysia during 1988-2008 swung back and forth between a 
Type-4 romantic triangle and a Type-1 ménage à trois triangle; while in the former 
situation there were conflicts between the state and the Malays, and in the latter the 
relations between these two got better. To be sure, the conflict between the UMNO and 
Semangat 46 in the late 1980s reached climax in the 1990 elections but gradually muted 
along with economic growth and the demise of Semangat 46, moving the triangle from 
Type-4 to Type-1 in the early and mid-1990s. Then the disputes between Mahathir and 
Anwar in 1997 made the triangle swing back to a Type-4 situation, while the 
state-Malay confrontation reached a peak when the Keadilan formed Barisan Alternatif 
(BA, Alternative Front) with the DAP, PAS, and several other parties to compete against 
the BN in the 1999 elections. Then, Mahathir’s declaration that Malaysia was an Islamic 
state after the events of 9/11, his advancement of Islamic banking sectors in 2001, his 
retirement as Prime Minister in October 2003, and the promises of political reforms by 
the new Prime Minister Abdullah Ahman Badawi won back a large amount of support 
from Muslims and middle-class Malays and swung the triangle back to a Type-1 
situation again.147 However, as Abdullah failed to meet the people’s expectations of 
eliminating corruption and increasing the efficiency of government institutions, along 
with Anwar’s return to politics, the Malay community split again and the triangle 
retreated back to a Type-4 situation. This cycle of intra-Malay conflict was also clearly 
reflected in the parliamentary election outcomes. As shown in Figure 5-2, whenever the 
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 For detailed discussions about the “Islamic state issue” in the 1990s and 2000s, see Case (2003), 
Hussin (1993; 1994), Kamarulnizam (2005: 33-48), Liew (2007), and Martinez (2002; 2004). For an 
introduction to Abdullah and his reform plans see Derichs (2006; 2007), Freedman (2006:119), Ganesan 
(2003:149) and Welsh (2005:155). For information about the 2004 election see Balasubramaniam (2005), 
Khadijah (2007) and Welsh (2004). 
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Malay split becomes serious, the number of seats won by the UMNO goes down while 
that won by the opposition camp goes up (as in the cases of the 1990, 1999 and 2008 
elections); when the tensions within the Malay community diminishes, the seat gap 
between the UMNO and the opposition camp becomes wider.  
 
Figure 5-2: Number of Parliament Seats Won by Major Political Forces, 1959-2008 

























































































Source: Author’s drawing from Table 5-2 
 
According to the ethnic triangle theory, under a Type-4 triangular situation, the actor 
that retains positive relations with the other two actors is in the pivot position and can 
take advantage of the conflict between the other two. This is what the Chinese did 
between 1988 and 2008. The strategic position of both the MCA in the BN and the DAP 
in the opposition camp became much more important than they were in the past, 
particularly when comparing the 1999 election with the 2008 election. During the 1999 
general elections, supporters of both the UMNO and Anwar/Reformasi openly called for 
Chinese support; the PAS even co-convened public rallies with the DAP in various 
states to show the validity of their partnership and granted permits for Chinese cultural 
festivals in Terengganu and Kelantan to strengthen its more pluralistic image (Martinez, 
2001: 191). However, while there were a number of younger Chinese professionals and 
intellectuals who were sympathetic to Reformasi, the majority of the Chinese still 
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backed Mahathir and the BN government mainly for three reasons. First, the Chinese 
were worried about the ethnic violence and economic problems in Indonesia, and they 
believed that the BN government could keep order and maintain stability. Second, many 
of the Chinese still trusted Mahathir as a bulwark against both Malay chauvinism and 
Islamization (Baker, c2008; Lee, 2004). Third, the Chinese business community had 
formed close alliances with UMNO elites and so their interests aligned with their Malay 
counterparts’ in maintaining the status quo (Freedman, 2006: 117). At the end of this 
election, the MCA obtained 28 parliamentary seats (dropping only 2 from 1995) while 
the DAP only won 10 seats. On the other hand, the PAS captured upwards of half of the 
ethnic Malay vote and increased its share dramatically from 7 to 27 seats, while the 
UMNO fell from 88 to 72 seats.148 In total, the BN won only 148 of 193 seats on 57 
percent of the popular vote, down from 162 seats and 65 percent of the vote in 1995. In 
particular, the BN in Peninsular Malaysia only garnered 53 percent of the votes and 102 
seats149—and it won 26 seats by less than a five percent majority and another 24 by less 
than a 10 percent majority. According to a study of one hundred Chinese polling stations 
in such closely contested constituencies, Chinese support for the BN not only increased 
by an average of three percentage points in these areas, but the share of their votes also 
contributed to the overall victory of the BN in these seats (Welsh, 2004: 147). This 
study revealed that Chinese votes in this election were pivotal for the BN to maintain its 
two-thirds majority in the parliament. 
 
However, the situation was much different in the 2008 election. Around 2005 and 2006, 
people had found that Abdullah was unable to practice his various reform plans. 
                                                 
148
 In addition, the PAS won control of two state assemblies: Kelantan and Terengganu. For details on the 
state level elections, see Case (2001; 2003), Felker (2000), Funston (2000) and Weiss (2000). 
149
 Whereas the BA received 43 percent of the votes cast to win 42 seats in Peninsular Malaysia. As 
Martinez pointed out (2001: 189), without the 46 seats from East Malaysia, the BN barely won a simple 
majority in the parliament in 1999. 
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Rampant scandals of vote-buying, bribing, and abuse of power by BN government 
officials caused particular disillusionment with Abdullah’s credibility to wipe out 
corruption (Derichs, 2006; Case, 2008; Lee, 2008). On the contrary, in mid-2005 the 
PAS experienced a generation shift in its leadership and a group of young and 
pro-reform leaders came to power, and they gave many concessions to please the 
non-Muslim Chinese (and Indians). At the same time, Anwar’s PKR also intervened to 
act as a bridge between the DAP and PAS and conducted negotiations on several tough 
issues (Derichs, 2006: 168-174). In 2007, the opposition coalition successfully held a 
mass rally condemning a judicial scandal in late September and the BERSIH (Coalition 
for Clean and Fair Elections, including five opposition parties and 25 civil society 
groups) demonstration demanding electoral reform in November. Unlike in 1998-2000 
when the majority of the Chinese kept distance from the mass protests, in 2007 many 
Chinese chose to participate in these two anti-government rallies.150 The police’s brutal 
dispersal of the masses by tear gas and the arrests of the protesters to a large degree 
explained the BN’s awful performance in the 2008 elections. In the end, opposition 
parties won 36.9 percent of seats (82 out of 222) in the parliament, while the BN only 
secured 63.1 percent of the remaining 140 seats. It was the first time since the 1969 
election that the ruling coalition did not win the crucial two-thirds majority in the 
parliament required to pass amendments to the Constitution, not to mention that the BN 
also lost five state elections (Kedah, Kelantan, Penang, Perak, and Selangor). More 
important is that some outcomes signaled potentials for big changes in the ethnic 
politics of Malaysia. First, the DAP raised its share from 12 to 28 seats, while the MCA 
saw its number of seats reduced by half from 31 to 15. This was the first time that the 
DAP had almost twice as many seats as the MCA. Previously, the DAP’s best 
                                                 
150
 In November 2007 there is another large-scale mass protest held by the Hindu Rights Action Force 
(HINDRAF) requesting the end of marginalization of Indian community. For details, see Lee (2008: 
187-191) and Singh (2009; 157-158). 
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performance was in the 1986 election, in which it garnered 24 seats while the MCA won 
only 17. Yet in that election Gerakan of the BN coalition also won five seats. In other 
words, Chinese representatives of the ruling coalition altogether still maintained a 
balance with the opposition Chinese, which implied a roughly equal split of the Chinese 
community in its voting. However, in the 2008 election Gerakan’s seat share also 
dropped from 10 (in 2004) to 2. This revealed that the majority Chinese swung their 
votes to the opposition. Second, the PKR captured 31 seats, up dramatically from five 
seats in 1999 and one in 2004. Of these 31 representatives, 20 were Malays, seven were 
Chinese and four were Indian. This was the first time that a multiethnic party gained 
popular support in an election. Whether the PKR can continue to function in its present 
form remains to be seen as “it is a very new form of politics for Malaysia” (Baker, 
c2008: 402). Third, the PAS increased its share from seven (in 2004) to 23 seats, while 
the UMNO’s numbers reduced significantly from 110 to 79 seats. This outcome was 
similar to that of the 1999 election. However, the PAS won seats in ethnically mixed 
districts around Kuala Lumpur. Given the demographics of those districts, some 
Chinese had to have voted for the PAS in order for it to win. In other words, 
cross-ethnic voting behavior did occur in the election. This is not only a big success for 
an Islamic political party, but also of great importance for Malaysian politics. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviews the changes in the state-Malay-Chinese relations from 1957 to 
2008. According to its varying triangular relations, the history of Malaysia can be 
divided into three phases. In Phase I (1957-1969), Malaysia experienced its first 
paradigm shift from the type-6 triangle of “state-Chinese marriage” to the type-8 “unit 
veto” triangle. To be sure, when Malaysia was newly independent, the government 
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chose to build a close partnership with the Chinese elites mainly due to three concerns: 
the Chinese share of the population was sizable, the Chinese business class was 
powerful in the economy, and there had been relatively good cooperation between 
Malay and Chinese elites in the last years of the colonial period. Consequently, many 
policies and institutions set up during the 1950s favored the Chinese such as a laissez- 
faire economic system and a relatively “fair” power sharing political structure. However, 
such arrangements brought grievances from the Malays who were already economically 
disadvantaged as well as a tough challenge from the Malay opposition party PAS in the 
federal and state elections. Although the government tilted its policy orientation towards 
the Malays after the 1960s, it failed to satisfy the majority Malays and even caused the 
end of its “marriage” with the Chinese. A “unit-veto” triangular situation was produced, 
and both anti-government mobilizations by the opposition parties and inter-ethnic 
conflicts took place. Eventually, ethnic conflict reached a peak in the May 1969 riots in 
Kuala Lumpur, which brought Malaysian politics into the next phase.  
 
In Phase II (1970-1987), the UMNO-led BN government tried to consolidate its 
political supremacy by co-opting the former opposition elites and pleasing the majority 
Malays via a series of pro-Malay policies in the economy, education, and politics (the 
electoral system). As a result, the state-Malay relationship gradually improved, resulting 
in an ethnic triangle shift from the type-8 “unit veto” triangle to the type-7 triangle of 
“state-Malay marriage”. Undoubtedly, the state-Chinese relationship was highly tense 
during this period, and conflicts between the two sides occurred when there were 
amendments to the rural weightage system, changes in educational and language 
policies, or new requirements for fulfilling the NEP. In the mid-1980s, the economic 
recession further worsened state-society and inter-ethnic relations and caused an internal 
split among the UMNO leaders. During this time, a mass demonstration by the Chinese 
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against a governmental arrangement of staffs in Chinese schools triggered counter- 
protests by the Malay youth. The following wave of mass arrests by the Mahathir 
administration allowed Malaysia to avoid overall social instability and brought 
Malaysian politics into the third phase.  
 
In Phase III (1988-2008), Malaysia’s ethnic triangle swung back and forth between a 
type-1 ménage à trois triangle and a type-4 romantic triangle, which reflected the ups 
and downs of state-Malay relations. At the same time, Malay-Chinese relations were 
improving in the 1990s, as the Malays regarded the Chinese as demographically and 
politically less dangerous and economically less dominant than they had been in the past 
due to two-decade practices of NEP and the dwindling population size of the Chinese 
community. As a result, the Chinese community became the balancer between the state 
and Malays and was strategically crucial when state-Malay conflict became intense; 
thus, both the BN government and the Malay opposition parties changed their policies 
toward the Chinese in order to attract their support. The government’s cultural and 
economic liberalization policies earned the Chinese sincere support in the elections 
during the 1990s and in the 2004 election. However, in the 2008 election, a large 
number of Chinese swung their votes to the opposition coalition and thus ended the 
BN’s two-thirds majority in the parliament.  
 
The BN government has been usually criticized as “authoritarian, corruptive, repressive, 
and discriminatory against the ethnic Chinese community.”151  Yet, given that the 
Chinese account for at least one-quarter of the Malaysian population and its business 
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 The following quotations are all from the author’s interview notes from December 2006 of seven 
Chinese activists and two Malay scholars and NGO members, all of whom described the past and current 
governments somewhere in the interview as authoritarian, corruptive, or repressive. Interestingly, when 
discussing the pro-Malay policies and institutions, the Chinese all described them as “discriminatory 
against Chinese” while Malays described them as “affirmative actions” or “necessary measures for the 
disadvantaged Malays”.  
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class is powerful in the economy, the Malaysian government cannot but provide some 
guarantee of Chinese interests. For example, although it is quite true that “political 
power is never evenly shared,” it is nevertheless shared—and such a power-sharing 
system is durable. While the government is dominated by UMNO (Malay) leadership, 
the MCA (and Gerakan) also participate in the Cabinet and enjoy a degree of influence 
over public policy. In fact, according to Ho (2002), from 1957-2008, the number of 
ministers from MCA appeared to be consistent (at least four) and the number of deputy 
ministers from MCA even increased over the period (from one to two members between 
1957 and 1978 to five to six members between 1979 and 2008). More importantly, since 
1969 the government has proved to be quite successful at managing ethnic tensions and 
avoiding significant ethnic violence. Although the BN coalition lost its two-thirds 
majority in 2008, it still retains a simple majority in the parliament and rules the 
government. Thus, for the near future the BN government shall have no problem 
maintaining social order and political stability. However, given that how Esman 
described Malaysia in 1994 (p.65) as “a polity [being] structured explicitly along ethnic 
lines of cleavage… [v]irtually every problem that [the] government encountered, even 
those that on the surface appeared ethnically neutral, proved to have competitive ethnic 
implications” is still true and will be valid in the near future, one real challenge for the 
Malaysian government might be how to adapt its ethnically-based public policies to the 
realities of globalization.  




This chapter applies the ethnic triangle model to review and explain the changes in the 
relationships among the State, the Chinese majority, and the Malay minority in 
Singapore. As shown in Figure 6-1, from its independence in 1965 to the year 2008, the 
history of Singapore can be divided into three periods in terms of the changing nature of 
its triangular relations: first from the “unit veto” model to a “romantic triangle” in which 
the Malay minority acts as a pivot between the state and the Chinese majority (Phase I, 
1965-1979), to the “marriage” of Chinese and Malays in which both ethnic groups had 
complaints against the PAP government in the 1980s (Phase II, 1979-1988), finally to 
the “ménage à trois” triangle in the 1990s (Phase III, 1988-2008).152 The following 
sections will examine policy impulses and implications for the changes in both 
state-society and (inter-)ethnic relations, which can be attributed to the needs of PAP 
regime maintenance, as well as to the economic and security demands of state- and 
nation-building. A short summary will be also provided at the end of the chapter. 
 
 
   Note: “T1/2…” refer to “Type-1/2… ethnic triangle” originally introduced in Chapter II, see Table 2-1 
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 This division is similar to the division provided by Vasil (1995), who divides Singapore’s 
governmental policy on the management of its ethnic diversity into three phases (1965-1979, 1979-1990, 
1990-present). In another research, Chan & Ng (2001) periodizes the history of Chinese business in 
Singapore into four periods (1819-1958, 1959-1975, 1975-1989, 1989-present), which also roughly 
coincide with the changes of ethnic triangles in independent Singapore. 
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Phase I (1965-1979): From Unit-Veto to Romantic Triangle 
 
According to a population estimate in 1961, the Chinese then represented 75.2 percent 
of Singapore’s 1.7 million inhabitants, the Malays 14 percent, and the Indians 8.3 
percent (Leifer, 1964: 1116). Demographically, the Chinese were the dominant ethnic 
group, with a three-quarters majority. In terms of economic power and social status, the 
Chinese were much wealthier than the Malays, while the Indians were in-between the 
other two groups. With regard to politics, before its independence, Singapore had 
achieved internal self-government from the British since 1959, when the Chinese-based 
People’s Action Party (PAP) won a majority of the seats in the Legislative Assembly in 
May of that year. Major basic institutions had been in place since 1959, including the 
integrated school system, the bilingual policy, a Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, 
and the Housing and Development Board (established in 1960) to construct low-rent 
units in urban areas (Bellows, 1993: 126; Hussin, 1992: 73-75). All in all, it would be 
fair to expect that, after its final independence in 1965, the PAP government would 
easily consolidate its ruling authority.  
 
Unfortunately, however, immediately after independence, the PAP government faced 
serious challenges on how to deal with harsh tension that existed between the Chinese 
and the Malays, as well as tension between the state and both ethnic groups.153 
 
The tension and conflicts between the grassroots people and the state, and between 
people of different ethnic groups, were quite common in Southeast Asian countries 
during the last years of the colonial period, due to the weakness of state power, the 
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 As for the Indians, their small population made it virtually impossible for them alone to substantially 
influence the overall ethnic situation in Singapore. Besides, a significant number of Indians were 
well-educated and held senior positions in a variety of professions and public services, which gave them a 
certain sense of self-confidence, power and satisfaction. Thus, there was no particular reason for the state 
to worry about its relationship with the Indians. 
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conflicts of interests between ethnic groups, and the rise of communism after World War 
Two. Singapore was no exception, and also experienced both vertical riots against the 
colonial administration from the Malays and the Chinese and horizontal mass riots 
between the Chinese and the Malays in the 1950s and 1960s. Among those 
anti-government riots, the most famous case was “the Maria Hertogh Riots” on 11-13 
December 1950, which was started by the Malay-Muslims who were unsatisfied with a 
court verdict; at the end, it caused 18 deaths and 173 injuries.154 As for the Chinese, 
there were also a series of anti-government protests and strikes in the mid-1950s led by 
students or labor union members, backed by pro-communist organizations. In 1954, 
Chinese school students started demonstrations against government policies on military 
service and English education. In April 1955, the students were associated with workers 
of the Hock Lee Bus Company on a strike against poor working conditions and low pay; 
on 12-13 May, a riot with about 2,000 strikers broke out in Alexandra Road and Tiong 
Bahru and caused four deaths and 31 injuries. After the riot, the Chief Minister of 
Singapore banned two pro-communist organizations and dissolved the Singapore 
Chinese Middle School Students Union (SCMSSU). Unfortunately, this sparked another 
student protest at Chung Cheng High School and Chinese High School. On 24 October, 
riots started at the Chinese High School and soon spread to other parts of the island, in 
response to the government’s ultimatum that the schools be vacated. Over the next five 
days, 13 people were killed and more than 100 were injured.155  
 
                                                 
154
 The Maria case was a custody battle between a 13-year-old Dutch girl’s biological mother Adeline 
Hertogh and her Malay foster mother Aminah binte Mohamed. Maria was sent to stay with Aminah when 
Mrs. Hertogh was delivering her sixth child in December 1942. After World War II, Mr. and Mrs. Hertogh 
returned to Holland, while Aminah brought up Maria in the Muslim faith. In early 1950, Mrs. Hertogh 
went back to Singapore to contest the custody of her daughter and to annul a Muslim marriage of Maria. 
The long judicial process, along with sensational press reports, stirred up anger among the local 
Malay-Muslims. Riots immediately erupted after the third court verdict from the Supreme Court was 
handed down, which was in favor of Maria’s Dutch mother. For details, see Hughes (1980) and Maideen 
(2000). 
155
 For details about the riots during the mid-1950s, see Clutterbuck (1984) and Ganguly (2003). 
  176 
According to Brown (2005), a far-reaching but negative effect of the 1955 riots was to 
raise the prospect of communal conflict, as the sole fatality caused by the rioters 
themselves was a Malay driver beaten by the Chinese rioters. Although political leaders 
appealed for calm and averted wider clashes at that time, they could not reverse the 
declining ethnic relations. The merger of Singapore and Malaysia (1963-1965) made the 
situation even worse. Singapore’s economy suffered from Indonesia’s cutting-off of all 
trade and economic ties to Singapore, due to Indonesia’s Konfrontasi against Malaysia. 
With a lower level of economic activity in Singapore and a more competitive climate, 
the Malays found themselves at a disadvantage in the struggle for jobs against the more 
dynamic Chinese (Leifer, 1964: 1119). In politics, the dispute over the nature of this 
new federation and the elite competition between the PAP and the UMNO intensified 
tensions between the Chinese and the Malays. It was in such a socio-political context 
that the “Prophet Muhammad Birthday Riots” occurred in 1964. On 21 July, about 
25,000 Malays attended a rally to celebrate the anniversary of the Prophet Mohammed’s 
birthday. After the rally, the procession went to the premises of the All-Malaya Muslim 
Missionary Society in the suburb of Geylang. When the crowd reached Geylang, some 
of its members provoked incidents with the Chinese and, as these increased in number, 
the Chinese retaliated. Despite immediate police action and the swift imposition of a 
curfew, the clashes continued sporadically for several days before order was restored. In 
total, 22 people died and 460 were injured in the July riots. On 3 September, riots broke 
out for a second time in the neighborhoods of Geyland, Joo Chiat, and Siglap, which 
ended with 12 dead and 64 injured (Ganesan, 2004). 
 
The 1964 riots between the Malays and the Chinese contributed to Singapore’s 
secession from the Federation of Malaysia in 1965, as elites of both countries were 
afraid of future communal violence that they might not be able to handle. In a sense, 
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Singapore was forced into independence mainly because of the ethnic issue, and the 
new state had to face high uncertainty as to its socio-political and economic viability, 
with crippling ethnic relations and the distrust of the Malay community towards the 
Chinese-led PAP government. Although the Malays only made up a 15 percent minority 
in Singapore, their close links with the neighboring Malay-Muslim countries, Malaysia 
and Indonesia, made their role crucial in domestic politics as well as in national security. 
As Mauzy and Milne stated (2002: 99-100), such a “double minority” setting—that the 
Chinese were a majority in Singapore but a minority in the region, while the Malays 
were a minority in Singapore but a majority in the immediate region—made the 
management of ethnic conflict a difficult and high priority task for the PAP government. 
 
More unfortunately, the PAP did not even earn the full support of the Chinese 
community. During the early 1960s, the PAP itself experienced considerable internal 
turmoil due to the power struggle between elites of two factions with different socio- 
economic backgrounds and political perspectives. The pro-communist “leftists” led by 
Lim Chin Siong, who strongly opposed Singapore’s merger with Malaysia, enjoyed the 
support of a significant majority within the “Chinese-speaking” Chinese community— 
the working class, Chinese school teachers and students, trade unionists, and members 
of the traditional clan associations. The “moderates” headed by Lee Kuan Yew, who 
were more pro-Malaysia and pro-British, drew very limited support from the Chinese 
upper class, civil servants, and those western-educated “English-speaking Chinese.” 
Lim's faction broke away from the PAP in 1961 to form the Barisan Socialis (BS), and 
greatly depleted the PAP of its grassroots base (Rodan, 1996: 64-65). Although the 
strength of the BS was severely diminished in the “Operation Cold Store” detentions156 
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 In “Operation Cold Store” and the subsequent arrests, 115 BS leaders, journalists and trade unionists 
were arrested and detained without trial under the Internal Security Act. Most of them were alleged to be 
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and subsequent mass arrests in 1963—and again in another wave of purges in October 
1966—the PAP was still quite “isolated from the people” during this period. 
 
To sum up, when Singapore announced its independence on 9 August 1965, in addition 
to its strained relationships with Indonesia and Malaysia, its domestic “ethnic triangle” 
could be described no better than triple-negative relations—between the state (the PAP 
government) and the majority Chinese, between the state and the minority Malays, and 
between the Chinese and the Malays. Needless to say, such a “unit-veto” triangular 
situation was extremely vulnerable and very unstable; any kind of ethnic violence that 
had occurred in the 1950s and early 1960s could easily happen again, which would 
definitely destroy the new republic in its infancy. Even worse, there was a lack of 
internal social cohesion to consolidate the new nation and to pursue further political and 
economic development. As then Minister of the Interior and Defense Dr. Goh Keng 
Swee confessed in 1967, “We are a complex, multiracial community with little sense of 
common history, with a group purpose which is yet to be properly articulated…we are 
in the process of rapid transition towards a destiny which we do not yet know” (cf. 
Chew, 1991: 363). 
 
In this context, it is understandable that from 1965 until at least 1979, the Singapore 
government made great efforts to deal with ethnic issues and instill a sense of common 
national identity amongst Singaporeans. Sometimes it even adopted radical measures, 
politically and socio-economically.  
 
First of all, on the institutional and political level, the salience and sensitivity of ethnic 
issues could be clearly observed in the Constitution. In addition to the general protection 
                                                                                                                                               
involved in subversive activities aiming to establish a “Communist Cuba” in Singapore—which was not 
true (Yeo, 2002: 217). For a detailed history of this period, see Hussin (2003: Chs. 2-3). 
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of civil rights (Articles 12, 16, 39, 152, 154), Article 149 further prohibited any action 
that might “promote feelings of ill-will and hostility between different races or other 
classes of the population likely to cause violence.” Moreover, all of Part VII of 
Constitution (Articles 68-92) was about the establishment of the Presidential Council 
for Minority Rights, which was created to reassure minorities that they would be 
protected against discriminatory legislation. In politics, the government also guaranteed 
fair representation of ethnic minorities at the highest levels of decision-making—that 
the composition of the cabinet, the ministry and the parliament always reflected the 
multi-ethnic character of Singapore (Vasil, 1995: 44-45). Specifically, concerning the 
external and domestic political environment, the state had to immediately ease the 
suspicion and anxiety of the Malay minority that Singapore might become a “Third 
China”. The approach was twofold. On the one hand, the state deliberately downplayed 
the Chineseness and restricted the majority’s privileges (discussed later). On the other 
hand, the state symbolically recognized the special position of the Malays157 and 
provided them financial support for social welfare, housing, education and training. 
Beyond symbolic enshrinement and limited special treatments, however, the state 
emphasized the virtues of meritocracy, multiracialism, and the neutrality of the state 
towards all ethnic groups (Ganguly, 2003). Unlike Malaysia, the PAP government was 
entirely unwilling to compromise the above foundational political principles, and it 
refused the Malay demands of preferential policies such as quotas with respect to civil 
servant positions, business licenses, or entry into universities. 
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 As stated in Article 152-2 of the Constitution, the Malays “are the indigenous people of Singapore” 
and thus “it shall be the responsibility of the Government to protect, safeguard, support, foster and 
promote their political, educational, religious, economic, social and cultural interests and the Malay 
language.” In practice, symbolic enshrinement included the national anthem written and sung in Malay, 
and the first President of the Republic, Yusof bin Ishak, being Malay. 
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Another example illustrating the official position on state neutrality with symbolic 
respect to the Malays was its language policy. Article 53 of Constitution set up four 
official languages (Malay, English, Mandarin, and Tamil), with Malay as the national 
language and English as the language of administration. Treating Malay as the national 
language was a display of “symbolic enshrinement,” while making English the language 
of administration, commerce, and education ensured that the Chinese majority were not 
provided with any linguistic advantage. Besides, compared to the other languages, 
English was ethnically “neutral” (Mauzy & Milne, 2002: 101). Following this, the 
parliament provided facilities for instantaneous translation to enable its members to 
debate in any of the four languages. Ethnic groups were free to publish newspapers and 
magazines in their own language. The government-controlled television and radio 
services offered different programs in each of the four languages. In education, the 
bilingual scheme was introduced in 1966, which required all school pupils to learn both 
English (compulsory) and one of the other official languages. By 1975, universities 
were all compelled to adopt English as the language of instruction (Vasil, 1995: 47-49).  
 
The state’s commitment to neutrality and its alienation of the Chinese could also be 
observed in its economic policy making process. In the 1960s and 1970s, the state left 
the powerful Chinese business community outside the mainstream of national economic 
activities, especially the industrialization drive, through the “two-legged” policy. Under 
this policy, the state provided generous tax incentives to encourage multinational 
corporations (MNCs) to invest in Singapore. It also set up many government-linked 
companies (GLCs) such as the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS), INTRACO and 
the Jurong Town Corporation (JTC) to participate in a wide range of economic 
programs (Ng, 2002: 258). The entrepreneurial role of the state was accelerating by the 
late 1960s; by 1973, 10 of the top civil servants held 93 directorship positions in GLCs 
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(Bellows, 1993: 127). This strategic economic bypass was deemed necessary as it 
obviated any need for the PAP government to rely on the Chinese business community 
and concomitantly reduced the latter’s political influence (Tan, 2004: 175). Moreover, 
this “two-legged” policy let the state once again show its “neutral” stance toward all 
ethnic groups, in the economy as well as in politics.  
 
Apart from political institutions and economic policies, the state also controlled the 
society tightly. Communist, extremist, or Chinese chauvinistic sentiments were all 
treated as menaces to ethnic peace and social order, and had to counter stiff legislation 
such as the Internal Security Act (ISA). Both Malay and Chinese extremists were 
arrested in 1966 and 1971, respectively, for creating ethnic discord (Hussin, 1992: 76). 
Similarly, “sensitive issues”, such as the backwardness of the Malays in the educational 
and economic fields or the cultural and linguistic aspirations of the Chinese community, 
were seldom allowed to be raised by the media or politicians. In 1974, the Newspaper 
Printing and Presses Act (NPPA) further instituted the state’s control over the media. 
Based on the NPPA, newspapers had to issue both ordinary and management shares, and 
the acquisition of management shares had to be endorsed by the state. Government 
officials were also assigned to the board of directors of Singapore Press Holdings (SPH). 
While the state never forced the closure of media, it exerted control in a less visible and 
subtle way: through the people holding the management shares who had a say over the 
appointment of personnel, and personnel deemed unsuitable could be removed at the 
state’s wish (Yeo, 2002: 217-218). The state was also hostile to community associations. 
In order to move the Chinese clan associations to the margins of people’s daily life, the 
state set up rival organizations such as the People’s Association and a multitude of 
community centers to provide better substitutes in social and cultural activities (Chan & 
Ng, 2001: 42; Chua & Kwok, 2001: 91). The Malay community associations, both 
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religious and non-religious, were also suspected of disaffection towards the government. 
Accordingly, in 1968 the religious associations were placed under the authority of the 
Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), and in 1969 all others under the 
umbrella of Majlis Pusat (Central Council of Malay Cultural Organizations Singapore) 
were controlled by the Malay Affairs Bureau of the PAP (Margolin, 2004: 40).  
 
Besides applying coercive measures to reduce the value of ethnicity as a political 
currency, the government also attempted to positively encourage inter-ethnic contact 
and integration through its public housing program under the Housing and Development 
Board (HDB). A massive resettlement of more than 160,000 people from traditional 
ethnic “ghettos” (such as Chinatown, Little India, or Geylang Serai where the Malays 
were concentrated) into multiethnic public housing estates was included in the housing 
program from 1961 to 1980. By 1978, 70 percent of the population was living in public 
housing (Ackermann, 1997; Giok, 2005). The state believed that, if a majority of the 
people lived in ethnically integrated public housing estates, residents would find the 
cultural conception of belonging to a geographically defined “Chinese”, “Malay” or 
“Indian” place difficult to reproduce in the new estates. Thus, people would establish 
new associational and communal networks with their neighbors, irrespective of ethnic 
categorization, through community centers, residents’ committees, common facilities, 
and various official and semiofficial institutions (Ackermann, 1997: 101-108). In other 
words, the state expected the public housing to be major instruments of “breaking social 
barriers and building national bridges of understanding” (Chew, 1991: 364). 
 
Now it is worth discussing the orientation of Singapore’s ethnic policy between 1965 
and 1979, and the impacts of institutions/policies on the relations between the state and 
ethnic groups. From the above mentioned institutional and policy settings, it is obvious 
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that the first priority for the state in this period was to mend its relations with the 
Malays. Thus, the state first emphasized its neutral stance towards ethnic groups and 
deliberately alienated itself from the Chinese community in the economy and in culture 
(language and education). The implication of this alienation is that, although the state 
was ruled by the Chinese-based PAP government, the Malays need not be afraid that 
they would become second-class citizens. Second, without breaking the fundamental 
principles of meritocracy and neutrality, the state showed its greatest respect to the 
special symbolic position of the Malays and its sincere concern about reversing the 
social and economic backwardness of the Malay community through assistance in 
education and training. Consequently, the state gradually won the trust and support of 
the Malay population, and state-minority relations turned out much better than before. 
Of course, as Barr and Low mention (2005), this positive situation was not without its 
tensions and blemishes. Yet, it lasted until the late 1970s or early 1980s, and is still 
remembered with nostalgia by Malays as “a little golden age of tolerance and respect.” 
 
In addition to the state-Malay relations, the Chinese-Malay relations also improved 
gradually. According to the Report on the Ministry of Education 1978 under Goh Keng 
Swee, bilingual education, along with integrated school systems and other 
corresponding educational policies, proved effective in bringing together children of 
different ethnic backgrounds to study and play together, and develop mutual tolerance, 
understanding and respect (Ganguly, 2003: 258). In society, the ordered mixing of 
different ethnic groups in the HDB flats brought people of different cultural background 
into contact spatially—in public spaces such as town centers, neighborhood parks, void 
decks and corridors. Residents also had the chance to experience—even if merely to be 
spectators of—the practices of other ethno-religious communities’ customs, rituals and 
festivals. While Ackermann (1997: 111-118) criticizes such contacts among neighbors 
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as relatively superficial while intensive social interactions remained largely ethnically 
exclusive, there was a greater degree of acquaintance among residents across ethnic 
lines. As time went by, ethnic separation was eliminated and the relations between the 
Chinese and the Malays gradually turned from negative to positive. Except for spill- 
over rioting from the May 1969 ethnic riots in Malaysia,158 there was no manifestations 
of any serious disharmony and conflict between the Chinese and the Malays during this 
era. In the history of Singapore, it was an unprecedented era of ethnic peace and quiet. 
 
Nonetheless, the above policies could not ease the tensions between state and the 
Chinese. The Chinese, with their long history as sojourners in Southeast Asian countries, 
had experienced powerlessness under British rule and discriminative treatments in the 
post-colonial period. Thus, it was natural for many Chinese—especially for the 
traditionally Chinese-educated Chinese—to view Singapore as a “Chinese state” where 
they could build its polity and society based upon their own culture and interests. As 
mentioned before, the Chinese who had such aspirations supported the BS which held 
the similar Chinese chauvinist claims. The PAP, whose leaders were western-educated 
and excessively westernized, did not enjoy much appeal among the masses of the 
Chinese during the 1960s. Thus, it was almost impossible for the PAP government to 
persuade the Chinese not to assert their dominance, not to mention deemphasizing the 
Chineseness and tilting institutions and policies in favor of the Malays.  
 
However, this mission had been made somewhat easier, at least in one important respect: 
the BS was no longer a political threat after the late 1960s. Between 1963 and 1965, the 
(Malaysian) federal government had made it extremely difficult for the BS to function 
effectively because of its repressive action against Chinese chauvinists and communists. 
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 This spill-over riot resulted in four deaths, 60 injuries, and over a thousand arrests (Lee, 2000: 38-39). 
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With two waves of mass arrests of the party’s leaders in 1963 and in 1966, and with a 
severe intra-leadership factional strife, the BS had already been fighting for its survival. 
Then, the BS leaders made a fatal mistake when they decided to boycott parliament. By 
late 1966, all the BS MPs had resigned from parliament and the party refused to 
participate in the 1968 general elections. The BS, in order to show their protest of 
“undemocratic acts” by the government, decided to give up the constitutional arena and 
to follow the path of an extra-parliamentary mass struggle. Yet, the party ignored the 
new political realities: that in the late 1960s, Singapore’s general stability and economic 
progress were beginning to be felt by the Singaporeans and that there was little to 
criticize the PAP government about (Hussin, 2003: 96-111). In the 1968 election, the 
PAP won all 58 seats in parliament and established itself as the unchallenged ruling 
party. Since then, the PAP could pursue its own agenda for the management of ethnicity 
“without having to worry about a strong political opposition that drew considerable 
strength from Chinese chauvinism and extremism” (Vasil, 1995: 43). 
 
Nevertheless, even without challenges from the opposition party in the political arena, 
the state still faced challenges from powerful Chinese individuals and groups. It should 
be noted that, for the majority of the Chinese who at that time still viewed themselves as 
sojourners and Singapore as temporary home, they did not have strong emotional 
attachment and sense of belonging to Singapore as did the Singaporean Malays. Nor did 
they have clear expectations regarding ethnic relations and politics. Insofar as the state 
provided a non-discriminative socio-political environment and a desirable economic 
future, there seemed very few reasons for them not to tolerate—if not fully 
appreciate—the PAP government. In fact, from 1968 until 1980, the PAP had always 
received more than 70 percent of the popular vote and won all of the seats in the four 
general elections from 1968 to 1980 (see Table 6-1). The voting results showed that the 
  186 
PAP had produced a high level of satisfaction among most Singaporeans, both Chinese 
and non-Chinese. Yet, a certain part of the Chinese—i.e. those traditional 
Chinese-educated—were still upset with the state on issues relating to Chinese identity, 
language, and culture. To a certain degree, it was the conflict between the PAP and the 
Chinese business community, and the latter’s open backing of the BS, that contributed 
to the state’s economic alienation from them.159 It must be noted that the reason those 
Chinese entrepreneurs resisted the state had less to do with protecting their commercial 
interests than arguing about issues regarding language and education (Chan & Ng, 2001: 
41-42). Specifically, they were angry about the elevation of the English language by the 
state, which caused the decline of Chinese schools in the 1970s. They also viewed the 
PAP as the oppressor of Chinese language, education, and culture (Lai, 1995; Vasil, 
1995). All in all, the relationship between the state and the Chinese during this period, 
although on the grassroots level was not as bitter as before, still remained negative. 
 
Table 6-1: Singaporean Parliamentary Election Results, 1968-2006 
Year Total No.  
of Seats 
No. of Parties Contesting 
(Independents) 
Seats won by 
PAP (%) 
Seats won by 
Opposition (%) 
% of PAP’s 
Popular Vote* 
1968 58 2 (5) 58 (100) 0 86.72 
1972 65 6 (2) 65 (100) 0 70.43 
1976 69 7 (2) 69 (100) 0 74.09 
1980 75 8 (0) 75 (100) 0 77.66 
1984 79 9 (3) 77 (97.5) 2 (2.5) 64.83 
1988 81 8 (4) 80 (98.8) 1 (1.2) 63.17 
1991 81 6 (7) 77 (95.1) 4 (4.9) 60.97 
1997 83 6 (1) 81 (97.6) 2 (2.4) 64.98 
2001 84 5 (2) 82 (97.6) 2 (2.4) 75.30 
2006 84 4 (0) 82 (97.6) 2 (2.4) 66.60 
Note: *Calculated on the basis of the contested constituencies ONLY.  
Sources: Yeo (2002: 210); Elections Department Singapore.  
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 One should be aware of the fact that the Chinese business community is never homogeneous. 
According to Chan and Ng (2001), they can be classified into two groups: one is culturally more Chinese 
than the other. The culturally more Chinese group is the dominant group, belonging mainly to the first 
generation of the “Chinese-speaking” Chinese, and tends to operate family-owned small/medium-sized 
companies (i.e. SMEs) and is typically involved in banking, retail trade, hotels and restaurants, light 
manufacturing, and property and real estate. The members of this group also participate actively in clan 
associations and the alumni bodies of local Chinese schools. The second group is more westernized, but is 
relatively small in number, being younger and better educated “English-speaking” Chinese, and is heavily 
involved in electronics, computers, and telecommunication products and are capable of working with 
MNCs and GLCs. Obviously, here “the Chinese businessmen” refers to the first group of people. 
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In general, the ethnic relationship in Singapore in the 1970s was similar to the situation 
of the fourth type of ethnic triangle described in Table 2-1, where there was one 
negative relationship between the state and the majority Chinese and two positive 
relationships between the state and the minority Malays and between the Chinese and 
the Malays. The Malay minority in this “romantic triangle” earned the pivot position 
and was advantaged in the conflicts between the state and the Chinese. Also, according 
to the theory, in this context there should be complaints, resistance, or even real fights 
from the Chinese in opposition of the state. Indeed, during this period, there was severe 
criticism of the state’s language and education policies from the Chinese community, 
with such criticisms mainly expressed through the press media. This was why the state 
controlled the press so tightly during this period. Also as mentioned, most of the time, 
the state response was to repress such criticism in the name of anti-Communism or anti- 
Chinese Chauvinism. One famous example was “the detention of the Nanyang Siang 
Pau editors” in 1971, an event in which the state arrested four senior members of the 
editorial and managerial staffs of one Chinese newspaper, Nanyang Siang Pau, for their 
“stirring up racial issues and glamorizing communism” and their systematic campaign 
“to create political instability sponsored by foreign forces” (Chee, 2001: 164). A similar 
charge was also brought against an English newspaper, The Eastern Sun, for being 
“financed by communist agents in Hong Kong” and engaging in “covert subversion.” 
Meanwhile, another local paper, The Singapore Herald, was sued by Chase Manhattan 
Bank for foreclosure on a loan default on a sum of $1.03 million, and its license was 
immediately withdrawn (Ganguly, 2003: 257).160 Another wave of arrests of “suspected 
communists” began in late 1975 and lasted until 1977, after several student protests in 
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 All three of these newspapers had severely criticized the state’s language and education policies 
during that period which, in the eyes of the PAP leaders—especially of Lee Kuan Yew, were signs of the 
communists’ attempt to “subvert the PAP government both from inside and outside.” This also justified 
the official stand that “Singapore’s press freedom must be subordinated to the state’s security needs and 
the promotion of national unity” (Rogers, 1972: 175-176). 
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late 1974 in which active student leaders, lawyers, and journalists, along with many 
communists or members of satellite organizations were arrested and jailed.161 
 
With the detention of active dissenters, the closedown of major critical presses, and the 
takeover of traditional Chinese clan associations, along with its effective administrative 
power and its economic achievement, the state became better able to control the whole 
society, and the Chinese resistance became rather weak and insignificant. The last 
bastion of opposition to the state’s language policy included students and faculty from 
the Chinese-based Nanyang University, an epicenter of anti-PAP and pro-Chinese 
sentiment.162 In 1975, the state pressed the university to switch from Chinese to English 
as the medium of instruction, and thus encountered some limited resistance. However, 
by 1978 even this limited resistance was overcome. In 1980, Nanyang University 
merged with the English-based University of Singapore to create the National 
University of Singapore (Ganguly, 2003: 258; Ng, 2002: 257-258). 
 
Phase II (1979-1988): The Outcast State? 
 
Looking back on the Singaporean government’s attitude toward ethnic groups in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, one may find that the balance between the demands and 
expectations of the Chinese and the Malays had been tilted in favor of the latter. One 
main reason was that the PAP government then did not get enough support from its 
people—especially from the majority Chinese. Thus, the government had to depend 
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 For information about the student demonstrations in 1974, see Milne (1975). For information on the 
wave of arrests afterwards, see Milne (1976), Tilman & Tilman (1977), and Shee (1978). 
162
 Nanyang University was established in 1955 with the support of the Chinese communities in 
Singapore and Malaya, with the main objectives of promoting Chinese education, culture, and identity for 
Southeast Asia’s Chinese. It is natural that later on this university tended to “produce” leaders and 
followers of the ‘Chinese-chauvinist” wing of Singapore politics and this wing tended to produce the 
majority of the Communist supporters and sympathizers. See Tilman & Tilman (1977) and Shee (1979). 
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substantially on the support of the minorities and the rather limited English-educated 
Chinese to maintain their hold on power—and it could not afford to alienate the Malays. 
However, in the late 1970s, the PAP regime had in many respects consolidated its 
legitimacy. In domestic politics, the BS had disappeared from the political scene and 
had not been replaced by another credible opposition group. In society, the PAP had 
successfully built a larger base of support within the Chinese community mainly due to 
its spectacular economic achievements—for example, in the 1970s, Singapore enjoyed 
high GDP growth rates, averaging 9.6 percent in the period 1971-1975 and 8.5 percent 
in the period 1976-1980; its unemployment rate declined steadily from a high of 7.4 
percent in the second half of the 1960s to 4.5 percent in the period 1971-1975 and 3.7 
percent in the period 1976-1980.163 Even in the international arena, Singapore as a 
sovereign entity has been fully accepted by other countries, including Malaysia and 
Indonesia. In all, the changes of both the domestic and international political situations 
dramatically reduced the previously crucial importance of the Malay’s support of the 
PAP government. It was time for the PAP to start more positively responding to Chinese 
dissatisfaction with the state’s ignorance of the concerns of their community. After all, 
in the long term, the sincere support of the majority Chinese would be much more 
crucial for the PAP to maintain its rule. Eventually, a redressing of the ethnic balance, 
giving the Chinese majority “a fair deal”, was inevitable (Vasil, 1995: 6).   
 
Thus, beginning in the late 1970s, the PAP government made a dramatic shift in its 
policy orientation, from communal neutrality to the reassertion of “Chineseness”. In 
1979, the government began the “Speak Mandarin Campaign” to encourage the use of 
Mandarin in public places and media, while also banning dialects in Chinese-language 
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 See Appendix C for Annual GDP Growth Rate 1970-2007; unemployment rate data were from Hoon 
& Kee (1998: 50) and Singapore Yearbook of Manpower Statistics (2006). 
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commercials over radio and TV. In 1980, the “Special Assistance Plan” (SAP) was set 
up to support the nine best Chinese secondary schools in promoting proficiency in 
Mandarin of their students, who were the top eight percent of Chinese performers on the 
Primary School Leaving Exam (PSLE). Furthermore, in 1982 Confucian Ethics became 
one of the subjects taught in the religious knowledge curriculum in secondary 
schools.164 These and other related policies and the associated mechanisms of social 
coercion, along with repeated public statements by Lee Kuan Yew and other 
government officials, all contributed to the reemphasis of Mandarin and Chinese culture 
(Barr & Low, 2005).  
 
According to several studies on Singapore, the reasons for the above policy shift are far 
more complicated than simply “a balancing move to reassure the Chinese community 
that their cohesiveness, cultural identity, and language claims still remained a primary 
concern of the government” (Vasil, 1995: 68). First, in the late 1970s the PAP 
government sensed a potential but serious cultural crisis: that the ascendancy of English 
in education, coinciding with fast modernization and economic development, might 
bring about the overexposure of the Singaporeans to spurious western fashions, such as 
egoism and political liberalism, and the unfortunate collapse of the traditional Asian 
value system. Specifically, the problem of deculturization seemed to chiefly affect the 
Chinese. As revealed in an official survey in 1977, the percentage of Singaporeans who 
read both Chinese and English newspapers was only 13 percent of the age group fifteen 
to twenty five, and most young Chinese Singaporeans did not speak Mandarin Chinese 
at home (Goh, 1979: 3-4). Since language is the major instrument for the transmission 
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 “Religious Knowledge” was introduced as a compulsory subject in secondary schools based on the 
recommendations of the Report on the Ministry of Education 1978 and the Report on Moral Education 
1979. Students could choose from Bible Knowledge, Islam Religious Knowledge, Buddhist Studies, 
Hindu Studies, and Confucian Studies. 
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of social customs, moral norms, and culture, it is very likely that Chinese traditions and 
culture could soon fade away. Another important reason, although more practical but 
ethnically-neutral, was that the political and economic rise of China brought the great 
expansion of business opportunities in China and the continuous need for a large pool of 
Mandarin-speaking elites (Ganguly, 2003: 259; Tan, 2004: 176). Other than cultural and 
economic concerns, promoting the use of Mandarin also contributed to greater cohesion 
among the Chinese. The Chinese community in Singapore used to be deeply divided 
along the lines of different dialects, which had produced many social cleavages and 
tensions in the past. If Mandarin was accepted as a common link language for all 
Chinese, the government might unite the different dialect groups and further consolidate 
its control within the Chinese community (Gopinathan, 1991: 283; Seah, 1980: 148).  
 
Meanwhile, in the economy, there was also a change in government attitude toward the 
Chinese. As stated before, in the 1960s and 1970s the state alienated Chinese 
businessmen and left them outside the mainstream of national economic activities. Yet, 
from the late 1970s onwards, the state actively engaged Chinese SMEs by providing 
financial and technical assistance for the expansion, modernization and diversification 
of their enterprises. Some important schemes and institutions included the Small 
Industries Finance Scheme (1976), the Small Industry Technical Assistance Scheme 
(1982), and the formation of the Small Industry Advisory Committee under the 
Economic Development Board (EDB) and the Material Application Centre under the 
Singapore Industrial Standards and Industrial Research (SISIR) (1980). To be sure, this 
policy shift had economic and political reasons. First, after a successful industrialization 
drive in the 1960s and 1970s, the government felt increasingly pressure from labor 
shortage and the need to upgrade its industries from labor-intensive to more capital- 
intensive methods of production. The success of this economic restructuring required 
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close cooperation of local SMEs, which had used proportionately more labor than other 
types of enterprises;165 yet those SMEs were supposed to incur rather higher adjustment 
costs than MNCs and GLCs in the process of restructuring. Given that most local SMEs 
were then owned by Chinese, any loss resulting from the new policies would lead to 
further grievances among the Chinese community. Moreover, these Chinese SME 
owners not only had had a history of resisting the PAP government in the past but still 
wielded significant political influence on constituents in the HDB heartland. Thus, their 
economic grievances, if not handled well, could be easily exploited by opposition 
parties for political gains—especially during the elections (Chan & Ng, 2001: 42-43, Ng, 
2002: 259-261; Ng, 2006: 309-311). Due to both the need for economic upgrading and 
the fear of losing ballots, the state could no longer alienate the Chinese businessmen, 
but rather needed to engage them in the programs of future economic development.  
 
Admittedly, the new set of economic and educational policies, particularly the 
promotion of Mandarin and Chinese culture, caused considerable controversy and 
suspicion among the minorities. First, the fact that the government did not provide 
similar SAP schools for the minorities was viewed as discriminatory. Moreover, the 
repeated exhortation to speak Mandarin and the agenda of promoting Chinese virtues in 
public all signaled a process of Sinicization of the entire Singaporean society, leaving 
the minorities feeling threatened and alienated. The sense of insecurity was particularly 
strong among the Malays. As revealed in the 1980 Census of Population, the Malay 
community was lagging far behind the other ethnic groups in educational and economic 
achievements (Table 6-2). Particularly, the Malay students on average were performing 
poorly in school. The percentages of Malay students passing the GCE ‘O’ and ‘A’ levels 
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 The local SMEs then constituted more than 90 percent of total business establishments and utilized 51 
percent of the nation’s workforce, but generated only 34 percent of total output. In other words, their 
productivity is about half that of the non-SME establishment (Ng, 2006: 261). 
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of exams were only 16 percent and 49 percent, respectively, comparatively much lower 
than that of Chinese students (44 percent and 68 percent, respectively) and Indian 
students (34 percent and 65 percent, respectively).166 As a result, the Malays made up 
only 2.5 percent of students enrolled in tertiary education, while the Chinese made up 
88.2 percent and Indians 6.5 percent. Given that the Malays made up 14.4 percent of the 
population and 15.2 percent of the student population in 1980, the percentage of Malay 
students at the tertiary level was disproportionately low. With the lowest level of 
educational attainment of all groups, the Malays were concentrated at the low end of the 
occupational hierarchy. Most Malay workers (89 percent) were in the clerical, service, 
and production related sectors or were cleaners or laborers; only 7.2 percent of Malays 
were holding administrative and managerial, professional, and technical related jobs. As 
a result, Malay monthly household income, on average, was only 74 percent of Chinese 
income ($900 vs. $1210) and 80 percent of Indian income ($900 vs. $1130). All in all, 
the Malays were highly anxious that the new trend of governmental policies, with the 
emphasis of Chineseness, would make them even less competitive with others in 
education—and in the future job market. 
 
Table 6-2: Key Educational and Economic Indicators of the Resident Population 
1980 1990 2000 2005 
 
T C M I T C M I T C M I T C M I 
Ethnic composition (%) 100 78.3 14.4 6.3 100 77.8 14.0 7.1 100 76.8 13.9 7.9 100 75.2 13.6 8.8 
% of pupils with ≥ 5 ‘O’ level passes 40 44 16 34 69 73 43 58 78 83 53 66 81 85 63 73 
% of pupils with ≥ 2 ‘A’ & 2 ‘AO’ level 
passes (including general paper) 
67 68 49 65 77 78 57 71 86 86 74 88 91 92 84 90 
P1 cohort admitted to tertiary institutions 10 13 1.3 4.3 36 42 13 18 57 64 26 35 60 69 34 39 
P1 cohort admitted to public universities 4.9 5.9 0.5 3.5 15 17 2.9 8.0 21 25 3.8 9.3 24 30 5.4 11 
Average monthly income from work ($) 598 595 388 568 1510 1582 1099 1373 3114 3237 2040 3093 -- -- -- -- 
Median monthly income from work ($) -- -- -- -- 1094 1139 954 1011 2234 2335 1790 2167 -- -- -- -- 
Average monthly household income ($) 1230 1210 900 1130 3080 3210 2250 2660 4940 5220 3150 4560 5400 5630 3440 5170 
Median monthly household income ($) 890 920 770 800 2300 2400 1880 2170 3610 3850 2710 3390 3830 4000 2830 3730 
Note: T=Total, C=Chinese, M=Malays, I=Indians. 
Source: Department of Statistics Singapore (1981, 1991, 2001); Ministry of Education Singapore (2007).  
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 In Singapore, secondary students need to obtain at least 5 ‘O’ level passes on the GCE ‘O’ level exams 
to progress to junior colleges or polytechnics, and then get at least 2 ‘A’ and 2 ‘AO’ level passes on the 
GCE ‘A’ level exams to progress to the universities. 
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In order to avoid misunderstanding among the Malays that the government was trying to 
please the majority Chinese at the expense of their interests, and also in order to help the 
Malay community to lift themselves up, in 1982 the government sponsored the 
formation of Mendaki (the Council on Education of Muslim Children), 167 aiming to 
enhance the academic performance of Malay students by providing remedial tuition 
classes in primary and secondary school and offering scholarships and loans for higher 
education, so as to improve the long-term employment and financial prospects of the 
Malays as a whole. However, it should be noted that Mendaki was a “community-based 
self-help organization” but not a government agent. Although the government assisted 
Mendaki in various ways, it left all responsibility for promoting cultural and religious 
activities to Mendaki, as well as to the collective efforts of Malays themselves. By 
rejecting direct involvement, the state could maintain a neutral stance towards all ethnic 
groups without prejudice or preference (Chua, 1998; Moore, 2003).  
 
To summarize, in Phase II (1979-88) the first priority for the state in the management of 
ethnic diversity was to mend its relations with the majority Chinese. It was supposed 
that, with the improvement of state-majority relations, Singapore would be able to 
upgrade itself from the previous romantic triangle to the ideal ménage à trois triangle 
with three positive bilateral relations between the state, the Chinese, and the Malays. 
Since in the previous phase most criticism from the Chinese had been about the 
devaluation of their group identity and culture, the PAP government thus hoped that the 
Chinese would be more satisfied with their new policies and programs, which cherished 
the Chineseness by their nature. Meanwhile, the biggest challenge for the government 
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 The government donated ten million dollars of public funds as an inauguration fund for Mendaki, and 
regularly financed the organization through a special “voluntary check-off” on the monthly contribution 
of Malay workers to the Central Provident Fund. Besides funding, Mendaki was also given access to 
government staff, training, and free accommodations for its tutorial programs (Tan, 1995: 347). 
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was how to tailor its various policies to the cultural demands and expectations of the 
Chinese on the one hand, while not being seen as ethnically-biased on the other hand. 
With this in mind, the fact that the government sponsored Mendaki but did not allow for 
the formation of similar organizations for the Chinese during this period signaled the 
state’s special and continuous commitment to the Malays.  
 
Unfortunately, the development of State-Chinese-Malay relations in the 1980s did not 
follow the PAP government’s expectations, which also shows the difficulties the state 
faced in keeping the favor of both ethnic groups. First, state-Chinese relations did not 
improve much. On the one hand, the “Speak Mandarin Campaign” and the related 
projects seemed effective in promoting the use of Mandarin within the Chinese 
population. According to a survey by the Ministry of Education in 1987, 68 percent of 
all new entrants into primary school that year came from homes in which parents used 
Mandarin with their children, compared with only 25.9 percent in 1980.168 On the other 
hand, more Chinese speaking Mandarin instead of various dialects might bring to a 
greater cohesion among the Chinese, but it by no means brought about stronger support 
for the government. The estrangement between the Chinese-educated Chinese and the 
English-educated Chinese—i.e. the PAP government—although not as large as it was in 
the 1960s, still existed. Meanwhile, the initial attempt of the government to engage 
Chinese SMEs in partnership was not successful. Many Chinese SMEs failed to 
restructure because they lacked the capital required and their operations were too small 
to enjoy any economies of scale. As a result, the Chinese SMEs still played a marginal 
role in the national economy until the mid-1980s (Ng, 2002: 260). For these Chinese 
who were living in the HDB flats and running small or medium-sized family-based 
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 Another survey by the Ministry of Communications and Information in the same year revealed that 87 
percent of Chinese respondents identified themselves as Mandarin speaking, whereas only 26 percent had 
done so in 1980 (cf. Kuo & Jernudd, 2003: 115). 
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businesses—they continued to feel themselves being marginalized, while the few 
English-educated Chinese elites forever constituted the rulers of Singapore and 
benefited the most from the economic expansion and growth of the country.  
 
In addition to the unimproved state-Chinese relations, the state-Malay relations in this 
period were also not as good as before due to the failure of the government to solve the 
problem of the Malays’ socio-economic backwardness. First, by the late 1980s 
Mendaki’s effects on the improvement of Malay academic achievement seemed rather 
limited. While Mendaki expanded gradually from six tuition centers offering special 
tuition to 880 students in 1982 to sixteen tuition centers catering to the needs of 4,450 
students in 1989 (Vasil, 1995: 91), the number of students involved was very small. 
Also, while the growth rates of Malay students passing national exams and those at the 
tertiary level were higher than those of other ethnic groups, the proportion of the Malay 
students at the higher education level within their community was still lower than that of 
the Chinese (or Indians) in absolute numbers.169 Furthermore, even if Mendaki had 
contributed to the above improvements, such limited educational improvements did not 
seem to help much in the job market. Not only were the Malays still overrepresented in 
the bottom levels and underrepresented in the higher levels of employment, but the gap 
between the Chinese and the Malays had widened. Between 1970 and 1990, Malays’ 
share of higher income professional, technical, administrative, and managerial positions 
actually decreased from 9.3 percent to 8.5 percent; in contrast, the Chinese share of 
these occupations increased from 76.9 percent to 82.7 percent. In the key business 
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 The percentages of Malay students passing the GCE ‘O’ and ‘A’ levels of exams in 1990 were 43 and 
57 percent (respectively), with growth rates of 269 and 116 percent (respectively) over the decade. Such 
growth rates were higher than the national averages (172 and 115 percent, respectively). The proportion 
of Malay P1 cohorts entering local publicly-funded tertiary institutions was 13 percent in 1990, ten times 
of that in 1980 (1.3 percent); during the same period the proportion of Chinese increased from 13 percent 
to 42 percent (3.2 times) and that of Indians increased from 4.3 percent to 18 percent (4.2 times). Original 
data was from the Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports (MCYS), Singapore. 
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section, a random survey revealed a heavy concentration of Malays in small-scale 
family-based businesses and a shortage of Malays in the manufacturing sector and 
high-tech consultancy and professional services (Lai, 1995: 155). As for income level, 
in 1990 Malay monthly household income averaged only 70 percent of Chinese income, 
while in 1980 it averaged 74 percent of Chinese income.170  
 
It should be noted that ethnic-related issues had been highly sensitive in Singapore since 
its independence. In the 1970s, both the socioeconomic backwardness of the Malays and 
cultural aspirations of the Chinese were not allowed to be raised in public (as already 
stated). However, after 1979, it was the state itself that opened this “Pandora’s Box.” On 
the one hand, the exercise of new language and education policies made the Malays 
“more aware of their minority status” (Quah, 1990: 57). On the other hand, the release 
of the official census and statistics confirmed the Malays’ backwardness again and again. 
The presence of this widening inter-ethnic disparity, and the likelihood of it continuing, 
thus posed a threat to the government’s legitimacy among Malay voters against the 
backdrop of growing Malay dissatisfaction.  
 
What made the situation even more complicated was the fact that ethnic relations in 
Singapore were also highly susceptible to the political developments of other 
countries—especially those of the Muslim world. In 1979, the Islamic revolution in Iran 
led to a resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism. This trend spread quickly from the 
Middle East to Southeast Asia in the early 1980s and caused some social unrest in those 
relatively stable countries. After fifteen extremists were arrested for preaching the need 
for a “pure” Islamic state and four others were killed in a clash with the guards of a 
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 Between 1980 and 1990, the average Malay monthly household income increased from $900 to $2250 
(2.5 times), while Chinese household income, on average, increased from $1210 to $3210 (2.65 times) 
and Indian household income from $1130 to $2660 (2.35 times). Although the Malays experienced a high 
increase, it remained the lowest actual amount, compared to that of the Chinese and Indians (Table 6-2). 
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Hindu temple in the Kedah state of Malaysia in 1980 (The Economist, 12 April 1980), 
Singapore became increasingly conscious of the political influence of such extremist 
Islamic groups in its territory. In January 1982, the government arrested ten members of 
the (illegal) Singapore People’s Liberation Organization (SPLO) and accused them of 
whipping up resentment among the Malay Muslim community against the government 
and planning to overthrow the government through violence.171 Then, in February the 
government installed S.R. Nathan, then the first permanent secretary of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, as executive chairman of its main English-language newspaper, The 
Straits Times, to tighten its grip on the media. Through these measures, the government 
made it clear that it would keep vigilant guard against ethno-religious crusades into 
politics and would always be ruthless in repressing attempts to incite minority 
communal feelings (Chan, 1983: 202). Nevertheless, it was undeniable that state-Malay 
relations in the 1980s were rather fragile, as the government became more suspicious of 
Malays’ allegiance to Singapore. In the mid-1980s, the Malays’ loyalty to Singapore 
was further questioned in the “Harzog Incident.” In late 1986, the PAP government 
invited Israeli President Chaim Herzog for an official visit. That visit provoked an 
outcry from the pro-Palestinian Malaysian government, who called Singapore’s 
invitation “immoral,” and several protests in Malaysia. When Singaporean Malays also 
protested, PM Lee Kuan Yew openly questioned whether “in certain circumstances, the 
Malay Singaporean reacted more as a Malay/ Muslim than as a Singaporean” and he 
wondered “if all Singaporeans would stick together in a crisis” (cf. Lee, 1987: 252-253). 
Later in the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) Debate in 1987, Brigadier-General Lee 
Hsien Loong publicly stated that the restrictive recruitment of Malays in the army was 
because the government does not “want to put any of [the] soldiers in a difficult position 
                                                 
171
 For more details, see BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 23 January and 12 February 1982. 
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where his emotions for the nation may come into conflict with his emotions for his 
religion” (The Economist, 28 March 1987). In short, in the mid-1980s the Malays were 
in an awkward position, one in which the government had no faith in their loyalty to 
Singapore and regarded them as the potential threat to national unity. 
 
Besides state-Malay relations, Chinese-Malay relations in the mid-1980s were also not 
as good as before. Although on the surface ethnic relations remained harmonic, it was 
backsliding in a rather subtle way. To be sure, the socio-political developments since the 
late 1970s all contributed to the (re-)awakening of the ethnic consciousness of both the 
Chinese and the Malays, which led to a stop of ethnic integration or a trend of 
re-segregation. There were three warnings of this unpleasant situation: the tendencies of 
voting, living, and schooling along ethnic lines. Firstly, from several general elections 
and by-elections in the 1980s, the government found that the electorate, especially the 
young voters, tended to vote for candidates of the same ethnic group “without being 
sufficiently aware of the need to return a racially balanced slate of candidates.”172 
Given that the Chinese composed 76 percent of the national population and that 
Singapore’s electoral system was then a one-person-one-vote, first-past-the-post system, 
this biased voting pattern definitely made a Malay candidate disadvantaged against a 
Chinese one on the basis of his race, language and religion. In fact, in the 1984 election, 
the PAP was forced to change candidates in Kaki Bukit and Telok Blangah in order to 
avert the defeat of two of its Malay candidates by Chinese opponents (Straits Times, 3 
February 2006). Clearly, if this trend continued, it would result in the 
under-representation of the ethnic Malay community in Parliament, which would cause 
a sense of rejection among the Malays, with ethnic tension and strife not far behind.  
                                                 
172
 Said by the then First Deputy Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong (The Times, 23 March 1988). For a 
more detailed discussion of this issue, see Parliamentary Debates Singapore (1988) and Tan (2005). 
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Secondly, the government found a trend of rising proportions of residents from similar 
ethnic backgrounds in some new public housing towns. As mentioned before, since the 
1960s the government had encouraged people to move from ethnic ghettos to HDB flats 
in order to promote inter-ethnic contact and integration.173 However, during the 1980s, 
the government noticed that many residents of public housing who were then allowed to 
resell their apartment units started to do so and move on to estates with a relatively 
higher concentration of residents from the same ethnic group (Chih, 2003; Giok, 2005). 
In other words, the residents appeared to be regrouping ethnically via the secondary 
housing market (Table 6-3). Obviously, this tendency was against the original design of 
spatially mixing the different ethnic groups in public housing estates, and would make 
Singapore “go back to the pre-1965 period when there were racial enclaves and racial 
riots” (S. Dhanabalan, cf. Straits Times, 12 February 1989).  
 
Finally, partly because of ethnic regrouping in public housing, many primary schools in 
such areas were also ethnically-unbalanced. For example, Bedok and Marine Parade 
were two areas with a high concentration of Malays. Consequently, primary schools in 
these two areas tended to have a high proportion of Malay students, and some had a 
student body of more than 30 percent Malay (Soh, 1993: 30). This situation had 
negative effects on students’ academic achievement. According to a Ministry of 
Education report in 1986, in schools where Malays comprised 30 percent or more of the 
student population, one in three failed their PSLE—which was double the national 
average. Where the Malay students made up less than 10 percent of the student 
population, the failure rate was one in five—which was also higher than the national 
average (Straits Times, 30 December 1986). One logical explanation of the poorer 
                                                 
173
 Given that the allocation of flats was done purely by the luck of the draw, the ethnic composition of 
public housing estates was supposed to reflect the overall national situation.  
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academic achievement of students in those ethnically-unbalanced schools was that 
students tended to speak in their mother tongue if their peers were all from the same 
ethnic group—and thus their English, the key to learning in Singapore, suffered (Straits 
Times, 14 September 1986). Moreover, concentrating students of the same ethnic 
background in schools also worked against ethnic harmony, as the students lacked the 
chance to study and play with children of other ethnic groups as well as the chance to 
learn the proper manners to get along with people of different cultures. 
 
Table 6-3: Revealed Ethnic Preferences in the Resale Market for HDB Flats 
Flat buyers (%) New Town/ 
Estate 
Ethnic group 
overrepreseted* Chinese Malay Indian/Others Total (n) 
Bedok Malay (23%) 38 59 3 2,205 
Eunos Malay (23%) 48 51 1 115 
Teban Gardens Malay (26%) 36 56 8 143 
Taman Jurong Malay (21%) 28 68 4 116 
Hougang Chinese (85%) 76 20 4 208 
Bukit Merah Chinese (83%) 87 9 4 127 
Redhill Chinese (88%) 85 -- 15 13 
Henderson Chinese (87%) 97 3 -- 59 
Yishun Indian/Others (9%) 14 62 24 71 
Kampong Java Indian/Others (15%) 50 9 41 56 
Note: *Figures in brackets are based on total number of households in the new town/estate. 
Source: Parliamentary Debates (1989: columns 721-722), cf. Chih (2003: 531) 
 
To sum up, between 1979 and 1988, the triangular ethnic relations of Singapore did not 
upgrade, as the government had wished, from the Type-4 romantic triangle (with a 
negative state-Majority relationship and a minority pivot) to the ideal Type-1 ménage à 
trois triangle (with three positive bilateral relations). Instead, the triangular ethnic 
relations during this period was downgrading towards the Type-5 marriage triangle, 
with two negative bilateral relations between the state and both the Chinese and the 
Malays and only one positive, inter-ethnic, relation. While the Chinese-Malay relation 
was decaying, it still remained positive, as both sides had a common windmill: the 
disappointing PAP government. According to the ethnic triangle theory, the political 
situation would become highly unstable when the state is cast out of the majority- 
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minority alliance, as the majority and the minority are likely to cooperate to overthrow 
the current government. Indeed, in the 1980s the PAP rulers found more and more 
difficult to please their people. Also, as Singaporeans became more highly educated and 
better-off, more people were willing to openly challenge the PAP regime. Even for 
ordinary people who might lack the courage to express their dissatisfaction in public, 
they showed their support for opposition parties in the elections. In the 1981 Anson by- 
election, the PAP lost one Member of Parliament (MP) seat to J.B. Jeyaretnam of the 
Workers’ Party (WP), who became the first opposition MP since 1966 (Chan, 1982). 
Then, in the 1984 general election, the PAP lost two MPs to the opposition: Jeyaretnam 
in Anson and Chiam See Tong of the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) in Potong 
Pasir.174 More significantly, there was an overall decrease of 13 percent of vote casts 
for the PAP, from 78 percent in the 1980 general election to 65 percent in 1984 (Table 
6-1), implying that more than 35 percent of the voters were unsatisfied with the PAP. 
 
What worried the PAP rulers more was that the opposition parties not only challenged 
them in the elections, but also developed networks with other opposition forces and 
attracted the traditional support group of the PAP regime: the English-educated Chinese. 
In May and June of 1987, the government arrested 22 activists who allegedly had taken 
part in a “Marxist conspiracy” to subvert Singapore and establish a Communist state. 
All detainees had similar backgrounds: they were English-educated workers and 
professionals of the Catholic Church, and had infiltrated the opposition Workers’ 
Party.175 Up to this point, it was clear that by the mid-1980s the PAP regime was 
                                                 
174
 Chiam won 60 percent and Jeyaretnam won 57 percent of vote. In at least four other constituencies, 
the PAP also faced serious challenges and won only marginal victories (Elections Department Singapore). 
175
 Both Lee (1988: 204-206) and Yeo (2002: 217) pointed out the English-educated background of these 
detainees and their links with the Workers’ Party. However, as a highly critical article by Haas (1989) 
stated, there was no strong evidence to prove that these people were Marxists, nor was there any plot to 
overthrow the government. This controversial arrest was given wide foreign media coverage by foreign 
journalists. For details see Far Eastern Economic Review issues (June-December 1987) and Kuah (1998). 
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bogged down in crises. Even worse, a serious economic crisis also occurred at this time. 
Resulting from a sharp appreciation of the Singapore dollar in the first half of the 1980s, 
a deep recession began in 1985 with a negative GDP growth rate of 1.4 percent, as 
compared with the double digit growth earlier in the 1970s and around eight to nine 
percent in the late 1970s and early 1980s (see Appendix C). As it was the first time 
Singapore experienced recession since 1970, the PAP’s ability to lead the country was 
further questioned by the people. In order to avoid being replaced or overthrown, some 
fundamental changes of government policies and institutions became highly urgent.  
 
Phase III (1988-2008): The “Ménage à Trois” Triangle and its Challenges 
 
If the ethnic policy orientation of the PAP government could be seen as being in favor of 
the Malays during the 1960S-70s but in favor of the Chinese during the 1980s, then 
since late 1980s its policy orientation had moved from the Chinese side toward middle 
ground. As already stated, in the mid-1980s the ethnic triangle in Singapore fell into an 
unfavorable situation, the Chinese-Malay marriage vs. the state. Besides the multiple 
pressures from the society, the PAP itself also reached a critical moment: the time to 
transit power from the first-generation rulers to the second-generation rulers. As the 
second-generation PAP leaders were not entirely confident about the level of popular 
support they could attract, it was understandable that the “regime maintenance issue” 
became the first priority for the “outcast” PAP government in the late 1980s. Moreover, 
since the policies of the previous phase caused two unintended consequences: the decay 
of both state-minority and majority-minority relations, how to combat such unpleasant 
trends became two other important tasks for the PAP regime. With the above concerns 
in mind, from 1988 onward there were a series of major institutional and policy changes 
in the electoral system, public housing, education, as well as new principles and 
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regulations on ethnic community-related affairs, all of which had fundamental impacts 
on state-society and inter-ethnic relations in Singapore.  
 
Among all the new policies and institutional settings, it is instructive to first discuss the 
introduction of the Group Representation Constituency (GRC) to the electoral system 
and the ruling on ethnic quotas in school and public housing. The GRC scheme, or the 
“Team MPs”, was first applied in the 1988 general election. Under the scheme, there 
were three to six MPs in one GRC and they were elected on a team basis—i.e. the 
“team” winning the largest number of votes would take all the seats in that constituency. 
The candidates of each team should be from the same political party and at least one of 
them should be Malay, Indian, or from another minority group. The number and size of 
GRCs have largely expanded since 1988. In the 1988 election, the number of GRCs was 
13 with teams of three MPs, and the other 42 districts remained the single-member 
districts (SMDs). In 1991, the number of GRCs increased to 15 with teams of four MPs, 
and the number of SMDs shrank to 21. In 1997, the number of SMDs further reduced to 
nine, while the size of some GRCs expanded to contain five or six MPs. In short, the 
proportion of GRC MPs had dramatically increased from 48.1 percent in the 1988 
election to 89.3 percent in 2001 (see Table 6-4).  
 
Table 6-4: Distribution of SMD/GRC MPs and Opposition Performance 






No.and Size of 
GRCs By Seats By District No. Name, Party, Constituency (% of Vote) 










1 Chiam See Tong, SDP, Potong Pasir   (63.1%) 










4 Chiam See Tong, SDP, Potong Pasir   (69.6%) 
Low Thia Khiang, WP, Hougang      (52.8%) 
Ling How Doong, SDP, Bukit Gombak (51.4%) 
Cheo Chai Chen, SDP, Nee Soon Cen. (50.3%) 




15, 5 w/ 4 seats, 6 w/ 





2 Chiam See Tong, SPP, Potong Pasir    (55.2%) 
Low Thia Khiang, WP, Hougang      (58.0%) 








2 Chiam See Tong, SDA, Potong Pasir   (52.4%) 
Low Thia Khiang, WP, Hougang      (55.0%) 




14, 9 w/ 5 seats and 5 





2 Chiam See Tong, SDA, Potong Pasir   (55.8%) 
Low Thia Khiang, WP, Hougang      (62.7%) 
  Note: *in all 55 districts, 5 are walkover districts, 2 of which are SMDs; **only 1 is SMD. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on information from the Elections Department Singapore. 
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Regarding the ethnic quotas in schools and public housing, first, a student quota policy 
was implemented in the 1987/88 academic year’s registration process. According to this 
policy, schools had to limit their enrollment of Malay children to no more than 25 
percent of the Primary One intake (Soh, 1993). Then, the Ethnic Integration Policy was 
announced in 1989, which imposed quotas on the ethnicity of buyers of HDB flats. 
Under the quota system, in each HDB neighborhood, the number of Chinese would be 
capped at 84 percent, Malays at 22 percent, and Indians/others at 10 percent of the total 
residents. In each HDB block, the maximum number of Chinese would be 87 percent, 
Malays 25 percent, and Indians and others 13 percent of the total residents. This policy 
was not to force the proportions of affected ethnic groups down, but rather aimed at 
keeping the problem of ethnic imbalance from getting worse (Chih, 2003; Lai, 1995). In 
practice, the ethnic limits only applied in resale arrangements involving buyers and 
sellers from different ethnic groups, while still allowing residents to sell their flats to 
buyers from the same ethnic group. That said, in cases where a block or a neighborhood 
had reached or exceeded the quota limit for Malays, such as cases in Teban Gardens 
where Malay residents already constituted 26 percent of the total in 1988 (Table 6-3), 
Malays could still sell to Malays, but Chinese or others living there could not sell to a 
potential Malay buyer. Thus, although ethnic Malays were still overrepresented in Teban 
Gardens, they would not go beyond 26 percent of the total residents after 1989. 
 
From the standpoint of ethnic relations management, it was expected that the GRC 
scheme and ethnic quotas in school and housing together could not only combat the 
disturbing trends of ethnic regrouping and restrain ethnic mobilization during elections, 
but also institutionalize “multiracialism” in Singapore and promote further integration. 
That said, the ethnic quota policy and the GRC scheme would discourage the tendency 
of communal voting and reduce the risks of ethnic conflicts in the election process. 
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Given that every GRC constituency has a balanced ethnic mix and that political parties 
competing in a GRC had to portray a multiethnic orientation that appealed to the 
electorate of different ethnic groups in order to secure as many votes as possible, no 
party would take an overtly ethnic line to alienate segments of the electorate (Tan, 2005). 
Moreover, the ethnic quotas in school and housing were meant to ensure a good ethnic 
mix at the level of each apartment block, each neighborhood, each electoral 
constituency, and each primacy school—i.e. institutionalizing a multiethnic “micro-” 
living environment for people of different ethnicities to interact for better understanding 
and accommodation. Meanwhile, the GRC scheme was expected to ensure a constant 
representation of ethnic minorities, particularly Malays, in the parliament—i.e. 
institutionalizing a multiethnic Parliament at the “macro-” (political) level.  
 
Besides institutionalizing a multiethnic micro- and macro-environment, the PAP 
government also corrected its overemphasis of Chineseness in the previous phase and 
moved back to adopt a “scrupulously neutral and evenhanded” approach to ethnic issues 
(Quah, 1990: 55). For instance, in 1990 the government discontinued the compulsory 
Religious Knowledge program in schools, and began to promote “Asian Values” instead 
of Confucian Ethics. Also, unlike the first generation PAP rulers in the 1970s, the new 
PAP leaders in the 1990s did not avoid mentioning ethnic-related issues, but openly 
encouraged ethnic communities to help the underachievers and pursue socio-economic 
developments through their own self-help groups. Accordingly, in 1989 Mendaki was 
reorganized broadened its objectives from just an educational role to tackling the 
economic, social, and cultural problems of Malays as well (Tan, 1995). In 1990, another 
Malay self-help group, the Association of Muslim Professionals (AMP), was formed,176 
                                                 
176
 The main goals of the AMP were to strengthen the Malay middle class and offer programs in 
education, human resource development and research (see AMP website: http://www.amp.org.sg). 
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followed by the Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA) in 1991 and the 
Chinese Development Assistance Council (CDAC) in 1992.177 All these groups were 
funded much like Mendaki, through monthly Central Provident Fund (CPF) deductions 
from members of the ethnic group and by a limited government matching plan. Beyond 
the funding, the government mainly took a consultant role that only “brought the 
problems of the different communities out in the open to agitate community leaders into 
coming forward to solve them” (PM Goh, cf. Straits Times, 6 May 1992). This “ethnic- 
based self-help group” approach in managing ethnic-related affairs was one 
distinguishing characteristic of Singaporean politics, supported by the belief that each 
ethnic group knew best what its problems were and how best to tackle them. Also, 
compared to government administrations, the group leaders could more easily raise 
sensitive issues and make hard choices without being misunderstood by their 
members.178 For example, when the government pointed out the problems of drug 
abuse, increasing divorce rates, single motherhood and poor parenting of the Malay 
underclass in late 1980s, it usually caused hostile reactions from the Malay community 
as being offensive against them. Thus, in the 1990s, the projects to establish halfway 
houses for ex-drug addicts, to provide training programs and tuition classes for 
low-skilled workers and students, to promote family life, or to allocate insurance funds 
for investors, were mostly done by the ethnic-based self-help groups, the Chambers of 
Commerce of the ethnic communities, and other ethnic-based grassroots organizations.  
                                                                                                                                               
According to J. Tan (1995), while both Mendaki and the AMP had claimed their relationship to be 
harmonious, there were signs of inter-organizational rivalry, most markedly in terms of considerable 
overlap between the educational programs offered by both groups. 
177
 Yet, according to Hussin (1993: 195), the formation of the CDAC, being unlike other self-help groups, 
was mainly to “demonstrate to the Chinese that the government viewed their welfare to be as important as 
that of other ethnic groups.” 
178
 Many criticized dealing with social problems via self-help groups, deeming it more wasteful than 
dealing with the problems directly via the state institutions. However, as Prime Minister Goh said, it was 
the most practical solution in current Singapore: “Ideally [there] should be just one national organization 
to cater for all. But that ideal may take a long, long time…I don’t see how the Chinese can do a better job 
than the Malays in solving Malay social problems. These are practical problems” (Straits Times, 11 
October 1992). Also see Business Times, 11 March 1993; Straits Times, 15 August 1993; 11 June 1995. 
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Another significant change in the PAP government in the 1990s was that it did not view 
people’s involvement in ethno-religious activities as a drawback that needed to be 
corrected or suppressed. Instead, the government encouraged each ethnic group to keep 
its distinct ethno-religious traditions alive, and financially support the maintenance of 
cultural heritages. For example, in March 1993 the government announced to provide 
buildings to the four major ethnic communities for heritage centers, and promised to 
contribute to their endowment funds on a dollar-for-dollar basis within a certain limit 
(Straits Times, 22 April 1993). Moreover, the PAP rulers found that it was easier for 
them to shorten the gaps between the government and people if they showed more 
respect toward people’s primordial concerns toward culture, religion, and language. 
With this in mind, the government tried to please the Malays by offering funds to 
retrofit mosques, by providing grants and training programs to improve teachers and 
students in the Madrasahs,179 by the top-ranked officials joining Hari Raya parties and 
Malay Cultural Festivals, and by making official speeches in Malay at the communal 
ceremonies. As for the Chinese, some major actions specifically targeted at pleasing the 
“silent majority” Chinese-speaking Chinese included: an increase in the number of the 
Feedback Unit’s dialogues in Mandarin, the formation of a Chinese Language Review 
Committee (CLRC) in June 1991,180 setting up Nanyang Technological University 
(NTU) in 1991 and the NTU Centre for Chinese Language and Culture in early 1994,181 
                                                 
179
 Madrasahs are Islamic schools that produce religious leaders and teachers by teaching Islam. In 1989, 
the Religious Education Unit in the MUIS was formed to look into ways to improve Madrasahs. In 1990, 
it started a madrasah teachers’ training program and in 1991 it started giving out capitation grants to 
every primary, secondary and pre-university madrasah student (Straits Times, 4 May 1993). 
180
 The Feedback Unit was started in 1985 as an institutionalized channel for citizen complaints about 
administrative matters and for them to voice their views on national issues (Chan, 1986:161). According 
to The Straits Times (17 February 1996), between 1985 and 1990, only 3 out of a total of 92 sessions (3.3 
percent) were in Mandarin. Yet, between 1991 and 1995, this number rose to 13 out of a total of 101 
sessions (13 percent). The formation of the CLRC was in response to complaints by the Chinese-educated 
about declining language standards and the problems faced by students in learning the language. 
181
 After closing of Nantah in 1980, Nanyang Technological Institute was “reborn” on the same campus 
in 1981 with government funding to educate practice-oriented engineers for the burgeoning Singaporean 
economy. In 1991 it became Nanyang Technological University, after the absorption of the National 
Institute of Education (NTU website: http://www.ntu.edu.sg). 
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and the launch of the Chinese Heritage Centre in May 1995 (Straits Times, 17 February 
1996).  
 
Meanwhile, the government still took a firm role to prohibit any chauvinism from 
hurting ethnic harmony and social stability. Laws such as the Penal Code, the Sedition 
Act, and the ISA were still used. In November 1990, the Parliament further passed the 
Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act. Under this Act, the government was 
empowered to take actions it deemed appropriate to prevent ethno-religious disharmony. 
Individuals engaged in political and subversive conduct under the guise of religion and 
who threatened Singapore’s ethnic harmony by their words or actions could be 
prosecuted in court and be subjected to fines or imprisonment. At the same time, the 
government still attempted to cultivate the concept of “Shared Values”182 among the 
people via a comprehensive network of state institutions such as the Presidential 
Council for Minority Rights and the Presidential Council for Religious Harmony 
(PCRH), semi-state institutions, and other soft mechanisms like schools and mass media. 
The underlying purpose of promoting such communitarian values was obviously aimed 
at urging ethnic groups not to be so preoccupied with “communal demands” but to focus 
more on further integration and national unity.  
 
Now it is worth discussing the impacts of governmental policies and institutions on the 
PAP regime and the ethnic relationships of Singapore during this period. First of all, the 
GRC system, although having the long-term goals of reducing the possibility of specific 
ethnic mobilization and ensuring “ethnic minority candidates [were] voted into 
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 In 1991, the White Paper on Shared Values emphasized five core values: nation before community 
and society above self; family as the basic unit of society; community support and respect for the 
individual; consensus instead of contention; and racial and religious harmony (Shared Values, 6 January 
1991, p.3).  
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Parliament as part of a wider ethnically-mixed team” (Lee, 1988: 203), showed to have 
negative impacts on the opposition forces and thus contributed to the maintenance of the 
PAP regime. To be sure, by absorbing “problematic” constituencies of opposition parties 
with significant electoral forces into larger GRC aggregates, the influence of the 
opposition parties in the elections was thus diluted (Chih, 2003: 537). Moreover, the 
numerical and ethnic composition requirements of contesting GRCs also made it harder 
for smaller political parties to field candidates and join the election campaigns.183 
While the opposition forces could cooperate and ally, such alliances were actually 
difficult to organize or sustain as their members usually had very different political 
concerns and interests (Rodan, 1997; 1998; Huxley, 2002). Consequently, as shown in 
Table 6-1, while the PAP electoral vote in contested constituencies dropped noticeably 
from 77.7 percent in 1980 to 64.8 percent in 1984, it dropped only slightly to 63.2 
percent in 1988. The GRC’s function was particularly essential in the 1991 election. In 
1990, prior to the election, Goh Chok Tong replaced Lee Kuan Yew, becoming the 
second Prime Minister in Singapore’s history, and his government was not stable. In the 
1991 election the PAP received merely 61 percent of the popular vote—its lowest since 
1968. Yet, it only lost four seats in SMDs. Also, as shown in Table 6-4, in this election, 
of the 36 electoral districts, 11 were “walkover districts” where there were no 
challengers against PAP candidates, and only one of these walkover districts was SMD 
while the other 10 were GRCs consisting of 40 MP seats—thus it is reasonable to 
believe that the PAP might have lost even more seats if these 40 seats were contested in 
SMDs. In other words, the GRC system helped Goh’s administration past the period of 
transition. In the 1997 election, the PAP won with an increased share of both votes and 
seats (65 percent of votes, 81 of 83 seats), reversing the steady electoral decline of the 
                                                 
183
 For example, the Malay-based party, the Singapore Malay National Organization (PKMS), had been 
effectively prevented from contesting in GRC constituencies ever since 1988 until it joined the Singapore 
Democratic Alliance (SDA), a multi-racial opposition alliance, in 2001 (Straits Times, 29 October 2001). 
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PAP over nearly two decades, signaling both a major personal triumph for Prime 
Minister Goh and the further consolidation of the PAP regime.184 As both the total 
number of GRC seats and the size of a GRC rose—the number of GRC seats rose from 
one half of Parliament in 1988 to nearly nine-tenths in 1997, while the maximum size of 
a GRC rose from three to six members—there was very little risk of the PAP losing its 
majority position in the Parliament, because the opposition parties only had the chance 
to win seats in SMDs. 
 
Nonetheless, the GRC system indeed ensured a constant representation of minorities, 
particularly Malays, in Parliament. Although many Malays had criticized the GRC 
scheme as being targeted at their community,185 later elections proved the GRC system 
to be “a passport” for the Malay minority to Parliament.186 As shown in Table 6-5, the 
percentage of the elected Malay MPs had been below its ethnic composition of the total 
population since 1972. The situation of under-representation became even worse in the 
1980s because of the tendency of ethnic voting. However, after the inception of the 
GRC scheme in 1988, the proportion of the elected Malay MPs approximately reflected 
its group size in the following three elections. In the 2001 and 2006 elections, the 
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 Of course apart from the GRC system, the PAP also had other “carrot-and-stick” strategies to win the 
elections. Taking the 1997 election as an example, during the campaign the government announced that if 
the voters chose the PAP, their neighborhoods would be improved through a “flat upgrading program”, 
their children would benefit from schemes like Edusave merit bursaries and scholarships, and their elderly 
parents would be taken care of (Li & Elklit, 1999: 209-213). On the other hand, facing an intense 
campaign in the GRC of Cheng San, the PAP filed 13 suits against Tang Liang Hong and 11 suits against 
Joshua Jeyaretnam of the opposition Workers’ Party team after they raised some ethnic issues and thus 
were sued as “using dangerous mix of politics and religion to woo Malays and Indians” (Straits Times, 
1-2 January 1997). In fact, since the late 1980s, lawsuits have replaced detention under the ISA as the 
principal means (“sticks”) of intimidating political opponents by the PAP regime (Rodan, 1998). 
185
 Many criticized the series of ethnic quota policies, saying that they would serve to “undercut the 
perceived growth and consolidation of Malay anti-PAP votes in existing Malay ‘enclaves’, and to prevent 
the emergence of new centers of Malay resistance”. As a result, in the 1988 election the PAP did not fare 
well in areas with a relatively high percentage of Malay voters—e.g. only 50.9 percent of votes in Eunos 
GRC, 54.9 percent in Bedok GRC, and 56.3 percent in Aljunied GRC—compared to a national average of 
63.2 percent (Chih, 2003: 536). 
186
 Statement given by a member of Taman Bacaan (Singapore Malay Youth Library Association) during 
an interview in November 2007. Also according to him, without the institutional protection of the 
minority (such as the GRCs), to just “expect” that all Singaporeans will vote for the best candidate 
regardless of ethnicity would be “silly and naïve.” 
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proportion of elected Malay MPs became higher than its group size. It should be noted 
that the GRC scheme only guaranteed a minimum quota of the minority MPs in 
Parliament—for example, nine Malay MPs elected from the GRCs (11 percent of the 
total 84 MPs) in the 2001 and 2006 elections. In other words, the increase of Malay 
MPs also reflected the efforts of the PAP government to promote Malay candidates in 
the nomination process. In fact, since the late 1980s and especially during the period 
under PM Goh, the PAP had actively brought more Malay elites into the government. 
 
Table 6-5: Elected MPs and Ethnicity, 1968-2006 





















































































Total 58 65 69 75 79 81 81 83 84 84 
Note: numbers in bold identify under-representation. 
Sources: Author’s compilation based on information from the Elections Department Singapore and 
Department of Statistics Singapore. 
 
Meanwhile, due to the government’s help of the Malay community to lift its educational 
achievements and solve its problems, such as alleviating drug addiction and giving aid 
to poor families, the PAP’s standing within the Malay community further increased in 
the 1990s. The change in attitude in the Malay community towards the PAP could also 
be observed in the elections. In the past, being associated with the PAP was taboo for 
many Malays, for such connections would be seen as betraying the community. But 
since the mid-1990s, there seemed to be no more stigmas in supporting the PAP openly. 
In both the 2001 and 2006 general elections, the support for the PAP in several GRCs 
with a higher percentage of Malay voters was higher than the national average.187  
                                                 
187
 For example, in the 2001 election the PAP garnered 79.8 percent of the valid votes in Jurong GRC, 
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In addition to the improvement of state-Malay relations, state-Chinese relations also 
improved in the 1990s. One important reason for this improvement was the diminution 
of the gap between the second generation of the PAP leaders and the Chinese folks. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, there had existed controversies between the English-speaking PAP 
elites and the dialect-speaking Chinese on issues relating to Chinese identity, language, 
and education. However, over the years the older-generation Chinese had been 
gradually waning—a situation that could be observed by the huge decline of the dialect 
speaking population over two decades: while the 1980 census found 64 percent of the 
Chinese spoke dialects at home, an Education Ministry survey in 2000 showed only 2 
percent of the Chinese spoke dialects at home (Straits Times, 21 October 2000). The 
second- and third-generation Singaporean Chinese—both political elites and ordinary 
people—are mostly Singapore-born and English-/bilingual-educated whose national 
identities are “Singaporean” first. In terms of the growth background and national 
identity, the majority Chinese do not greatly disagree with government officials.188 
Besides, the new PAP leaders are indeed “more Chinese” than their predecessors and 
thus enjoy stronger backing from the Chinese community.  
 
As for majority-minority relations, while mechanisms at the high (political) level, such 
as the GRC scheme or various restrictive regulations,  have successfully ensured elites 
and parties campaigned not on ethnicity but on policies for the country’s long-term good, 
                                                                                                                                               
which was higher than the national average of 75.3 percent. Several GRCs with a higher percentage of 
Malay voters, such as Aljunied and Sembawang, were not even contested (Straits Times, 4 November 
2001). In another example, in the 2006 election, the PAP received 60 percent of the valid votes in Eunos 
ward of Aljunied GRC, which was higher than the average 54 percent polled by the PAP in each of the 
remaining four wards with fewer Malay voters (Straits Times, 9 May 2006). 
188
 The author once asked the students of Chinese origin in her tutorial section about their cultural and 
national identity; most of them identified themselves as “Singaporean” and some as “Singaporean 
Chinese”. Even for those “Singaporean Chinese”, they have never associated their Chineseness with the 
Chinese in China. Outside the class, they converse in English or “Singlish”—combining English with 
some words of Mandarin, Malay, and dialects—with their peers; but none of them could really speak in 
dialect. This situation was very different from what the author had experienced around the HDB flat she 
lived, where many of the older-generation Chinese could not even speak English.  
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public policies at the grassroots level—ethnic quotas on schooling and housing, 
inter-ethnic home visits or cross-cultural events on Racial Harmony Day, or the 
advocating of “Inter-Racial and Inter-Religious Confidence Circles”—are even more 
effective in pursuing a “gradual integration” from the bottom up. Insofar as people of 
different ethnic backgrounds are living closely and their children are playing and 
studying together, they have constant opportunities to communicate with each other, and 
thus build up mutual understanding, accommodation, and trust. Even though people 
with different customs living together would also experience complaints and disputes,189 
the Survey on Social Attitudes of Singaporeans (SAS) 2001 (with sample size 1,481) 
showed that almost all Singaporeans agreed (97 percent) that it is good to have different 
ethnic groups living in the same neighborhood and they (98 percent) are willing to let 
their children play with children of other ethnic groups. Also in this survey, seven out of 
10 Chinese (70 percent) and Malays (71 percent) indicated that they have close friends 
who are not of their own ethnicity. 84 percent of Malay respondents would invite 
Chinese friends to celebrate special occasions while 51 percent of Chinese respondents 
would invite their Malay friends. As for ethnic relations in Singapore, the vast majority 
of Singaporeans (90 percent) was satisfied with the current situation and was optimistic 
about ethnic relations in the future (92 percent).  
 
To sum up, the ethnic triangle of Singapore since 1989, by and large, has been gradually 
upgraded from the Type-5 triangle (i.e. both Chinese and Malays were unsatisfied with 
the state) to the ideal Type-1 ménage à trois triangle with three positive bilateral 
relations between the state, the Chinese, and the Malays. This pleasing development 
                                                 
189
 For example, some of the author’s Malay interviewees complained that the Chinese fed their dogs on 
void-deck tables, while some other Chinese interviewees complained that the Malays left food along the 
corridors for cats. Moreover, some Malays were unhappy that their Chinese neighbors polluted the air 
when burning papers in honor of ancestors, while some Chinese were unhappy that their Malay neighbors 
were very noisy when holding their wedding ceremonies (interview note, November 2007).  
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shows that the above-mentioned state policies and actions, despite their limitations, 
have mainly satisfied the demands of both the majority and the minority and encouraged 
close and harmonious interactions among people from different ethnicities. Nonetheless, 
it by no means implies that there have been no disputes or disagreements between the 
state and the society or between ethnic groups. Yet, such tensions and conflicts were 
resolvable within the existing institution without mass riots.  
 
For example, state-Malay relations since 2001 had once turned a bit sour under the 
shadow of the 9/11 tragedy. In late 2001 and August 2002, Singapore’s police arrested 
34 Jemaah Islamiah (JI) network members for planning bomb attacks against the US 
embassy and naval vessels, Changi Airport, projects on Jurong Island, and the 
waterworks of Singapore. Originally, the two arrests were only to prevent terrorism. 
However, local Malays were inflamed when officials characterized the alleged terrorists 
as “Malay Muslims” (Case, 2003: 171-172). The Malay resentments were intensified in 
2002 and early 2003 when the Ministry of Education suspended several female Malay 
high school students for wearing the tudung (Islamic head covering) in national schools 
as such behavior would endanger national identity. Many Malays felt a growing 
pressure of assimilation—or that of social discrimination, as their customs (such as 
wearing tudungs) have been seen as negative and dangerous (Barr & Low, 2005). A 
local Malay advocacy group, Fateha, even complained about the state’s “disrespect for 
Islam” and sought assistance from Malaysia. Nonetheless, the PAP government’s 
response to these two events showed it is capable of handling such crises. In the former 
case, Deputy Prime Minister Tony Tan placated the rest of the Malay community by 
announcing that families of the alleged terrorists would not be penalized financially, and 
Prime Minister Goh held a dialogue in February 2002 with 1,700 community leaders to 
ask for their full support. In the latter (tudung) case, the PAP government first rejected 
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interferences from Malaysia, and then it garnered ground support from the larger Malay 
community through its MPs and religious leaders. Obviously, in these two cases, the 
Malay community leaders were crucial as the bridge of communication between the 
state and the common people and as a cooling system to prevent their members from 
extreme acts. Without the strong backing of the religious and community leaders, the 
government would not have been able to solve the disputes so easily.190  
 
Similarly, although Chinese-Malay relations have improved over the past two decades, 
some issues still remain to be solved. First, the educational and economic gaps between 
these two groups are still wide. As shown in Figure 6-2, while the proportion of Malay 
students obtaining at least five ‘O’ level passes has increased from 16 percent in 1980 to 
59 percent in 2008, the proportion of Chinese students with five ‘O’s has also increased 
from 44 to 86 percent during the same period; the Malays still lagged behind Chinese 
students for 27 percent, the pattern of which showed little change in the past decades.191 
Even worse, the income disparities between Malays and Chinese between 1980 and 
2005 have in fact widened (refer to Table 6-2). While Malay families’ average monthly 
household income increased more than 3.8 times from $900 to $3440, it was 74 percent 
of the Chinese income in 1980 but only 61 percent of the Chinese income in 2005. Such 
a growing economic gap between ethnic groups may have negative impact on ethnic 
harmony in the future. Furthermore, in the society, although there has been a 
convergence of behavior and greater cultural appreciation and intermingling in schools 
and offices, the Malays still face various forms of pressure from the mainstream 
(Chinese) society. For example, many of the author’s Malay respondents expressed 
                                                 
190
 For details of these two incidents, see Ganesan (2004: 41-64) and Kenneth Tan (2003: 241-258). 
191
 However, Figure 6-2 also shows that the gap between Chinese and Malay P1 students admitted to 
post-secondary institutions (Institutes of Technical Education, Polytechnics, Junior Colleges, or 
Centralized Institute) has steadily reduced from 29 percent (1990) to 9 percent (2008). 
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worry that Mandarin would replace English in the workplace in the near future and that 
their job opportunities would be hurt because they found that more and more Chinese 
tend to use Mandarin to chat in the workplace and only use English to speak to their 
minority colleagues. They also complained that they were excluded from many 
grassroots activities held in the neighborhood, as these activities were in Chinese. In 
other cases, some young Malay women abandoned their tudungs at work in order to 
“remove an obstacle to acceptance and promotion”, and some Malay parents pushed 
their children to play with Chinese children in order to “learn their habits.”192 In more 
extreme cases, Malay youths even joined Chinese street corner gangs “for security and a 
sense of identity” (Straits Times, 10 April 1993; 11 October 1995). In these cases, the 
Malays felt the pressure to conform their habits to those of the Chinese majority, and 
they were unhappy that they need to show that they were “not like a Malay” in order to 
earn the respect of Chinese colleagues or friends. 
 














Malay w/ 5 "O"s Chinese w/ 5 "O"s
Malay Post-secondary Chinese Post-secondary
Malay w/ 5 "O"s 16 37 43 46 48 46 46 49 53 57 58 59 59 63 60 59 59
Chinese w/ 5 "O"s 44 67 73 77 77 78 79 81 83 84 85 86 87 85 86 85 86
Malay Post-secondary 36 45 50 55 63 66 70 75 76 78 79 82 83 84 86
Chinese Post-secondary 65 73 77 78 81 82 88 90 91 92 93 94 94 94 95
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Source: Ministry of Community Development, Youth and Sports (MCYS) for data from 1980 to 1995; 
Ministry of Education (MOE) for data from 1996-2008. 
 
On the other hand, the Chinese were generally unaware of social practices and forms of 
discrimination and the sense of marginalization that they created. However, such 
                                                 
192
 Interview note, November 2007. Also see Barr & Low (2005) for a discussion of the intensifying 
assimilationist pressure on the Malays in reaction to the rise of militant Islam as a threat in the region. 
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unconscious neglect may lead to conflicts between the Chinese and the Malays. Thus, 
except reminding the Chinese that they should be more sensitive to the feelings of 
non-Chinese, the government has also kept constant vigilance against even the smallest 
of irritations that might hurt ethnic harmony of the country. For example, in September 
2005, the government invoked the Sedition Act, for the first time since 1966, to charge 
three “bloggers” for making inflammatory remarks against ethnic Malays online.193 
Although many criticized the government for trying to curtail freedom of speech and for 
imposing control over the Internet (e.g. Rodan, 2006: 180-186), through this case the 
government sent a strong and clear message about the limits of political discourse: that 
even in cyberspace, there was still a “red line on the ground” against inappropriate 
behavior—behavior that would create distrust and animosity between the ethnic groups.  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
This chapter reviews the changes in the state-Chinese-Malay relations in Singapore 
from 1965 to 2008. In Phase I (1965-1979), the ethnic triangle of Singapore gradually 
shifted from the type-8 unit-veto triangle to the type-4 romantic triangle in which the 
Malays were the pivot position. To be sure, when Singapore had just become 
independent, the three bilateral relationships were all negative resulting from the 
conflicts experienced during the last years of the colonial period. The PAP government, 
failing to earn the full support of the Chinese community and under pressure from 
neighboring Malay countries, decided to mend its relationship with the Malays through 
                                                 
193
 In this case, a letter from a Malay lady printed in The Straits Times Forum asked whether cab 
companies allow un-caged pets to be transported in taxis. As it is, most Muslims in Singapore are required 
to avoid contact with a dog’s saliva. On 12 September, two bloggers Nicholas Lim Yew, 25, and Benjamin 
Koh Song Huat, 27, were allegedly responding to this letter with vulgarities, disparaging remarks about 
Malay-Muslims, and pictures to humiliate Muslims. Four days later, another blogger Gan Huai Shi, 17, 
was also alleged to have lashed out at the lifestyle, religion, and economic situation of the local Malay 
community. For details, see Straits Times, 13, 17, 24 September, 8, 27 October; and 24 November 2005. 
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policies such as constitutional protections of special Malay positions, social and 
educational assistance, and by keeping distance from the Chinese business class. In the 
society, the government tried to prevent ethnic conflict by restrictive regulations and 
repression, while also encouraging more inter-ethnic contacts via a public housing 
system. As a result, both state-Malay and Chinese-Malay relations gradually improved. 
However, there were severe complaints and criticisms of the government from the 
Chinese community as well as confrontations between the Chinese and the state.  
 
From 1979 onward, the PAP government shifted its policy orientation to the reassertion 
of Chineseness, with the purpose of mending its relations with the Chinese majority. 
Unfortunately, the various pro-Chinese policies and programs not only failed to please 
the Chinese community, but also made the Malays angry. In other words, in Phase II 
(1979-1988) the ethnic triangle did not upgrade from the type-4 romantic triangle to the 
type-1 ménage à trois triangle, but downgraded to the type-5 triangle in which the state 
was cast out of the Chinese-Malay marriage. Even worse, it seemed that Chinese-Malay 
relations were also decaying because of the rise of ethnic consciousness in both 
communities and the widening socio-economic gap between them. The inter-group 
mixing and integration seemed to stop, shown by the three disturbing trends of voting, 
living, and schooling along ethnic lines. This implied that the ethnic triangle might 
further downgrade to the unit-veto triangle. In order to save its political legitimacy and 
maintain ethnic harmony and social stability, the PAP government changed its policy 
orientation once again and brought Singapore politics into the next stage. 
 
In Phase III (1988-2008), the PAP government first used the GRC electoral system to 
secure its ruling power and ethnic quotas in schools and housing to stop the trend of 
ethnic re-grouping. Then it applied many flexible public measures to evenly make every 
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ethnic group happy. Meanwhile, the second-generation PAP leaders seemed to be more 
sympathetic to the people’s primordial concerns about culture, religion, and language 
than the first-generation rulers were. As a result, the ethnic triangle of Singapore since 
1989 has gradually advanced to the ideal type-1 ménage à trois triangle with three 
positive bilateral relations. Although there were still disputes among the groups, such 
tensions and conflicts were resolvable within the existing institutions without mass riots.  
 
To conclude, in the past decades, due to the above-mentioned proactive policies and 
arrangements, the prudence of Singapore’s government in dealing with ethnic issues and 
the strict penalties that await ethno-religious extremists has immunized Singapore from 
experiencing the ethnic turbulence that occurred in quite a few countries with sizable 
minority populations. Even when the country was in the midst of international economic 
or political crisis, such as the Asian Financial Crisis or the 9/11 attacks, it was still be 
able to maintain a relatively calm atmosphere so that its citizens, regardless of ethnicity, 
could behave rationally and live together peacefully. In retrospect, Singapore’s ethnic 
relations have gradually upgraded from a highly unstable unit veto model in the 1960s 
to an ideal ménage à trois triangle in recent years. This progress confirms the PAP 
government’s achievement not only in regulating ethnic behavior and maintaining social 
order, but also in integrating the different ethnic groups into a rather united and cohesive 
nationality. In Southeast Asia, Singapore stands out as a successful case in terms of 
ethnic conflict management. Nonetheless, just as its Minister of Defence, Teo Chee 
Hean, reminded us “[Singapore’s] present stability and prosperity is neither a natural 
nor permanent state of affairs” in the 2007 Temasek Seminar (cf. Singh, 2008: 317), 
both the government and the people still have to be watchful of any potential threat that 
might hurt the security of this small city-state in the future.  




After looking at the three case studies, this chapter returns to the main themes of this 
thesis, once again highlighting and clarifying some basic concepts of the ethnic triangle 
theory. Then it examines how far these three case studies support the propositions of the 
ethnic triangle theory and points out some important differences and similarities among 
the three cases. Finally, some suggestions for further studies on ethnic conflict and 
violence are provided in the concluding part of the chapter.  
 
The Ethnic Triangle: Purposes and Concepts 
 
As stated in Chapter II, conventional studies of ethnic conflict and violence have offered 
general explanations as to the factors that variously influence the escalation of conflicts 
into violence. The validity of such explanations, by and large, has been confirmed via 
numerous empirical and quantitative research studies. It is undeniable that ethnic 
relations within a country are affected by differences among ethnic groups, public 
policies, political and electoral systems, economic situation, specific incidents, and 
numerous other factors. Particularly, as the statistical outcome of the cross-national 
time-series data in Chapter III shows, institutional/policy restrictions and discrimination 
appear to be more decisive in explaining (inter-)communal conflict, protest, and 
rebellion than other factors are. Meanwhile, comparing the Asian model with global 
data, people in Asia generally seem to be more sensitive to cultural, political, and 
economic differences among ethnic groups and the openness of the government. While 
the consciousness of ethnic difference contributes to fewer communal conflicts and 
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rebellion, increased political freedom apparently encourages anti-government protest 
and rebellion.  
 
However, rather than figuring out which factors are more important in bringing about 
ethnic conflict and violence or whether the aforementioned factors do have such 
influences, this thesis is more concerned with interpreting how the various “master 
cleavages” in selected countries affect ethnic groups and inter-ethnic relations in general. 
More specifically, this thesis aims to investigate “the processes” by which Governments 
adopts in managing ethnic relations, specifically, the series of institutional arrangements 
or policy designs, which in turn lead to changes in the balance of ethnic groups’ relative 
status and strength. Given the dynamic characteristic of inter-ethnic relations, especially 
majority-minority relations, invariably, there are bound to be different responses from 
ethnic groups of such state-initiated policy moves. In turn, these could force the 
government to further mediate, if not amend, its policies—with the similar 
corresponding chain reactions from affected ethnic groups, being repeated again and 
again. Such processes, although admittedly dynamic and somewhat complicated, can 
actually be better understood through the “ethnic triangle model”, which is adapted 
from the “strategic triangle” theory in international relations. Although Chapter II has 
introduced the basic concepts and propositions of the ethnic triangle and offered an 
elaboration of the eight types of triangular relations with possible consequences (i.e. 
peace or five types of ethnic violence) via a bunch of empirical examples, several 
important points need to be highlighted again here.  
 
First, an ethnic triangle contains three actors: the state, the ethnic majority, and the 
ethnic minority. However, the boundaries of these three “actors” are flexible. Members 
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of “the state” may be from either the majority or the minority but represent neither of 
these two communities—or the state only reflects the will and interests of a specific part 
of an ethnic group. For example, the PAP government in Singapore in the 1960s could 
at best be seen as a small ruling group of the “English-speaking Chinese” and it had 
many disputes with the majority (Chinese-speaking) Chinese. The New Order regime in 
Indonesia—particularly during Suharto’s last years in power—obviously represented 
only Suharto himself and his clients but not the majority pribumis. Meanwhile, two or 
more different ethnic groups can also form an alliance of “the majority” or “the 
minority”. For example, in Indonesia there are Javanese, Sundanese, Madurese, and 
over 200 smaller ethnic minorities, yet they all belong to the “pribumi” majority 
vis-à-vis the “non-pribumi” Chinese minority. Similarly, in Malaysia the Malays and 
other natives in Sarawak and Sabah are “Bumiputra” vis-à-vis the “non-Bumiputra” 
Chinese and Indians. Furthermore, within each camp internal divisions and conflicts are 
always possible due to different interests and concerns. The MCA-Gerakan frictions in 
the 1970s and early 1980s and the UMNO’s Team A-Team B splits in the late 1980s (in 
Malaysia) are good examples illustrating this point. Nevertheless, there are still some 
minimum requirements for an ethnic minority to qualify as a competitor in such 
triangular games, such as a certain size of the population, a certain degree of political or 
economic strength, and, most importantly, a certain portion of members willing to play 
the game for the community’s interests. It is not easy for a tiny group to produce a 
critical mass in political and social systems; nor can a minority initiate meaningful 
political action if most of its members show no will to do so. Also take Indonesia as an 
example: although there are over 200 distinct ethno-linguistic groups in the country, 
most of these groups are too small to be competent in playing politics.  
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Second, in the ethnic triangle model, a bilateral relationship is usually identified as 
either positive or negative. The so-called “positive” (or “negative”) relationship is a 
relative concept, usually implying that the current relationship between two groups is, 
by and large, improving or better than the previous time period. In a similar vein, 
claiming that there is a positive relationship between two groups only refers to a 
relatively harmonious relationship among the majority of members of two groups, but it 
by no means implies that there are no conflicts among individual members of two 
groups; claiming that the relationship between the state and an ethnic group “is good” 
also does not imply that all members of this ethnic group are satisfied with whatever the 
current government has done. For example, the Singaporean Malays in the 1990s and 
2000s generally enjoyed good relations with the state, which was reflected in the high 
rate of support for PAP candidates in the general elections. Nonetheless, there was still 
tension between the Malays and the government in 2001 and 2002 after the arrests of JI 
members and due to the tudung issue. Yet, tensions and disputes are rather easily 
resolved without mass riots when the majority of an ethnic group are basically satisfied 
with the status quo and thus are willing to accept the current rules of the game.  
 
Third, in most of the past research on ethnic conflict and violence there were only two 
opposing major actors, such as “the government vs. an ethnic minority” or “group A vs. 
group B”. Such discussions were limited to the study of the linear relationship between 
the two actors. However, just as the fact that the triangle is the basic unit of a plane or 
polyhedron, applying the triangle to discussions of ethnic relations can help us form a 
more comprehensive picture. Nonetheless, when discussing a triangular relationship 
between the government and two specific ethnic groups, it by no means implies that 
there are only two ethnic groups in a country. One shall always keep in mind that there 
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are many such ethnic triangles that exist at the same time. For example, in both 
Malaysia and Singapore the ethnic situation may be presented as the triangular pyramid 
in Figure 7-1, in which the three ethnic groups are the Malays, the Chinese, and the 
Indians; any of these triangles is worthy of discussion. Similarly, in Indonesia ethnic 
conflicts not only exist between the Chinese and pribumis, but also exist between 
indigenous Papuans and immigrants from other islands or between Javanese and 
non-Javanese; all such cases are potential candidates for further research. 
 
Figure 7-1: Multiple Ethnic Triangles 
 
 
With these basic concepts in mind, from Chapter IV to Chapter VI the ethnic triangle 
model was applied to review and analyze the dynamic, on-going change consequent to 
State actions, in the relationships among the principal actors in the “triangle”, namely, 
the State, the Chinese, and the indigenous population, in three post-colonial Southeast 
Asian countries—Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. In the following sections, these 
three cases are examined to see how much they support the propositions of the ethnic 
triangle theory and to compare the differences and similarities of ethnic relations in the 
three countries.  
 
The Ethnic Triangle: The Empirical Applications 
 
The Minority in the Ethnic Triangle 
The ethnic triangle theory proposes that a minority with more demographic, political, or 
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socio-economic significance would earn a better position and a stronger ability to 
negotiate with the state or to fight against discrimination, while at the same time its 
relationship with the majority would easily become tense (Propositions 2 and 3). In 
regard to the significance of the ethnic minority in each of the three countries, in the 
1950s and 1960s the Chinese in Malaysia were the most significant when compared 
with the Chinese in Indonesia and the Malays in Singapore. The Chinese in Malaysia 
constituted 37 percent of the population, while Singaporean Malays represented 15 
percent and Indonesian Chinese represented only about three percent of the national 
population in their respective countries. In terms of economic power, the Chinese in 
both Malaysia and Indonesia were economically advantaged groups while the Malays in 
Singapore were much poorer than their Chinese counterparts. With regard to “group 
consciousness” in politics, the Malaysian Chinese had their own political party (MCA) 
and its community elites had experience cooperating and negotiating with the majority 
(Malay) elites in political affairs in the last years of the colonial period. The Indonesian 
Chinese, on the other hand, did not even qualify as an “important social group” in 
domestic politics, even though several Chinese citizens did show individual interest in 
politics. The Singaporean Malays were in-between the two extremes. While the Malays 
in Singapore were economically and socially disadvantaged, their group identity was 
strong, and they had close links with the Malays in Indonesia and Malaysia.  
 
Since the ethnic Chinese in Malaysia were sizeable in number and their strength in the 
economy was too great to be ignored, it is understandable that in the early years of 
independent Malaysia, the Chinese voices were quite loud in domestic politics, which 
made their relationship with the Malays highly negative and eventually resulted in the 
May 1969 riots in Kuala Lumpur. Even after 1970, while Chinese participation in the 
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political decision-making process was limited, the ruling Malays never attempted to 
totally exclude the ethnic Chinese from the political arena; while Chinese language and 
education were restricted, the Malaysian government could not practice assimilation 
programs that were too coercive of the Chinese community as the Indonesian 
government did to its Chinese minority. Also interesting, partly due to the two-decade 
practice of the NEP and the rapid decline of the Chinese population in Malaysia (from 
35.6 percent in 1970 to 24.5 percent in 2000), the relationship between the Chinese and 
the Malays in Malaysia became much better in the 1990s. In a similar vein, in Singapore 
in the 1960s and early 1970s the Malay community was crucial in supporting the PAP 
regime, and thus the government had to take their demands and interests seriously. But 
when the PAP consolidated its legitimacy both domestically and internationally in the 
late 1970s, the importance of the Malays was reduced, and the government began to 
become more pro-Chinese. Within the three cases, the Indonesian Chinese suffered the 
highest degree of discrimination and ethnic violence. Also, it seems that without holding 
a certain degree of power in politics, the economic strength of the Chinese unfortunately 
brought them to an even more dangerous situation. All in all, these examples support the 
aforementioned propositions that the significance of the ethnic minority would add to 
the minority’s bargaining chips in political deals, but may at the same time ruin its 
relations with the ethnic majority.  
 
Institutional/Policy Factors and Ethnic Relations 
The ethnic triangle theory proposes that whether the current state institutions and public 
policies in the political, socio-economic, and cultural arenas satisfy the ethnic groups 
(both majority and minority) would directly affect the ethnic group’s relationships with 
the state (Propositions 1 and 2). Whether institutions and policies provide an 
  228 
environment to encourage inter-/trans-ethnic contacts and communications would also 
influence inter-ethnic relations (Proposition 3). In particular, the quantitative regression 
results in Chapter III point out that institutional/policy restrictions and discrimination in 
the political and economic arenas have robust positive effects on both state-society and 
inter-ethnic relations. In reviewing the history of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, 
one can find a bunch of examples to support the above propositions. Here some 
important ones are highlighted. 
 
First, other than coercive measures to totally disfranchise an ethnic group in the political 
affairs, some special institutional designs—particularly those in party and/or electoral 
systems—also have profound impacts on the balance of power among the major ethnic 
groups. This is where the importance of the rural weightage system can be clearly seen 
in Malaysia: because the weightage system enhanced the electoral power of the Malays 
(the majority of whom lived in rural areas), the ethnic balance of electoral power was 
clearly tilted in favor of the Malays and the voting power of the Chinese minority was at 
the same time marginalized. On the other hand, to a certain degree the GRC scheme in 
Singapore since 1988 has guaranteed a minimum number of representatives from the 
socio-economically disadvantaged Malay community that must be elected to Parliament; 
thus since the 1990s, the proportion of Malay MPs has reflected the proportion of 
Malays in the total population.  
 
Second, political institutions stand out as one of the most crucial factors in ethnic 
triangular relations when comparing the developments of Indonesia and Malaysia since 
the 1970s. To be sure, both the Indonesian and Malaysian governments attempted to 
ease pribumi/Malay-Chinese tensions via similar cultural and economic policies—such 
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as implementing redistributive policies that greatly benefited the indigenous people or 
restricting the cultural practices of the ethnic Chinese. However, in the political arena, 
Indonesia and Malaysia were quite different. In Indonesia, Suharto prohibited almost all 
social forces from participating in the decision-making process. In Malaysia, the BN 
government was a grand coalition that even incorporated many ex-opposition forces, 
and it also held regular elections for people to express their satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction. However, the electoral system was blatantly designed to disenfranchise 
the Chinese. Both the Indonesian and Malaysian governments failed to reduce the 
wealth gaps between the Chinese and the indigenous people or to assimilate the Chinese 
through these arrangements (though Suharto was more successful at assimilation). 
However, in Suharto’s Indonesia the pribumis also saw that a small number of Chinese 
tycoons had a say in politics (which the pribumis did not) resulting from their close 
links with Suharto or his family members. Economic grievances and political 
dissatisfaction together escalated pribumi-Chinese tensions. Such tensions were 
controlled when the overall political and economic conditions were good, but when 
conditions became unstable and stressful, the Chinese quickly became targets of mass 
riots. Also, because the government’s attitude towards the Chinese was negative and 
discriminatory, the pribumis felt that they could arbitrarily vent their anger on the 
Chinese without much punishment. As for the Chinese, they had no political, legal or 
institutional protection when resentment against them rose, and their wealth made them 
particularly vulnerable during crisis. Contrarily, in Malaysia, while the federal and state 
elections were always seriously contested, the entire election process served an 
important role in consolidating Malay political supremacy—even though many Chinese 
were rich, their real influence in society and politics was too subtle to be a threat. When 
the Malays felt politically secure, they could be more tolerant towards the Chinese and 
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their wealth. Also, even though some politicians still used ethno-religious differences to 
manipulate the people, they manipulated the people into voting, not into rioting. 
Although there was tension between Malays and Chinese from time to time, those 
tensions did not disrupt the overall stability of Malaysia.  
 
Third, compared with Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore has been much more 
successful in managing ethnic relations. Not only did it deal with ethnic issues more 
fairly, but it also established institutionalized opportunities, such as public housing, the 
school system and its ethnic quotas, for everyday inter-communal contact and 
communication at the grassroots level. The robust trans-ethnic interaction networks in 
Singapore served as what Varshney called “agents of peace” that contributed to its 
harmonious ethnic relations. It should be noted that in post-Suharto Indonesia, along 
with democratization, many inter-/trans-ethnic NGOs also emerged at the local or 
national level. How much these NGOs will contribute to the improvement of ethnic 
relations deserves further investigation. Also, in Malaysia since the 1990s and 
particularly in the 2000s, people witnessed more and more cooperation between Malay 
and Chinese opposition elites and more cases of voting beyond ethnic lines during the 
elections, indicating that Malay-Chinese relations are much closer and promising now at 
both the elite and the mass levels. Most important of all, in the 2008 election the PKR 
became the first-ranked opposition party in the parliament, and it was the first time that 
a multiethnic party gained popular support in an election. Whether the PKR can 
continue to function in this (multiethnic) way also remains to be seen. 
 
Historical Factors in the Ethnic Triangle 
As stated in Chapter I, this study takes the new institutionalist viewpoint that what 
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happened at an earlier point in time will influence the possible outcomes of a sequence 
of events occurring at a later point in time. In other words, “history”, or the past 
experiences of inter-group contact, to a certain degree influences the way a government 
thinks about ethnic issues and manages ethnic relations as well as the ways people 
stereotype and treat others from different ethnic groups. Such historical factors usually 
affect people deeply but rather unconsciously and are hard to examine via quantitative 
or statistical methods, yet they are by no means less important. With this concern in 
mind, Proposition 3 of the ethnic triangle theory suggests that past experiences of 
inter-ethnic contact, as well as past institutions and policies, have a positive impact on 
the current ethnic triangular relations. It would be much easier for two ethnic groups to 
build positive relations if the two groups had more pleasant contact experiences and less 
bad memories in the past. Unfortunately, in the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, and 
Singapore, since the final years of the colonial period, the relationship between the 
Chinese and Malays has been tense and hostile, first due to the Japanese use of locals to 
suppress the Chinese and then due to conflicts of interests during and after 
independence (as stated in Chapter III). Consequently, when the three governments 
were formulating political and socio-economic policies, they had to take such negative 
inter-ethnic relations into account. Also, when a government found that certain policies 
had caused bad results in the past, it would definitely try to change policies and remedy 
the situation in the present. The three shifts in ethnic triangular relations in the three 
countries in the past decades and the corresponding changes (or fine-tunings) of 
institutions and policy orientations well illustrate this point. Here the author only picks 
out one famous example: the victory of Chinese political parties in the 1969 elections 
and the following communal violence in Kuala Lumpur revealed a high degree of 
Malay grievance against the economic and political power of the ethnic Chinese. 
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Therefore, starting in 1971, the Malaysian government practiced a comprehensive 
economic and educational affirmative action program (the NEP) to empower the Malay 
community economically, and in 1973 it also amended the Constitution to consolidate 
Malay superiority in politics. Obviously the Malaysian government had learned lessons 
from the 1969 riots.  
 
The Ethnic Triangle and Ethnic Violence 
The ethnic triangle theory proposes that any player in a lower position in the ethnic 
triangle will seek to elevate its role; while the greater the pressure a player faces, and/or 
the less likely a player may elevate its role, the more violent it tends to behave 
(Propositions 4 to 5). Combined together, in terms of the likelihood of ethnic riots and 
violence, the theory also proposes that other things being equal, the ménage à trois is 
more stable (i.e. mass ethnic violence is less likely to occur) than the romantic triangle, 
the marriage, and the unit-veto triangle, as the “outcasts” in the marriage triangles and 
the “foes” in the unit-veto triangles have more incentives to change the status quo by 
any means (Proposition 6). Also, there are many cases in the three countries to support 
the above propositions. For instance, the Indonesian pribumis from 1950-1965, the 
Malaysian Malays from 1957-1969, and the Malaysian Chinese from 1970-1987, were 
outcast by the other two actors’ marriage, and they all tried to improve their position via 
protests and demonstrations—and even riots—when they felt too disappointed. 
Admittedly, there were also exceptions, such as the Indonesian Chinese from 1966-1998, 
who were too weak to change their outcast status. The other exception is the PAP 
government in Singapore in mid-1980s, which had the ability to practice many reforms 
to upgrade its outcast position.  
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Nevertheless, it should be noted that the three countries, in recent years, have more 
stable triangular situations than they did in the past: Singapore has been in a ménage à 
trois triangle since 1988, and Indonesia has been in a type-2 romantic triangle in which 
the state is the pivot—indicating that the state is capable enough to handle ethnic 
relations even if there are tensions between ethnic groups. As for Malaysia, it swings 
between a ménage à trois triangle and a romantic triangle since 1988. During the 2008 
elections, the Chinese seemed to be beneficial buffer between the government and the 
Malays. Whether or not the Chinese will be able to sustain such advantages, to a large 
degree, relies on the political wisdom of the community’s political elites.  
 
Conclusion: Implications of the “Ethnic Triangle Paradigm” to Future Research 
 
The main purpose of this thesis is to construct a relatively simple but comprehensive 
model to interpret dynamic changes in state-majority-minority relations within a country. 
From the cases of Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, it seems that the “ethnic triangle 
model” can help researchers better understand the contexts and trajectories of 
policy-making, the effects of policies and institutions, the chain responses from the 
respective players, and the changing relationship among the three pivots of the 
“triangle”, i.e. the State, the Chinese, and the indigenous people in these three countries. 
It is too early to claim, but while this thesis only applied the ethnic triangle model in a 
study of State-Chinese-Malay relations in Malaysia and Singapore, and State-Chinese- 
pribumi relations in Indonesia, it is plausible that this model could perhaps be also 
applied to better understand other multiethnic countries in which there is ethnic 
competition and conflict—especially if there are qualified minority group(s) as the third 
player.  
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As a small, albeit arguably relevant, example, take the case of Fiji. According to the 
MAR database (2009), East Indians represent 43 percent of the total population in Fiji, 
whose ethnicity, language (Hindi), and religion (Hindu or Islam) are different from the 
native Fijian majority (50 percent of the population, who are of Melanesian or 
Polynesian descent and are mainly Methodist Christians). During the British colonial 
period (1874- 1970), these two groups were separated from each other primarily due to 
“divide and rule” policies. Consequently, their relations were conspicuously tense as 
Fijians were given political privileges on the one hand, while the East Indians were 
economically advantaged, on the other. Given that the East Indians and the native 
Fijians are of roughly equal numerical balance, it is understandable that after its 
independence (1970) any ethnic group that captured State power would be rejected by 
the other group, given the tendency of the group in power to implement policies which 
were discriminatory against the other group. As it turned out, before 1987, under the 
rule of the Fiji-led Alliance Party (AP), East Indians were cast out. Then the Indian- 
based Fiji Labor Party (FLP) won the 1987 election and tried to change the policy 
preferences of the predecessor government. The ethnic tensions that ensued and other 
contributing pressures were exploited by the military that soon overthrown the 
government in a coup, resulted in widespread communal violence. In 1990, the native 
Fijian Great Council of Chiefs approved the new, racially-biased, constitution which 
entrenched indigenous political domination through the reservation of legislative seats. 
Naturally, the East Indians protested against what they saw as a biased constitution and 
their repeatedly objections led to a new, relatively equitable, constitution that was 
approved in 1997. In 1999 the FLP won the election and the country was once again 
ruled by East Indians, after which some extreme elements within the native Fijian 
community reacted by engaging in violent attacks and anti-government demonstrations. 
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Compounding the unstable ethnic imbroglio were regular disputes and conflicts relating 
to the sensitive issue of renewals of the land leases. The coups, changes of governments, 
communal demonstrations and violence that ensued, led to interventions by various 
international forces but they were all unsuccessful. After the United Fiji Party formed 
the new government in 2001 and newer attempts to moderate communal unhappiness 
(such as the inclusion of East Indians in the Cabinet in 2005), inter-communal conflicts 
seemed to decrease, albeit gradually.  
 
Admittedly, it is rather too premature to claim the applicability of the “ethnic triangle 
model” to cases such as the Fijian experience, and by extension, to similar situations in 
other countries. In Fiji, at least before 2005, the ethnic triangle kept swinging back and 
forth between type-7 and type-6 triangles, as outlined in earlier chapters. In the former 
cases, the minority (the East Indian) was the outcast, who suffered various kinds of 
discrimination and thus tried to change their status quo via violent ways. In the latter 
cases, the majority (the native Fijian) soon became the outcast and thus also reacted to 
safeguard its interests, thereby initiating coups (vertical anti-state violence) and anti- 
East Indian riots (horizontal inter-ethnic violence). New studies and research about Fiji 
are required to find answers of how various institutional and policy factors and 
interactions between ethnic groups and the State contribute to the repeated transfers of 
power and inter-communal violence and whether the Fijians can move toward a more 
equitable and greater lasting ethnic relationship. 
 
Meanwhile, it is probable that, besides the experiences of Fijians and East Indians in Fiji, 
the dynamic and ever-changing relationships between the 78 ethnic groups as listed in 
Table 3-1 and their corresponding governments, as well as their group competitors— 
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among many more other cases which are not mentioned in Table 3-1—can also be 
understood and interpreted via the “ethnic triangle” theoretical model. While there are 
the usual claims of differentiating contexts and circumstances that limits the 
applicability of theories and models of research—and these needed to be noted—it 
might still be possible to utilize a model such as this “ethnic triangle” framework in 
quite a few countries where the history, political system, cultures and related 
imperatives have semblance to the three countries studied in this particular thesis, 
namely, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.  
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Newspapers, Magazines, and Website Resources 
Asiaweek 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, various issues. 
Business Times, various issues. 
Economist, various issues.  
Far Eastern Economic Review, various issues. 




Swivel Preview (http://www.swivel.com) 
The Economist, various issues. 
The Jakarta Post, various issues. 
The Straits Times (Singapore), various issues. 
The Times, various issues. 
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APPENDIX A:  
Employed MAR Variables in Chapter III 
Variable Implication Value and Label 
1. Employed Minority at Risks Variables as Case Selection Criteria: 
For an ethnic group to be selected in chapter III, it must meet ALL three following criteria: 
(1) Group’s population > 100,000; (2) Group proportion of country population > 2.5%; (3) GOJPA ≧ 2 
Exceptions (cases with * in Table 3-1): Groups which do not meet criteria (1) or (2) BUT  
whose GROUPCON ≧2 AND GOJPA ≧ 4 will also be selected 
GROUPCON Groups spatial 
distribution 
0  Widely dispersed 
1  Primarily urban or minority in one region 
2  Majority in one region, others dispersed 






0  No political movements or organizations representing group interests 
1  Group interests promoted by umbrella organizations 
2  Group interests promoted by one or more conventional political parties/movements 
3  Group interests promoted mainly by conventional movements/parties but also by 
militant organizations with limited support 
4  Group interests promoted mainly by militant organizations but also by some 
conventional organizations 
5  Group interests promoted only by militant organizations 




Annual indicators. . Missing values: -99. 
0  None manifest 
1  Acts of harassment: individual acts against property/persons with no fatalities 
2  Political agitation: Campaigns urging authorities to impose restrictions on group 
3  Sporadic violent attacks: by gangs or other small groups. Some fatal actions 
4  Anti-group demonstrations : Rallies, marches 
5  Communal rioting: Armed attacks 
6  Communal warfare: Protracted, large-scale inter-group violence  
PROT Protest 0  None reported 
1  Verbal opposition  
Requests by a minority-controlled regional group for independence (public letters, 
petitions, posters, publications, agitation, court action, etc.). 
2  Symbolic resistance  
Sabotage, symbolic destruction of property OR political organizing activity on a 
substantial scale (e.g. sit-ins, blockage of traffic). 
3  Small demonstrations  
A few demonstrations, rallies, strikes, and/or riots, the largest of which has total 
participation of less than 10,000. 
4  Medium demonstrations (total participation between 10,000 and 100,000) 
5  Large demonstrations (total participation over 100,000) 
REB Rebellion 0  None reported 
1  Political banditry, sporadic terrorism (< 6 events) 
2  Campaigns of terrorism (> 6 events) 
3  Local rebellion 
   Armed attempts to seize power in a locale except cases that are the beginning of a 
protracted guerrilla or civil war during the reported year. 
4  Small-scale guerrilla activity  
Includes all 3 of the following traits: < 1000 armed fighters, sporadic armed attacks 
(<6 reported per year), and attacks in a small part of the area occupied by the group. 
5  Intermediate guerrilla activity  
Includes 1-2 of the defining traits of the above and 1-2 of the below. 
6  Large-scale guerrilla activity  
Includes all three of the following traits: > 1000 armed fighters, frequent armed 
attacks (>6 reported per year), and attacks affecting large part of the area occupied 
by the group. 
7  Civil war/protracted civil war fought by rebel military 
   Has all the characteristics of large-scale guerrilla activity, plus rebels control large 
scale base areas that are secure over time. 




Based on the total number of differences checked for 18 indicators. Maximum 
possible score is 18. Missing Values: -99. 




Summing the weight of eight types of cultural policy restrictions: religion, use of 
language, language instruction, ceremonies, appearance (e.g. dress), family life (e.g. 




Summing the weight of nine types of cultural policy restrictions: freedom of 
expression, freedom of movement, rights in judicial proceedings, restrictions on 
organizing, restrictions on voting rights, policy/military recruitment, civil service 




0  No discrimination 
1  Neglect/remedial policies  
Significant poverty and under-representation in desirable occupations due to 
historical marginality, neglect, or restrictions. Public policies are designed to 
improve the group’s material well being. 
2  Neglect/No remedial policies  
No social practice of deliberate exclusion. Few or no public policies aim at 
improving the group’s material well-being. 
3  Social exclusion/neutral policy  
Significant poverty and under-representation due to prevailing social practice by 
dominant groups. Formal public policies toward the group are neutral or, if positive, 
inadequate to offset active and widespread discrimination 
4  Exclusion/restrictive policy  
Public policies (formal exclusion and/or recurring repression) substantially restrict 
the group’s economic opportunities by contrast with other groups. 
4. Independent Variables taken from Freedom House and World Bank 
FREEDOM Freedom status 
(country) 
1  Free 
2  Partly Free 
3  Not Free 
According to Freedom House, countries whose combined average ratings for Political 
Rights (PR) and for Civil Liberties (CL) fell between 1.0 and 2.5 were designated 
"Free"; between 3.0 and 5.5 “Partly Free," and between 5.5 and 7.0 “Not Free.” Both 
PR and CL are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest 
degree of Freedom and seven the lowest.  
INCOME Income status 
(country) 
1  High Income country 
2  Upper Middle Income country 
3  Lower Middle Income country 
4  Low 
 According to World Bank, countries are classified as low income, lower middle 
income, upper middle income, or high income, based on each country’s GNI per 
capita in US$.  
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APPENDIX B-1:  
State-Pribumi-Chinese Conflict Incidents and Government Responses, Indonesia 
Date Place Crisis (Pol/Eco/Soc-Cul) and/or Incidents Damages (esp. Chinese) & Government Response 
The Dutch colonial period and the Japanese occupation (before 1945) 
1740 Jakarta (then Batavia) Chinese v.s. the ruling Dutch 6,000 killed 
1912 Solo; Surabaya anti-Sinicism n.a. 
1918 Kudus anti-Sinicism, by members of Sarekat Islam (SI) n.a. 
Mar/1942 Java; Sumatra Directly by the Japanese (against suspected dissidents) n.a. 
Oct/1943 “Pontianak Affair” large-scale arrests to suppress a suspected rebellion Of the 1500 killed by the Japanese, 854 were Chinese 
The war for Independence (Aug 1945 – Dec 1949) 
10/Nov/1945 Surabaya n.a. 58 killed; 13 injured; 1 missing; 43 houses damaged 
23/Mar/1946 Bandung n.a. 54 killed; 50 injured; 36 missing; 5020 houses damaged 
6-8/Jun Tangerang, Java  656 killed (136 women, 36 children); 496 injured; 403 
missing; 3409 houses damaged 
18/Sept Bagansiapiapi  239 killed; 52 injured 
01/Jan/1947 Palembang 
The suspicion on the part of the Indonesian nationalists 
that the Chinese were pro-Dutch 
256 killed; 114 injured; 594 missing; 3060 houses 
damaged 
20/Jul Java Timur (E. Java) 
Java Barat (W. Java) 
Java Tengah (C. Java) 
Sumatra 
Anti-Dutch “1st police action” 164 killed; 50 injured; 165 missing; 1849 arrested 
83 killed; 18 injured; 52 missing; 7233 arrested 
406 killed; 8 injured; 180 missing; 6559 arrested 




Anti-Dutch “2nd police action” 7 killed; 5 injured; 2 missing; 389 houses damaged 
757 killed; 89 injured; 9221 arrested 
26 killed; 18 injured; 52 arrested 




Bandung, Sukabumi, & 
cities in W Java 
Cirebon 
Anti-Chinese sentiment under the PKI shadow  fights 
b/t students of ITB riots 
n.a. 
Late 1965~67 Java & Sumatra Anti-Communism & Anti-Chinese 500000~1000000 killed, most were NOT Chinese 
10/Nov/1965 Makassar  
(S. Sulawesi) 
Riots by Muslim student and youth organizations, HMI 
& ANSOR 
The targets were Chinese buildings and other property 
rather than people 
10/Dec Medan An attack on the Chinese consulate  police shots  
rampage of the city 
About 200 killed 
Apr, Aug, Oct 
1967 
Jakarta “The Ling Siang Yu affair” an anti-Chinese mob 
attacked the mourning Chinese  anti-communist 
youths launched a demonstration and broke into the 
Chinese embassy  
3 killed; >20 injured 
Oct-Nov W. Kalimantan Killings of Dayaks by Chinese communists/PGRS 
guerrillas  riots by Dayaks against Chinese civilians 
Thousands of Chinese killed, more than 50,000 refugees 
18/Oct/1968 ? The execution of 2 Indonesian marines by Singapore 
caused anti-Chinese riots 
Many houses, shops and property of the ethnic Chinese 
destroyed 
The 1970s and 1980s: The New Order 
27/Jun/1973 Palu S-Cul: a Chinese shop owner uses a paper w/ Qur’an to 
pack, which was regarded as impiety 
Chinese-owned shops were attacked 
5/Aug Bandung (W. Java) S-Cul: a VW car with Chinese knocked down a local 
people on the road  ECO.: rice shortage 
1 killed; 23 hospitalized; 1500 shops and houses damaged; 
cost: 1000000 rupiah 
mid-Jan/1974 Jakarta 
“the Malari riot” 
ECO: thousands of students protested to oppose 
excessive Japanese investment, rising prices, and 
corruption  turned into an anti-Chinese riot 
11 killed; >800 detained; >100 buildings burned; >800 
cars destroyed; thousands of shops looted. [*e.g. “Astra”, 
a local firm which imported Toyota automobiles, owned 
by a Chinese family, was burned] 
Apr/1980 Makassar S-Cul: (rumor) a servant in a Chinese family, Suharti, 
died because of her boss’s maltreatment 
> 100 Chinese-owned houses and shops destroyed 
Apr Medan (Sumatra) S-Cul: anti-Chinese demonstration by USU students 





Solo Semarang  
Magelang, Pekalongan, 
Kukus, towns of C Java 
S-Cul: student fight w/ ethnic-Chinese involved  In total: 8 killed; 14 injured; >680 arrested; 240 Chinese 
shops, 230 homes, 23 factories, 32 office buildings, and 1 
school damaged 
12/Sept/1984  Tanjung Priok  C & E 
Java 
POL: anti-government’s Bill on Mass Organizations  
SOC-CUL: C/E Java were flooded w/ underground 
pamphlets inciting the faith to take up arms to defend 
their religion against those who would destroy Islam 
The 1st bombings were of the Bank Central Asia, part of 
the holdings of Liem Sioe Liong (Chinese tycoon); 28 
were killed 
 
Jan/1985 Borobudur POL/S-Cul: last year’s riots spilled over Buddhist images were bombed; the palace of the 
Susuhuman of Solo was burned 
Early Jul Jakarta POL/S-Cul: last year’s riots spilled over The Metro shopping center in Chinatown was destroyed in 
a fire; the headquarters of Radio Republik Indonesia was 
gutted in a major blaze; 60 buildings in a Jakarta 
commercial district were flamed 
Sept 1986 Surabaya S-Cul.: a girl servant claimed being maltreated by her 
Chinese boss 
Chinese-owned cars and shops were burned 
The 1990s: the Last Years of the Suharto Regime 
1/Jan/1994 n.a. Trishaw riders vs. police for an accident Chinese shops and vehicles were looted and destroyed 
Mid-Apr Medan POL: anti-government labor protest  anti-Chinese riot 
[* the most serious anti-Chinese riot in N Sumatra in the 
past 12 years] 
4 Chinese killed; >150 Chinese-owned stores destroyed; a 
dozen factories destroyed; some 50 vehicles overturned 
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26/Jul/1995 Banjarmasin (S. 
Kalimantan) 
S-Cul: an argument b/t a shopkeeper and a customer At least 7 Chinese-owned shops destroyed 
2-4/Nov Purwakarta (W. Java) S-Cul: (rumor) a 14-yr old Muslim girl of a local shop 
was slapped by her Chinese boss for stealing chocolate 
> 20,000 people rampaged the business center; 18 shops, 2 
warehouses, 3 houses and 9 vehicles were destroyed 
24-26/Nov Pekalongan (M Java) S-Cul: a Chinese tore pages from the Qur’an  Property owned by the ethnic Chinese was ransacked 
14/Jan/1996 Bandung (W. Java) S-Cul: people couldn’t get ticket of a rock concert Chinese businesses and vehicles were targeted 
27/Jul Jakarta  
*PDI headquarters  
POL: anti-Suharto riots after the gov’t-supported 
ousting of Megawati as leader of the IDP 
[* the most violent riots in 3 decades in Jakarta] 
5 killed; 30 missing; 149 wounded; >20 buildings, 9 
banks, and 100 vehicles were burned; Chinese businesses 
were specifically attacked 
10/Oct Situbondo (E. Java) POL/relig: > 3000 Muslims rioted after a court decision 
to impose only 5-yr prison sentence on a Muslim leader 
who was charged w/ insulting Islam 
5 killed (Christian); 25 churches were burnt; a Chinese 
temple and dozens of Chinese-owned stores were 
vandalized 
16/Dec Tasikmalaya (W. Java) POL/relig: thousands of Muslims rioted for the police’s 
mistreatment of a Muslim teacher and 2 senior Islamic 
students – who were beaten in a city jail for disciplining 
a policeman’s son 
2 of the 4 dead were Chinese; Chinese businesses & 
Christian churches were targeted; >100 buildings (police 
stations, churches, factories, shops, schools, banks) were 
burned—cost $36 million 
27/Jan/1997 Tanah Abang (Jabotabek) n.a. A factory was burned down 
30/Jan Rengasdengklok (W. Java) S-Cul: a Chinese complained about the noise made by 
Muslims who were observing Ramadan 
4 killed (1 Chinese); 3 churches, 2 Buddhist temples, 42 
shops, 76 houses, 2 banks, 3 factories—many owned by 
the Chinese, were attacked; 21 rioters were arrested 
18/Feb Bandung (W. Java) n.a. n.a. 
27/Mar Pekalongan (C. Java) POL: Golkar vs. the PPP for the 29 May elections > 60 buildings, mostly Chinese, were damaged 
23/May Banjarmasin (S. 
Kalimantan) 
POL: riots almost daily during the election. A fire 
occurred when thousands of Golkar and PPP supporters 
rampaged through the city 
130 people were killed as fire engulfed a shopping center; 
some churches and a Buddhist temple were burnt along w/ 
Chinese-owned businesses 
2/Jun Kadipaten (W. Java) S-Cul: (rumor) a Chinese shop boss strip- searched a 
female accused of shoplifting 
Chinese properties and 3 churches were attacked 
9/Sept Tangerang (Jabotabek) n.a. n.a. 
15/Sept Ujung Pandang (Sulawesi) S-Cul: a Chinese man Benny w/ mental disease 
allegedly murdered a 9-yr-old Muslim girl 
6 people killed (including Benny); 62 houses burned; 4 
churches/ temples destroyed. The damage to 1471 homes 
and stores was valued at 17.5 billion rupiah ($1.8 million) 
5/Jan/1998 Bandung (W Java) POL: 1000s against mishandled official attempts to 
clean up roadside stalls  anti-Chinese riots 
100s of shops along 5 km stretch of road in the area of 
Cicadas destroyed, including Marahari Dept. store 
12-13/Jan Genteng (W Java); 
Glenmore, Jajag, Kalibaru, 
Rogojampi, Srono, 
Singojuruh (E Java) 
100s of Chinese-owned warehouses, stores, and vehicles 
were damaged 
12-16/Jan Jember and surrounds (E 
Java); Banyuwangi (W 
Java) 
Many Chinese shops were attacked; Sumber Mas, 2nd 
biggest dept store/shopping center was destroyed 
24/Jan Probolinggo (E Java) n.a. 
26/Jan~3/Feb Pakisaji, Rembang, 
Kragan, Tuban (C & E 
Java); Banyuwangi 
ECO: against increase in the prices of basic goods, 
kerosene (also anti-government) 
2 churches, >15 Chinese stores, >17 shops destroyed; 
A Chinese-owned rice milling company was attacked 
28-30/Jan Bulu, Jatirogo, Palang, 
Rembang, Tambakboy (E 
Java) 
ECO: coincides w/ Islamic holiday Idul Fitri b/c the 
celebration food costs too high 
Chinese-owned shops were looted; a Pentecostal church in 
Bulu was destroyed 
1-4/Feb Ujung Pandang (S. 
Sulawesi); Donggala (C 
Sulawesi); Sukarame (W 
Java); Malang, Pasuruan, 
Puger (E Java); Bandar 
Lampung 
Stoned about 6 Chinese shops and street lamps in 
Donggala; Chinese-owned kerosene shops in Malang; and 
dozens of Chinese-owned shops in Ujung Pandang 
6/Feb Brebes (C Java); Bima (W 
Nusa Tenggara) 
Warehouses of Chinese wholesalers of basic goods looted; 
Chinese-owned shops, 1 hotel, 1 shopping mall damaged. 
7/Feb Bojonegoro (E Java) “Langgeng” attacked (Chinese-owned; largest store in the 
area selling basic commodities) 
8/Feb Ende, Lombok (E & W 
Nusa Tenggara) 
>21 Chinese-owned shops destroyed; 71 shops looted; 
ethnic- Chinese sought sanctuary w/ the military & police   
11/Feb Palu (C Sulawesi) n.a. 
12/Feb Losari (Yogyakarta) 2 young were shot; 5 injured; 40 Chinese properties 
damaged; merchandise thrown into streets & burned 
12-16/Feb Bulakamba, Gebang, 
Purwokerto, Brebes (C 
Java); Bandung, Ciasem, 
Ciledug, Cirebon, Patrol, 
Sukamandi (W Java) 
6 killed; 10 injured; >150 Chinese-owned stores, hotels, 
restaurants burned & looted; 3 churches burn; Chinese 
families shelter in police stations/fled 
12-14/Feb Jatiwangi (W. Java) 25 Chinese stores burned; about 30 houses damaged 
13/Feb Pamanukan (W Java); 
Padang Siampuan (N 
Sumatra) 
n.a. 
14/Feb Lumajang (E Java); 
Sentani (Irian Jaya); Praya 
(Lombok) 
ECO & S-Cul: against rising prices of basic goods, food 
shortages, mass unemployment 
S-Cul: anti-Chinese graffiti – Chinese are blamed for the 
above problems 
7 killed and >26 injured; 150 Chinese businesses 
destroyed 
14/Feb Kendari (SE Sulawesi) S-Cul.: anti-Chinese riots have been provoked by 
conservative Islamic scholars who called for a jihad 
against financial speculators and commodity hoarders. 
> 6000 rioted; Chinese-owned properties were attacked 
16/Feb Pagaralam (S Sumatra) n.a. n.a. 
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10/May Medan (N Sumatra) POL.: Anti-government rioting  
Note: this is the worst unrest in Medan since 1994 









Solo (C Java), Medan 
Padang (W Sumatra), 
Palembang (Lampung), 
Yogyakarta 
POL: 6 student protestors were shot by police forces  
the massive anti-Suharto riots  ECO-CUL: 
anti-Chinese riots 
 
Total: > 2,200 people killed; 168 women raped; > 25,000 
foreigners & Chinese fled the country b/t May 13~20 
* Trisakti Students shooting: 4 killed, 16 injured 
* Jakarta riots: 1188 killed, 1339 injured, 152 raped, 6230 
buildings destroyed, 1948 cars/motors burned 
* Solo riots: 30 killed, 20 disappeared, 338 buildings 
destroyed, 919 cars/motors burned, 10 raped 
Post-Suharto Period 
29/May/1998 Jeneponto (S Sulawesi) * Reasons not clear, but this is one of the first outbreaks 
of violence since Suharto resigned 
Chinese shops were targeted 
15-16/Jun Tegal (C Java) and other 3 
Java towns 
POL-ECO.: protesting against corruption and rising 
food prices  
Peaceful protests turn violent as thousands attack Chinese 
properties 
26/Jun Purworejo (C Java) n.a. Chinese businesses are among others targeted 




Wonosori (E Java); 
Cilacap (C Java); 
Lombok 
n.a. Wonosori: 1000s looted rice mills owned by the Chinese; 
Cilacap: >10000 fishermen set fire to 10 trawlers owned 
by the Chinese 
31/Aug Aceh POL.: triggered by anti-military sentiments, targeting 
the Chinese 
2 killed; Chinese businesses are attacked during two days 
of rioting by some 2,000 people 
2/Sept Medan (N Sumatra) n.a. n.a. 
7-9/Sept 1. Kebumen (C. Java); 2. 
Jakarta & Surabaya 
1. S-Cul.: (rumor) a Chinese boss hit a pribumi worker. 
2. ECO.: against the rising prices of basic goods 
Chinese properties are attacked; 9 Chinese shops burned 
8-9/Sept Pontianak (W 
Kalimantan) 
The hiking food prices made people who cannot buy 
them plundered stores 
n.a. 
15/Sept Riau, Jambi S-Cul.: (rumor) a Chinese killed a pribumi in a traffic 
accident 
3,000 people rampage through; government offices and 
around 400 buildings owned by the Chinese are torched. 
13/Nov Jakarta 9 demonstrators (against Habibie) were shot by police 
near Atma Jaya Univ.  looting and general disorder 
[Protests spread to Bandung, Surabaya, Yogya, Semarang, 
Padang Bali, Medan, Balikpapan, Samarinda and Ambon] 
4/Dec Pare (S Sulawesi) n.a. n.a. 
8/Dec Luwu (S Sulawesi) n.a. n.a. 
25/Dec Poso (S Sulawesi) n.a. 79 injured’ 130 houses, 7 shops, 12 government offices, 
and 15 cars destroyed 
9/Jan/1999 Kerawang (W. Java) n.a. Mobs attacked Chinese properties; 7 killed; 19 injured; 31 
shops destroyed; 7 cars burned 
8/Mar Bandung (W Java) Religious: Muslims vs. Catholic Chinese >80 buildings, 1 shop, 2 cars, and 1 school destroyed 
Early Apr W. Kalimantan S-Cul: b/t Madurese settlers, Dayaks, and the Chinese; 
but mainly b/t Dayak & the Madurese. 
More than 200 people were killed 
15/Apr Jakarta n.a. A bomb exploded in a Chinese-owned department store 




Jakarta, Bandung, Medan, 
Ujungpandang, 
Lampung, Semarang 







POL: against resort & industrial developers begin on 
Bintan (Riau)  S-Cul: victims were the Chinese and 
the Christians  
> 15 churches, central business (mainly Chinese-owned) 
and hundreds of houses burned; >1200 people dislocated 
18/Feb/2001 Selat Panjang (Riau) A gambling dispute triggered an anti-Chinese riot A police station, housing for families of policeman, and 
many Chinese-owned shops were burned; 16 Chinese 
were killed; >2000 Chinese fled to Pekanbaru, Karimun 
island, and other locations. 
10/May/2006 Makassar A Chinese man allegedly tortured his indigenous 
housemaid to death  thousand of people poured onto 
the streets to vent their anger over the case 
n.a. 
Sources: data before 1994 are collected from various Asian Survey annual reports and other academic articles; data after 1994 
are based on reports from Jakarta Post, Far Eastern Economic Review, Sejarah Indonesia (Indonesian Matters), and Purdey 
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APPENDIX B-2:  
State-Malay-Chinese Conflict Incidents and Government Responses, Malaysia 
Date Place Crisis and/or Incidents Damages & Government Response 
1945-47 Batu Pahat (45/46) 
Batu Malim (Raub) 
Batu Kikir (46) 
POL: the Communist threat in Malaya  
 communal clashes 
** 1948-1960: the 1st time use of Emergency powers 
Jan/1958 Penang n.a.  
May/1959 Pangkor S-Cul.: a quarrel b/t Chinese & Malay A large-scare evacuation of 2,000 Chinese of the island 
21/Jul/1961  Utusan Melayu Strike—when Utusan Melayu was forcibly 
taken over by the UMNO 
 
Jul-Sept/1964 Singapore S-Cul.: (rumor) “the Chinese are planning to kill Malays 
who walk alone in areas where the Chinese predominate”  
2 riots; 30 killed 
12/Jul/1964 Wellesley  2 killed; the 2nd time use of Emergency powers 
1966 Sarawak POL.: Oust opposition (SNAP) Chief Minister the 3rd time use of Emergency powers 
1967 Bukit Mertajam Communal clashes  
Nov-Dec/ 
1967 
Penang POL.: a strike by the Chinese Labor Party against a 
currency devaluation the killing of 2 Malays led to riots 
targeting the Chinese 




KL & big cities of W. 
Malaysia 
POL.: after election + ECO. 
 
196 killed (143 Chinese), 1109 injured, and 9143 arrested.  
The 4TH time use of Emergency powers; arrested Lim Kit 
Siang (DAP), V. David (Gerakan), and many activists. 
1973  S-Cul.: The Chinese was outraged by the exam language  
Dec/1974 KL Hundreds of Muslim students led by ABIM protested 
against peasant hunger and poverty 
Arrested 1200 of the protesters under ISA 
1975-77  POL.: succession crisis within UMNO 
(P.M. Razak died in Jan 1976) 
Jun/76: 2 journalists were arrested and accused of 
involvement “in a Communist scheme”  
Nov/76: 2 deputy ministers, 1 MCA official, 2 DAP MPs & 
the chairman of the PSRM were arrested under the ISA. 
Sept/1976 Kelantan PAS quarrel against central on timber issue  rioting State of emergency; 3 PAS ministers resigned 
1977-78 Kelantan POL.: friction b/t PAS & UMNO in the state government 
 Oct. 15, 1977: several demonstrations in Kota Baru & 
other towns 
The expulsion of PAS from the BN in Sept/77; the police 
imposed a curfew in Oct/19; the 5th time proclamation of 
emergency (until Mar/78’s election) 
1979 Kerling <extremist Muslim actions>  
16/Oct/1980 Batu Pahat? <extremist Muslim actions> suicide raid attack on a police 
station 
8 killed, 23 injured 
1982  S-Cul.: Primary school education emphasizes Malay 
language ability 
 
Aug/1982 Kuala Terengganu A fight between UMNO and PAS supporters One person being killed 
1983-84  POL.: constitutional crisis Government used police powers to stop any activity that 
might be a threat to national security and public order 
1985 Baling <extremist Muslim actions> 18 killed, 160 arrested 
1985 Padang Terap (Kedah 
state) 
A fight between UMNO and PAS supporters in the 
by-election campaign 
A PAS member was killed and several others injured 
Nov/1985 Kampong Memali 
(Kedah) 
An arrest of Ibrahim Mahmood, a local religious teacher 
and an ex-PAS electoral candidate, resulted in a clash b/t 
the police and 400 armed villagers 
18 people including 4 policemen killed 
Mar-May 1986 Sabah POL+S-Cul.: Muslims riot to destabilize a government 
representing after the 1985 state election 
* Burned shops, cars, attacked police; 5 killed 
1987 Kuala Lumpur ECO+POL: recession + intra-Malay split 
S-Cul: protests against government’s educational policy 
led by Chinese  counter-protests by Malays 
* (Oct/27-Nov/14) 119 dissidents were arrested; 49 were 
served w/ 2-yr detention orders (34 were Chinese); rallies 
were prohibited; 3 newspapers were suspended 
1994  POL.: anti-government’s ban of a Muslim sect, 
Al-Arquam, in early August 
9 Al-Arquam members were held in detention under the 
Internal Security Law 
1997-98  ECO.: (December) Ringgit de-valued 60% (Sept/98) 4 people were arrested under the penal code for 
spreading rumors on the internet about communal violence 
1998 Kampung Pawa, 
Penang 
A minor communal clash n.a. 
1998-2000 KL Anwar’s arrest & trial causes periodically street protests A wave of arrests  
2000 KL UMNO Youth held a rally against Suqiu’s demand of 
ending Malay rights 
Mahathir’s National Day speech: blacken Suqiu as an 
extreme group 
28/Apr/2007 Ijok (Selangor) In Ijko by-election a violent clash b/t BN and PKR 
supporters on nomination day. 
n.a. 
8/Sept Batu Buruk 
(Terengganu) 
A rally to campaign for electoral reforms turned violent 
when the riot police forcefully tried to break it up 
The police fired several shots and injured a number of 
supporters 
10/Nov KL “The BERSIH demonstration”—estimated 40,000 to 
60,000 people to participate—to pass a memorandum 
calling for electoral reforms to the Agong 
Peaceful except in a couple of locations where riot police 
shot tear gas and used water cannons; 29 were arrested and 
17 later charged for a variety of violations 
Late Nov KL “The HINDRAF demonstration” by Indians Police dispersed the masses by tear gas 
Sources: pre-1969 data are from Horowitz (2001); post-1969 data are collected from various Asian Survey annual reports, 
New Straits Times, Far Eastern Economic Review, Azeem (2005), Christie & Roy (2001), Crouch (1996), and Lee (2008). 
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APPENDIX B-3:  
State-Chinese-Malay Conflict Incidents and Government Responses, Singapore 
Dates Crisis and/or Incidents Damages & Government Response 
12/Dec/ 
1950 
“The Maria Hertogh Riots” – anti-government riots by 
the Muslims against a court verdict 
* N. Bridge Rd; Jalan Besar areas 
18 dead; damaged including 1 military & 2 police vans outside the 
Sultan Mosque 
- 20 Dec: imposed a 7-day curfew after a police inspector died. 




“The Hock Lee Bus Company Riots”—by 2000 students 
and labor unionists in Alexandra Rd & Tiong Bahru 
4 dead, 31 injured 
- government banned 2 pro-communist organizations and dissolved 
SCMSSU 
24-29/Oct “The Chinese High School riots” 13 dead, >100 injured 
1963 “The Operation Cold Store” detentions The arrests of 115 (pro-communist) BS leaders, journalists, and trade 
unionists under the ISA ( 1966: the 2ND wave of arrests) 
7/July/ 
1964 
“The prophet Muhammad Birthday Riots” – competition 
b/t UMNO & PAP became inter-ethnic riots b/t the 
Malays & the Chinese 
* Kallang; Geylang Serai, Chinatown areas 
22 dead, 460 injured  
- 12-days curfew until 2 August 
- arrested 2516 – 600 members of Chinese secret societies; 256 
possessing weapons; 1660 breaking curfew 
3/Sept/ Began w/ a death of a rickshaw driver + Indonesian 
paratroopers and agents 
* Geylang; Joo Chiat, Siglap 
187 incidents caused 12 dead; 23 seriously wounded; 64 injured  
- curfew; 480 arrested under the ISA 
- with Malaysian soldiers assistance  
- soft measures i.e. speeches, visits, shelters 
- “goodwill committee” in all 51 constituencies in July to help the 
Malays receive social welfare and job opportunities  
- 15 “peace committees” in the area mostly affected by the riots 
- ask local press to behave 
Mid-1969 Spill-over rioting from the May riots in Malaysia 4 dead, 60 injured, >100 arrested 
1971 “The detention of Nanyang Siang Pau editors” – 
journalists criticized state’s education and language 
policy 
- government arrested 4 members of the editorial & managerial staff 
of the Nanyang iang Pau for their “systematic campaign to work up 
racial feelings” and to create political instability sponsored by foreign 
forces 
- a similar charge also brought against the Eastern Sun, an English 
language paper “financed by communist agents in HK 
- The Singapore Herald, a local newspaper, was sued for foreclosure 
for a loan default by the Chase Manhattan Bank for a sum of $1.03 
million the same year; license was withdrawn 
1975-77 Several student protests in late 1974 The arrests of “suspected communists” 
1975-80 The Nantah Issue: the Chinese community was against 
the government’s decision to end the Nanyang 
University 
Nanyang University merged with the University of Singapore to 
created the NUS in 1980 
Jan/1982 “The arrests of 10 SPLO members” whipped up Malays’ 
resentment 
The government further tightened its grip on the media 
Late 1986 “The Herzog Incident”—the Malays protested against 
the visit of Israeli President Chaim Herzog 




“The Marxist conspiracy” The government arrested 22 activists of the Catholic Church and the 
Workers’ Party who allegedly tried to subvert Singapore 
1999 “The Istana Kampong Gelam and Malay Heritage Centre 
Issue” – Malay newspaper reports arose the doubt of 
state policy 
- A number of the government’s Malay MPs and prominent 
personalities were utilized to explain the situation 
- Foreign Minister issued a statement: the Malaysian media’s 
involvement in matters that affect local Malays constitutes 
interference in domestic politics w/ a potential to destabilize ethnic 
relations and could harm bilateral ties b/t the 2 countries 
Dec/2001, 
Aug/2002 
The arrests of 34 JI members (who planned bomb 
attacks against the US embassy, Changi Airport, etc) 
Local Malay first inflamed when officials called the alleged terrorists 




“The Tudung issue” – disagreement b/t the parents of 4 
Malay-Muslim girls and the Ministry of Education on 
the wearing of headscarfs during school hours  
- not allowed to change school attire 
- the government garner ground support from the larger Malay 
community through its MPs & religious authorities and organizations 
like the Mufti and MUIS. 
- Against foreign interference: official statements plus rejected an 
employment-pass application from a Malaysian lawyer to represent 
the families of those affected by the tudung issue. 
2005 Some Chinese bloggers used pictures and insulted words 
to humiliate Malay Muslims online 
The government arrested three bloggers under the Sedition Act (the 
first time since 1966) 
Note: data gathered from various Asian Survey annual reports, Straits Times, Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Ganesan Narayanan (c2004: 41-64), and Lee (2000: 38-39). 
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Indonesia 5.7 1.8 -2.2 3.5 1.1 2.8 1.4 6.9 10.9 7.5 7 7 8.1 7.6 5 6.9 8.9 7.7 6.3 9.9 7.6 2.2 4.2 7 2.5 5.9 4.9 5.8 7.5 7.2 7 6.5 6.8 7.5 8.2 7.8 4.7 -13.1 0.8 5.4 3.6 4.5 4.8 5 5.7 5.5 6.3
Malay sia 7.6 6.4 7.3 5.4 7.7 7.8 3.9 8 4.9 6 5.8 9.4 11.7 8.3 0.8 11.6 7.8 6.7 9.4 7.4 6.9 5.9 6.3 7.8 -0.9 1.2 5.4 9.9 9.1 9 9.5 8.9 9.9 9.2 9.8 10 7.3 -7.4 6.1 8.7 0.5 5.4 5.8 6.8 5.3 5.8 6.3
Singapore 12.5 13.3 11.3 6.8 4 7.2 7.8 8.6 9.3 9.7 9.7 7.1 8.5 8.3 -1.4 2.1 9.8 11.5 10 9.2 6.6 6.3 11.7 11.6 8.2 7.8 8.3 -1.4 7.2 10.1 -2.4 4.2 3.5 9 7.3 8.2 7.7
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
 
Sources: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (1980-2008); Sundrum (1986: 42) for Indonesia 1961-1973; Sundrum (1988: 43) for Indonesia 1974-1979; 
NationMaster.com for Malaysia 1961-1979; Swivel Preview for Singapore 1971-1979. 
